Processes of Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Significance of Opposition Competitiveness in Dominant Party Systems

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Abstract

In this monograph, first, I argue that democratization in sub-Saharan Africa can be successful, even if the government is dominated by one major political party. Indeed, a competitive opposition party (even if too weak to take power) can force the dominant government party to be more responsive to voter demands overall and to limit clientelistic practices. This thesis stands in contrast to much of the recent literature on democratization in Africa, which generally views dominant government parties as incompatible with democratic consolidation and responsiveness.
Second, I argue that the most important factor for explaining competitiveness degrees of contemporary opposition party systems in African dominant party systems lies in historical legacies of cleavages around the time of independence that were able to spill over into contemporary third wave party competition.
These arguments are tested in a mixed-methods design, which is based on a quantitative analysis of 53 elections in third wave African dominant party systems and an ensuing in-depth model-testing comparative analysis of four African cases.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Studie zeigt, dass Demokratisierungsprozesse in Subsahara-Afrika erfolgreich verlaufen können, selbst wenn die Regierung von einer grossen Partei dominiert wird. Eine wettbewerbsfähige Oppositionspartei kann – auch wenn nicht stark genug um die Wahlen zu gewinnen – die dominante Partei zu mehr Responsivität gegenüber den Wählern zwingen und zur Verminderung klientelistischer Praktiken führen. Damit liefert die Studie einen originellen Beitrag zum bisherigen Forschungsstand, der dominante Parteien gemeinhin als unvereinbar mit der Konsolidierung der Demokratie und demokratischer Responsivität erachtet.
Des Weiteren zeigt die Studie, dass ein präsentes Erbe historischer Konfliktlinien aus der Zeit der Dekolonisierung die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit heutiger Oppositionsparteien in afrikanischen dominanten Parteiensystemen befördert.
Die Studie basiert auf einem gemischten Untersuchungsdesign, das sowohl quantitative Verfahren als auch die historisch-komparative qualitative Methode anwendet. Untersucht werden 53 Wahlen in dominanten Parteiensystemen Afrikas sowie vier detaillierte Fallstudien.

Contents

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1 Introduction, State of the Art and Conceptual Framework

Introduction

On March 21, 2012, Mali experienced its first military coup and breakdown of its electoral regime since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992.[1] This came as a surprise to many. After all, Mali was considered to be one of the few fairly functioning democracies on the African continent that had held eight free, and mostly fair, parliamentary and presidential elections during its two decades of multiparty competition. Furthermore, conventional wisdom argues that peaceful turnover through the ballot box and the termination of electoral one-party dominance are strong indicators of a consolidated democracy or at least provide a window of opportunity for full democratization (Huntington, 1991; Alvarez et al., 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Hence, it is puzzling that Mali's democracy did not consolidate during the ten years after its first incumbency change through the ballot box in 2002 and the end of electoral dominance by the previously governing *Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali* (ADEMA).

[1] Note: The book *The Quality of Democracy in Africa – Opposition Competitiveness Rooted in Legacies of Cleavages*, published with Palgrave Macmillan in 2017, is a substantially revised and updated account of this thesis' content [Link].

Equally puzzling is the fact that electoral turnover and the end of *dominant party systems* in the multiparty electoral regimes of Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002, or Zambia in 2011 neither led to democratic consolidation.[2]

In contrast to this and contrary to conventional wisdom on dominant party systems in Africa, which lack turnover by definition, incumbent former Flight Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings and his electorally dominant party, *National Democratic Congress* (NDC), initiated democratic consolidation in Ghana. Rawlings and the NDC substantially reduced the skewness of the playing field in party competition and increased civil liberties despite their dominance and lack of incumbency change after the formal opening of Ghana's political regime in 1992 to formal multiparty democracy. The resulting more balanced playing field in party competition eventually led to electoral turnover and the end of the NDC's dominance in 2000. After that, and in contrast to the cases above, Ghana's democracy consolidated further, and the previously dominant party, NDC, remained a strong and cohesive opposition party despite leadership succession from J.J. Rawlings to John Atta Mills. Eventually, this led to another successful electoral turnover in 2008 and the consolidation of an institutionalized two-party system in Ghana. Likewise, Botswana's quality of democracy improved between independence and the first decade of the 2000s despite lack of turnover, i.e., uninterrupted electoral dominance by the *Botswana Democratic Party* (BDP) since 1965. Furthermore, South Africa has a comparatively good democratic record since the introduction of multiracial elections in 1994 despite continued electoral dominance of the *African National Congress* (ANC).

If we take a global view, we easily find more examples that run counter to conventional wisdom on the role of dominant party systems in processes of democratization. Pempel (1990a) edited a whole volume on these "uncommon democracies", where one party dom-

[2]In a dominant party system, one party wins in successive and relatively free, but not necessarily fair elections an absolute majority in parliament as well as the presidency (Sartori, 2005[1976]; cf. Bogaards, 2004).

inates electoral competition over a substantial amount of time in countries as diverse as Italy, Sweden, Japan, Israel, India and Mexico between 1945 and 1990. These dominant party systems were not necessarily stumbling blocks on a path to democratic consolidation and higher qualities of democracy. On the contrary, they provided stability for the consolidation of their democratic regimes. In Mexico, we even find an interesting parallel to Ghana, as the dominant *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) significantly reduced the skewness degree of the playing field in multiparty competition since the second half of the 1990s, which eventually led to incumbency change in 2000, and an institutionalized multi-party system thereafter. Taiwan resembles Mexico, as the electorally dominant party, *Kuomintang* (KMT), underutilized its coercive power to tilt the playing field in party competition in its favor, which led to the first electoral turnover, end of dominance by the KMT, and subsequent democratic consolidation and institutionalization of a multiparty system with another turnover in 2008 (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 309–318). Hence, evidence from other regions suggests that dominant party systems in electoral regimes do not necessarily have to be problematic for democratic consolidation.

However, in opposition to other world regions, dominant party systems are not "uncommon", but rather prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and consolidated democracies generally rare.[3] Accordingly, it is widely argued that dominant party systems are bad for democratic consolidation in Africa (Huntington, 1991; Bogaards, 2000; Van de Walle, 2003). Yet, anecdotal evidence presented at the beginning of this section runs contrary to that. Mali experienced the breakdown of its electoral regime after electoral turnover and ten years of seemingly favorable party system conditions while Ghana fully democratized during and after ten years of dominance by a party with authoritarian roots. This leads us to central question of this book: Why does electoral turnover in African electoral regimes not necessarily lead to higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation, and why do

[3]Henceforth "Africa". Note, that this book does not include North African countries in its analysis.

some of Africa's dominant party systems, which lack the experience of regular incumbency change, lead the way to higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation?

The book aims to solve this puzzle by looking into the neglected variance of competitiveness of the opposition in African dominant party systems. I argue that democratization can be successful in dominant party systems if a competitive opposition – even if too weak to take power – challenges the dominant government party. I argue that under this condition the quality of democracy will improve substantially. I test this argument by looking into a most diverse set of African electoral regimes that featured dominant party systems in the period between 1990 and 2008. My findings show that first, dominant party systems with strong and institutionalized opposition parties have more comprehensive civil liberties and second, are more likely to develop position-taking programmatic means of mobilizing their voters besides the dominant modes of mobilization through clientelism, valence issues and personal charisma. The analysis thus suggests that the opposition does not need to win office. In order to improve the quality of democracy it is enough that competitive opposition parties challenge the dominant party and force its rulers to be more responsive to voters' demands.

Furthermore, I argue that the most important factor for explaining degrees of competitiveness in contemporary opposition party systems in African dominant party systems lies in historical cleavages that were able to spill over into contemporary third wave party competition. Opposition parties need non-material sources of cohesiveness in the context of a dominant governing party and the prevalence of clientelistic and valence competition. On the one hand, cohesiveness due to legacies of cleavages allows opposition parties to compete more effectively on the dominant party's "natural" terrain of clientelism and valence competition because opposition supporters and party-elites are more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic and valence promises when they are bound to the party by non-material means. On the other hand, legacies of historical cleav-

ages also make position-taking programmatic mobilization a more viable, alternative mode of mobilization that allows competition with the dominant party on an equal standing. However, the successful survival of cleavages that were formed around independence is dependent on the occurrence, timing, length and degree of suppression of post-independence authoritarian regimes.

These arguments are tested in a mixed-methods design, which is based on a quantitative analysis of 53 elections in 18 third wave African dominant party systems and an ensuing in-depth model-testing comparative analysis of four crucial cases: The dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho and the formerly dominant party system of Ghana, as well as the formerly "almost-dominant party system" of Mali. The analysis makes use of comparative historical analysis and survey-based measurements of party positions and voter preferences.

The book contributes to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the role of party systems in late third wave democratization processes in general, and the literature on dominant party systems and the role of turnovers in particular. The quantitative results of the book show that it is useful to devise an index that measures the competitiveness degree of the opposition parties in dominant party systems because not all dominant party systems have the same consequences for democratic consolidation. The more competitive opposition parties are in African dominant party systems between 1990 and 2008, the more comprehensive civil liberties will be.

Furthermore, the book explains late-third wave democratizers' party system structure and institutionalization degree by the existence of salient legacies of cleavages that are rooted in conflicts caused by processes of nationalization and centralization at independence. The competitiveness degree of opposition parties in dominant party systems and the institutionalization degree of non-dominant party systems that evolved out of dominant party systems are significantly explained by the survival of legacies of cleavages proxied

by the age of the runner-up opposition party and the number of minimally competitive *pre*-third wave elections. These results are then confirmed by a comparative-historic analysis of four crucial cases. Indeed, we can trace the survival of a territorial center-periphery cleavage since independence over time and until the beginning of the third wave in both Botswana and Ghana. The territorial cleavage still structures the party systems of the two countries and results in contemporary programmatically more structured and more responsive party systems. In Lesotho and Mali, in turn, survival of territorial legacies of cleavages was too strongly disrupted during pre-third wave authoritarian phases for their third wave party systems to still rely on and result in competitive opposition parties during dominant party system phases and thereafter. Accordingly, both Lesotho and Mali's contemporary party systems are less programmatically structured and less responsive.

Both the finding that dominant party systems have different effects on the quality of democracy in late third wave democratizers – depending on the different degrees of competitiveness of the opposition – and the finding that party system structures in Africa can be fruitfully explained by Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage approach are original contributions to the literature on democratization and party systems. To my knowledge, this is so far the first approach that systematically quantifies path dependency and historical explanations and relates African party system's competitiveness structure to legacies of historic territorial center-periphery cleavages. These results are substantiated with an additional in-depth comparative historical analysis of four crucial cases. Last but not least, the study attempts to measure party system responsiveness degrees in Africa by a survey-based measurement of the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic positions based on an original elite-survey dataset and relates it to voters' preferences measured by Afrobarometer data. Before I further carve out the contribution of the book by discussing the state of the art, the following section presents the structure of the book.

In the following two sections, I present the state of the art and the conceptual framework. Afterwards, I demonstrate that it is useful to devise an index that measures the *competitiveness degree* of the opposition parties, i.e. "potential incumbency vulnerability" of the dominant party in dominant party systems, because the index explains the varying consequences of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness of African dominant party systems to a large degree.

Second, I argue that relatively high opposition competitiveness degrees of contemporary African third wave dominant party systems can be explained by the existence of salient historical legacies of cleavages formed in routinized electoral competition shortly before and after independence. If contemporary opposition parties cannot base their ideological image on independence cleavages, they lack historic, ideological and symbolic "capital" and have to exclusively rely on short-term mobilization strategies of the electorate – clientelism, charisma and valence issues –, which naturally work better for the incumbent dominant party in an uncertain context of new and non-routinized electoral regimes. The saliency of such short-term mobilization strategies and concomitant absence of long-term mobilization strategies and non-material sources of cohesiveness in turn leads to opposition parties that are more prone to co-optation by the dominant party, factionalism and floor-crossing ("nomadisme de politique") – as I will explain later in the book –, which weaken and de-institutionalize opposition parties and decrease the self-perceived vulnerability degree of the dominant party.

Both the fact that dominant party systems have varying consequences for the quality of democracy and the explanation for this are original contributions to the comparative literature on African democratization. So far, the literature unanimously considers dominant party systems to be stumbling blocks on the way from first elections to democratic consolidation in late-third wave democratizers (Alvarez, 1996; Bogaards, 2000; 2004; Huntington, 1991; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2010), or regards them to be

problematic for democratic consolidation at least (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Van de Walle, 2003). Explicitly or implicitly, the literature considers opposition party systems to be homogeneously weak within the group of African dominant party systems.

In the first instance, my findings are based on statistical evidence from a dataset, which has been collected for this study and comprehends 53 elections in 18 African dominant party systems.[4] Second, from these results, I derive four model-testing comparative case studies: In a comparative historical analysis and an ensuing party system responsiveness analysis, I compare the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho, the former dominant party system of Ghana and the former "almost-dominant" party system of Mali. It is important to contrast Botswana and Lesotho with two cases of the group of non-dominant party systems, because the latter are so far generally regarded as favorable for democratic consolidation in the literature. They set the benchmark against which any positive assessment of a dominant party system has to be tested.

The comparative historical analysis traces the four different contemporary party system configurations back to the political cleavages of the embryonic party system, which was founded shortly before decolonization. As my analysis shows, a crucial condition for legacies of cleavages to spill over into present institutionalized party systems in general and competitive opposition parties in particular, is the requirement that cleavages have already been regularly invoked and routinized to some degree in pre-third wave elections, i.e. have not been interrupted by the introduction of too rapidly following and too stable periods of authoritarian one-party government and/or military government.

Finally, I compare self-collected elite survey data of the four cases with Afrobarometer mass survey data. I find evidence that parties in dominant party systems with an institutionalized and potentially threatening opposition (Botswana), or in former dominant party

[4]The cases are the dominant party systems of, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Burkina Faso Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia.

systems that evolved into an institutionalized two-party system (Ghana), which both are still structured according to the historic cleavage around independence, are programmatically more distinctively set apart and more responsive to the policy preferences of their electorate than parties in dominant party systems with a perceivable non-institutionalized opposition (Lesotho), or in former dominant party systems that evolved into a generally non-institutionalized and chaotic multi-party system (Mali), and which both are not effectively structured anymore according to the historic cleavage around independence. Because the Ghana two-party system model for democratic consolidation is empirically relatively rare in Africa, I argue that the Botswana model of a dominant party with an institutionalized and potentially threatening opposition can be a viable alternative way to democratic consolidation than the non-dominant but also generally non-institutionalized Mali "model" that obviously does not lead to democratic consolidation (as proven by the 2012 military coup in Mali).

The book has five sections: In this section, I also discuss the state of the art and define the conceptual framework. After that, in the second section, I conceptualize the central concept of opposition competitiveness and its measure in African dominant party systems and theorize its significance for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness in dominant party systems. Ensuing, I test this first argument in a cross-sectional large-N analysis of 18 contemporary African dominant and former dominant party systems. The third section develops a model for the explanation of different opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems and tests the argument in a cross sectional analysis of 18 third wave dominant party systems and a dynamic analysis of 53 third wave elections in dominant party systems. The fourth and fifth sections re-test the arguments in a qualitative comparative historical analysis of four crucial cases – Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali – and a party system responsiveness analysis through the comparison of self-collected elite survey data with contemporary Afrobarometer mass survey data in

these the four African countries.

Instructions for cross-reading:

Generally, the book is organized to be read in one piece and has five sections. In case of cross-reading the following explanation of the book's structure might be useful:

Apart from this introduction, section 1 also includes the sections of the state of the art and the conceptual framework. Sections 2 and 5 are about the theoretical and empirical significance of opposition competitiveness for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness in third wave African dominant party systems. Section 2's empirical part is about the test of this argument in a large-N setting. Section 5 re-tests the argument of section 2 in a small-N setting by the use of democratic responsiveness as an important indicator of the quality of democracy. The general theoretical argument of Section 5 is identical to section 2 and has to be consulted there.

Sections 3 and 4 are about the theoretical and empirical explanation of opposition competitiveness in third wave dominant party systems. Section 3's empirical part tests the argument in the same large-N setting as in section 2. Hence, the case selection of section 3 should be consulted in section 2. Section 4 re-tests the argument of section 3 in the same small-N setting as in section 5. Accordingly, the small-N case selection is both valid for sections 4 and 5 and will not be repeated in section 5. The theoretical argument of section 4, in turn, should be consulted in section 3.

While the two main theoretical arguments and the large-N as well as the small-N case selections are only described once in the book, every empirical subsection in sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 is preceded by a unique methods subsection.

If someone is only interested in the quantitative tests of the two main arguments, she should read sections 2 and 3 and neglect parts 4 and 5 entirely. Alternatively, if she is

exclusively interested in the qualitative tests of the two main arguments, she should only read the theoretical parts of sections 2 and 3, and sections 4 and 5 both entirely.

State of the Art

The end of the Cold War triggered a wave of 'electoralization' in the countries of the so called *late third wave of democratization*, amongst them the sub-Saharan part of the African continent (cf. Huntington, 1991; LeBas, 2011, 5). Almost every sub-Saharan African country introduced formal multiparty democracy. However, two decades of experimenting with multiparty elections on the continent yielded mixed results, resulting in many "incomplete" types of democracy or "hybrid" regimes at best, electoral autocracies at worst, and only few liberal democracies (O'Donnell, 1996, 34; Carothers, 2002). In contrast to experts' fears of excessive fragmentation in Africa's new party systems, dominant party systems where one party wins subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections for a considerable amount of time became Africa's new modal type of party system during the third wave (Bogaards, 2000; Bogaards, 2004; Van de Walle, 2003; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007).

The unprecedented mass of formal multiparty elections and the variance of its outcomes during the past two decades triggered a renaissance of comparative political science research with focus on democratization in Africa: (1) A significant part of this literature concentrated on the newly emerging party systems and observed the aforementioned prevalence of dominant party systems among Africa's electoral democracies (Bogaards, 2000; 2004; Van de Walle, 2003; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2013). (2) Another section of the comparative African party system literature concentrated on the general fragmentation and/or institutionalization degree of African party systems without explicitly referring to the phenomenon of dominant party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Lindberg, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). (3) A further important fraction of the literature is less focused on party systems

per se and concentrates in a more general way on third wave democratization and transition processes in Africa and other late-third wave countries (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Carothers, 2002; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Among them, Lindberg (2006; 2009) focuses on the – as he argues – path-dependent democratizing effect of the introduction of formal multi-party elections in Africa. In line with that, (4) there are studies that specifically identify turnovers as causes of democratic consolidation, which implicitly points out to the purported negative effect of dominant party systems for democratic consolidation (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Moehler and Lindberg, 2009; Wahman, 2012b) Last but not least, (5) some of the more recent literature tries to derive generalizations on causes and consequences of African party systems from detailed comparative case studies (LeBas, 2011; Osei, 2012; Elischer, 2013).

So far, the existence of a dominant party system has mostly been considered to be problematic for late third wave democratizers' democratic consolidation in general, and African electoral regimes' democratic consolidation in particular (Bogaards, 2000; 2004; Van de Walle, 2003; Manning, 2005; Huntington, 1991; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). An electoral democracy that has never been tested by a change of incumbency through free multiparty elections, is regarded to be an *unconsolidated* democracy (cf. Alvarez et al., 1996). Przeworski and Limongi (1997, 178) even explicitly define as "democracies only those systems in which incumbent parties actually did lose [elections]". However, the assumptions underlying these definitions have not been systematically tested in most accounts. Van de Walle (2003, 309) is the only one that provides evidence for the hypothesis of a bad influence of dominant party systems on the quality of democracy. Yet, his evidence is based on a small sample of six African dominant party systems. Furthermore, some of these studies rather focus on the correct identification of dominant party systems and compare the suitability of different measurements of party system fragmentation (Bogaards, 2004; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007). Most of these studies also implicitly or explicitly assume that opposition

parties in dominant party systems are by definition weak and non-institutionalized without providing convincing evidence to substantiate this claim (Bogaards, 2000; Van de Walle, 2003; Manning, 2005).

Studies that point out mixed or even positive effects of dominant party systems on democratic consolidation are few, and are mostly concentrated on single case studies or sub-regional samples rather than systematic comparison: Both a study on democratization in Senegal by Villalon (1994) and a general critique by Suttner (2006) on the "party dominance" concept exemplified with reference to the case of the dominant ANC in South Africa criticize the 'fetishization' of turnover as an indicator for full democratization. And according to Du Toit (1999), the electoral dominance of the BDP in Botswana paved the way for stabilization and liberal democracy. In a study on elections in Southern Africa, Bogaards (2007b) demonstrates that dominant party systems are not necessarily undemocratic and non-dominant multi-party systems not necessarily democratic. Lastly, Basedau (2005) who mainly analyzes potential causes of dominant party systems in 38 African electoral regimes emphasizes that dominant party systems rarely lead to full authoritarianism in Africa.

Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal contribution on party systems and democratization in Latin America underlined the importance of institutionalized party systems for democratic consolidation. Mainwaring and Scully's work inspired Africanists to adapt the concept of party system institutionalization to the African continent (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005; Lindberg, 2007). In line with Mainwaring and Scully's operationalization, Kuenzi and Lambright measure the institutionalization of African party systems through the degree of volatility, the average age of the parties, the legitimacy of elections and the independence of the party organization from its contemporary leaders. They conclude that African party systems are less institutionalized than party systems in Latin America. Furthermore, they argue that the duration of experience

with democracy is decisive for explaining the institutionalization degree of contemporary party systems in Africa.

In contrast, Lindberg (2007) exclusively concentrates on election-based data to determine the institutionalization degree of African party systems, because – as he correctly argues – we should not include the age of parties in the measurement of institutionalization if we want to explain the institutionalization degree by the age of democracy in a country. His study concludes that there is a trade-off between effective competition and stability. Stable party systems in Africa mostly feature a dominant party and lack of effective competition while non-dominant party systems, in turn, are volatile and non-institutionalized.

While providing valuable insights into the general nature of party systems in Africa, both Kuenzi and Lambright as well as Lindberg's approaches suffer from the fact that they conflate dominant and non-dominant party systems in Africa in one sample. Yet, in contrast to non-dominant party systems, the governing party does not change in dominant party systems. Accordingly, overall volatility scores are lower in dominant party systems by definition. Consequently, due to the prevalence of dominant party systems in Africa, we could argue that it is not necessary to measure the volatility degree of African party systems at all. Looking at the fragmentation degree would suffice because dominant party systems could be equated with institutionalization, and non-dominant party systems with volatility. However, regarding dominant party systems, I argue that it is far from sure that opposition parties in dominant party systems are all equally institutionalized. Accordingly, its important to have a closer look at the structure of the opposition party system nested within dominant party systems (see also van Eerd, 2010). Hence, an approach that conflates incumbent and opposition parties' constituting parts in the measurement of institutionalization degrees misses important variance among opposition party systems nested within dominant party systems.

To summarize the main gaps in the respective literature, first, the consequences of dominant party systems for democratic consolidation and the quality of democracy of late-third wave democratizers have not been fully understood so far. Second, the role of the opposition parties nested within dominant party systems has either been completely neglected or the opposition parties have been described as homogeneously weak and volatile without presenting convincing evidence for this claim. Third, the relationship between the fragmentation degree and the institutionalization degree in African party systems has not been fully understood. Institutionalization of the dominant party has been equated with institutionalization of the whole party system. This is problematic, because it relies on the untested assumption that the nature of the opposition party systems nested within dominant party systems does not matter for the description and the consequences of dominant party systems in late third-wave democratizers in general and Africa in special.

Types of Electoral Regimes in the Third Wave of Democratization

With exception of the south-european countries that started the *third wave* of democratization in the 1970s (a term famously coined by Huntington (1991)), most of the subsequent third wave transitions produced "incomplete" or "grey area" types of democracy (O'Donnell, 1996, 34) (Latin American and Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s as well as Eastern European, former Soviet and sub-Saharan Africa countries in the 1990s). These so called "hybrid regimes" are somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism. Their quality of democracy is mixed and less consolidated, i.e. they are more prone to full authoritarian backlash than consolidated democracies.

Only a minority of these third wave electoral regimes became *representative democracies/polyarchies* according to Dahl's (1971, 3) eight criteria of (1) elected incumbents, (2) free and fair elections, (3) inclusive suffrage, (4) right to run for office, (5) freedom of expression, (6) alternative information, (7) freedom of association and (8) institutions for

making government policies depend on votes or other expressions of preference. Democracies as polyarchies have a relatively high quality of democracy and are more democratically consolidated, which means that "democrats can relax" because democracy breakdown becomes unlikely (Schedler, 2001, 85). In other words, democracy is "the only game in town" and other means to power are not an option (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 5).

At the other end of the spectrum, some third wave electoral regimes are better to be considered as outright *electoral autocracies*. Here, elections have façade character and remain mere plebiscites in order to achieve superficial legitimacy for an autocratic government. Important opposition parties are banned and incumbency change through elections remains highly unlikely if not impossible (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 13).

The middle ground and largest category of third wave electoral regimes can be subsumed under Levitsky and Way's (2010) regime category of *competitive authoritarianism*. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes have a substantially higher amount of uncertainty about the electoral outcome than electoral autocracies. Opposition parties find it worthy to compete because they have a minimum chance of winning. Yet, incumbency change is less likely than in democracies as polyarchies. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are basically free, but not sufficiently fair.

More precisely, "free elections" in competitive authoritarian regimes are regular elections where electoral fraud is neither systematic nor decisive for the electoral outcome. Intimidation and harassment of voters and opposition parties are not systematic or virtually absent. Elections are competitive in a sense that major candidates and opposition parties are not systematically excluded (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 5–13). What discerns competitive authoritarian regimes from democracies as polyarchies is the lack of a level playing field between incumbents and the opposition. The usual incumbency advantage between the governing party and the opposition parties is exaggerated compared with polyarchies due to a systematically skewed playing field: E.g., incumbents systematically use

state resources in electoral campaigning like state finance and infrastructure (vehicles or buildings). Government contracts may be used to reward entrepreneurs that support the governing party and punish entrepreneurs that support the opposition parties. And/or, effective access to media with broad coverage is strongly skewed towards the governing party. Especially in developing countries, the independent media may only reach a small urban elite while state-controlled radio, TV and newspapers are able to reach the countryside and/or other, more peripheral parts of a country. Likewise, the less easily controllable internet is generally more available to an urban and literate elite than to the the electorally more relevant masses. Lastly, the judiciary is not independent enough to rule impartially in crucial disputes between the government and the opposition.

All this makes competition unfair. Yet because elections are substantially free and competition is meaningful to a certain amount, incumbency change remains possible (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 9–13).

Although incumbency change is a possibility in competitive authoritarian regimes, I agree with Levitsky and Way (2010) that even if it actually happens, it does not necessarily have to lead to a higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation. The new incumbents may find it useful to profit from the same skewed playing filed that initially disadvantaged them when they were in opposition. Hence, incumbency change is not a sufficient condition for a high quality of democracy and democratic consolidation.

Dominant party systems are the main focus of this study. They are situated within political systems that feature national formal multiparty parliamentary elections (and additionally, presidential elections in presidential systems). In the following, these political systems are called "electoral regimes" to avoid false equation of elections with democracy. Political systems without any national-level elections (e.g. one-party regimes like China's Communist Party) are of no concern in this study. More precisely, this study of dominant party systems is situated within democratic electoral regimes (polyarchies) and compet-

itive authoritarian electoral regimes. It is not situated within non-competitive electoral regimes, i.e. electoral autocracies, where incumbency change is impossible.

Although my study draws on Levitsky and Way's (2010) concept of competitive authoritarianism I disagree regarding their implicit conclusion that a lack of incumbency change – i.e. dominant party systems – necessarily signals the existence of a competitive authoritarian regime and a low quality of democracy (cf. Bogaards, 2007b). In the next section, I outline why African dominant party systems can lead to a higher quality of democracy and democratic consolidation even if effective incumbency change does not take place because they have the potential to provide stability and to be responsive to their citizenry. Accordingly, dominant party systems are not necessarily exclusively to be found among competitive authoritarian electoral regimes, but might also be found among electoral regimes with a higher quality of democracy.

Furthermore, as shown in the case selection further below, on the one hand, (1) I define the boundary between competitive authoritarianism and electoral autocracy more narrowly than Levitsky and Way (2010) while on the other hand, (2) I am more lenient regarding the boundary between democracy as polyarchy and competitive authoritarianism. I do (1), because I consider the reality of political competition for opposition parties to be of fundamental difference in countries like Zimbabwe or Belarus, where opposition politicians face regular beatings and imprisonment during elections campaigns and election results are marred by large fraud vis-à-vis countries like Botswana or Senegal, where opposition politicians can compete freely although their access to the media and campaign resources is relatively more restricted compared to the government party (these four countries are cases of competitive authoritarianism in Levitsky and Way's study). And I do (2), because – considering my exclusively regional focus on Africa – I find it useful to be less strict with the labels of democracy and democratic consolidation than scholars with an intercontinental focus. I acknowledge that a somewhat skewed access to the media and government resources

influences competition, but find it misleading to go as far as Levitsky and Way and use the word "authoritarianism" in such cases: If our definition of democracy is too maximalist, the empirical basket of democracy in Africa remains empty (cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Munck, 2009). This would defy the general intuition that a significant variance regarding democracy levels is a reality in Africa. Nonetheless, I embrace Levitsky and Way's (2010) emphasis on the level playing field in party competition. They remind us that the word democracy can be a misleading label for some electoral regimes where the level playing field is skewed too heavily. In the end, it is a question of drawing a (more or less arbitrary) line to achieve meaningful categorization.

Party System Responsiveness: A Yardstick for the Quality of Democracy

Besides a skewed playing field, most third wave electoral regimes have also interrelated and serious deficits regarding horizontal accountability, the rule of law, as well as *party system responsiveness* and vertical accountability (cf. Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 2002). I focus on party system responsiveness and vertical accountability as important yardsticks to assess the quality of democracy in African electoral regimes (cf. Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2004). In modern representative democracy, where parties are the central agents of political representation, party system responsiveness is rather synonymous to the concept of *democratic responsiveness* (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4): Political parties are virtually the only actors in modern representative democracy with access to elected positions (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4). Even independent candidates usually associate themselves with a party in parliament to gain access to a parliamentary group. And independent presidential candidates usually strive for the stable support of at least one important political party in campaigning and parliament.

Party system responsiveness corresponds to Dahl's (1971, 3) eighth requirement for representative democracy: "Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference." Expressions of (policy) preferences are most efficiently organized around party platforms and labels. Party platforms deliver orientation and shortcuts about bundles of policy preferences and channel conflicts that otherwise would be expressed in a cacophony of conflicting individual interests. Citizens are able to make an informed voting decision without investing large amounts of time in informing themselves about the policy preferences of individual politicians (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 2–4). Accordingly, it is more easy for voters to assess if actual government policies correspond to the policy platforms that have been promoted during their campaign. This enables vertical accountability and increases the possibility that government policies "depend on votes and other expressions of preferences".

I understand "party system responsiveness" as the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic positions and the congruence between partisan voters' policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Party system responsiveness is the central component in the "chain of responsiveness" (Powell, 2004), that links citizens' policy preferences with citizens' voting behavior, the election outcomes and the adopted public policies themselves. "Party system responsiveness" enhances the quality of democracy, because it secures that governments adopt and implement the policies that arise from the will of the citizens (cf. Dahl, 1971). A responsive democratic regime is less prone to autocratic reversal, which means that "democrats can relax" (Schedler, 2001, 85), i.e. democracy consolidates.

Party system responsiveness is based on programmatic modes of voter mobilization. One of the most important alternative modes of mobilization is clientelism where private benefits for specific individual citizens (private goods) or small groups of citizens (club goods) are exchanged for votes (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Whereas programmatic mobilization provides long-term linkages to the electorate, clientelistic mobilization delivers short-term rewards for votes. The two modes of mobilization are in opposition to each other, but are not necessarily mutually exclusive.[5]

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Party System Institutionalization and Responsiveness

Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal contribution teaches us the importance of an institutionalized party system for a high quality of democracy after democratic transitions. Without institutionalized parties that link citizens to the political system and provide predictability to politics, formal democratic institution like national elections are meaningless. An institutionalized party system facilitates mutual learning and coordination between the electorate and their political representatives about their respective policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004). And this increases programmatic party system responsiveness in turn.

Without a minimally institutionalized party system, programmatic party system responsiveness is difficult if not impossible. In order to provide the necessary aggregation of interests, channeling of conflicts and predictability in politics, political parties need to be institutionalized. If parties‘ competitive interactions do not follow stable patterns of competition and conflict, it is difficult for voters to understand, which interests the parties represent. Voters cannot hold the party/parties in power accountable for a bad performance and likewise have no identifiable alternative to cast their vote on if parties appear and disappear from one election to the next. Institutionalized political parties as the main access point to the government and the state are even more important in the African context where the influence of civil society is much weaker than in the established democracies of the Western hemisphere.

[5]Cf. with Singer and Kitschelt's (2011) "Do Everything" (DoE) parties, which combine clientelistic and programmatic mobilization.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) believe that dominant party systems are symptomatic for weakly institutionalized and programmatically non-responsive party-voter linkages (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). I rather argue that dominant party systems provide stability by definition because they stay in power for a considerable amount of time. The voter always knows who is to blame for a bad government performance compared to frequently changing incumbents who are able to blame the legacy of their forerunner, or parties in coalition governments who can mutually hide behind their companions. Furthermore, the long-term grip to power allows the dominant party to develop a long-term public policy platform and further institutionalize itself. However, dominant party systems tend to go hand in hand with weaker and less institutionalized opposition parties than party systems with regular incumbency change. Non-institutionalization and weakness diminishes the opposition parties' ability to develop a trustworthy alternative policy platform and the necessary political orientation for voters in case of a bad dominant party performance.

Accordingly, in opposition to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), I argue that dominant party systems are not per se non-institutionalized, but rather the opposite. Yet, their potential for responsiveness and high quality of democracy depends on the strength and stability of the opposition party/parties.

And, in opposition to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), I do not consider programmatic responsiveness to be a necessary component of institutionalization. Rather, the other way round, institutionalization of the party system provides a chance for programmatic responsiveness that can be, but does not necessarily have to be taken. E.g., in Latin America, the party systems of Columbia and Venezuela in the second half of the 20th century were highly institutionalized and seemingly competitive, yet they were not programmatically responsive to their electorate and their quality of democracy was rather low (Bornschier, Forthcoming; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Accordingly, my argument is rather probabilistic than deterministic.

Generally, It is rather unlikely that young African electoral regimes' degree of programmatic responsiveness meets the responsiveness level of the established democracies in the OECD-world. Nonetheless, I expect to find variation within African electoral democracies in general, and the large group of African dominant party systems in particular. I argue that the degree of programmatic party system responsiveness and the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic positions– i.e. the realization of the potential of dominant party system institutionalization – are related to the degree of the self-perceived incumbency vulnerability of the dominant party, which, in turn, I will operationalize through the strength and institutionalization of the opposition party/parties in a dominant party system.

In the beginning of the following section, I conceptualize dominant party systems with special emphasis on their opposition competitiveness degree, which is measured by the strength and institutionalization of the opposition in a dominant party system.

2 Opposition Competitiveness and its Significance for Dominant Party System Responsiveness

In dominant party systems, the same party dominates the government and inter-party competition for a considerable amount of time *without* violating the most fundamental rights of democratic competition. A dominant party system thwarts the common expectation that electoral competition leads to periodic changes in government.

In the following, I argue that actual incumbency change is *not* a necessary condition for higher party system responsiveness and a high quality of democracy. A relatively strong and institutionalized opposition (even if too weak to take power) can force the dominant government party to be programmatically more responsive to voters and advance the quality of democracy overall.

First, I present the conceptualization of a dominant party system and its disadvantages and advantages for party system responsiveness and the quality of democracy in an electoral regime. Second, I look at the so far neglected differences in opposition party system configuration within a dominant party system and explain how a relatively strong and institutionalized opposition can force the dominant party to advance party system responsiveness and the quality of democracy. Finally, the section closes by testing the potentially positive effect of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems.

Dominant Party Systems and Responsiveness

As discussed above, unlike to authoritarian one-party regimes, dominant party systems feature regular and minimally free electoral competition with varying degrees of fairness/skewness of the playing field in party competition. A dominant governing party in a polyarchy or competitive authoritarian regime does not know the election results before the elections have been held because electoral fraud – if present – is neither systematic nor decisive. On the one hand, the party dominates the government and inter-party competition for a considerable amount of time, and on the other hand, there is still the theoretical possibility present that the dominant governing party could loose the elections. Accordingly, minimal competitiveness is a precondition in dominant party systems.

Whereas the term *party system* denotes a "network of competitive relationships between political parties" (Rae, 1971[1967], 47), the adjective *dominant* signifies that outcomes of these competitive relationships result in uninterrupted and repeated electoral victories of the same political party that render the participation of other parties in government unnecessary (except oversized coalition governments that are formed out of non-arithmetical reasons). This entails an absolute majority in the lower house and – in presidential systems – an additional victory in presidential elections for the dominant party. Absolute majority victories are based on natural absolute majorities in the electorate or on fabricated absolute majorities through the means of majority electoral systems and/or gerrymandering (redistricting of electoral districts for electoral advantages).

Opposition parties are naturally weaker in dominant party systems than in party systems with regular change of incumbency. Opposition parties in dominant party systems lack government experience by definition, because they are neither required for an absolute majority of the president's party in parliament nor for coalition government in parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. Accordingly, they can and could not recently prove their

suitability to form an alternative government. This lack of experience may deter potential opposition voters from voting for the opposition.

On the one hand, a dominant party system can be problematic for electoral regimes' quality of democracy overall and party system responsiveness in particular: First, if majorities in the electorate are natural and opposition parties weak, future electoral victories for the dominant party are likely even if it performs poorly. Foreseeable electoral victories for the party in power can lead to arrogance and lack of programmatic responsiveness. Abuses of power and non-democratic behavior like corruption become more likely. Instead of being temporarily borrowed from the people, power resembles of being entitled to the dominant party. At the same time, opposition parties and their voters could become desperate, which enhances the probability for problematic or even non-democratic behavior like *unjustified* election boycotts or appeals against election results and/or violence on the side of the opposition in turn. Second, a party that is always in power can never prove that it would accept a defeat at the polls, which is an important sign for democratic consolidation. Reasonable suspicion remains that a dominant party behaves only democratically as long as it wins elections (cf. Huntington, 1991; Alvarez et al., 1996, 5–11). Third, if dominant parties developed out of liberation movements against colonialism, other suppressive regimes or secessionist movements, they tend to equate the new nationstate with the dominant party itself and delegitimize new democratic opposition parties as traitors and collaborators of the ancient regime. At the same time, they can base their support on natural majorities and deep loyalties from the liberation struggle that are not easily shaken by bad performances in routine politics. Fourth, if dominant parties have extreme majorities in parliament that are larger than two thirds, they are tempted to change the constitution and electoral procedures in order to secure their dominant position for the future.

On the other hand, a dominant party may also help to enhance the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation of an electoral regime: First and foremost, a dominant party provides continuity and stability in many ways. It will be able to develop its policies over a longer period than a governing party that faces electoral defeat any time soon. It has the opportunity to develop a long-term national project (which it might also find instrumental to stay in power). This will foster programmatically oriented politics and responsiveness. Second, in economically and politically insecure regions, electoral stability might attract foreign investments, which lead to economic growth. Economic growth in turn is an important implicit promise of democracy in developing countries, which leads to voter satisfaction and democratic consolidation. Third, responsibility for poor government performance and policies is maximally transparent. The voter knows who is to blame and the dominant party has few excuses: It cannot blame a lack of time to develop the country or a bad heritage of the forerunner government. It cannot hide its responsibility behind a coalition government. However, if opposition parties in a dominant party system are relatively weak and non-institutionalized, voters will find no trustworthy alternative to cast their vote on.

The neglected aspect of dominant party systems are the opposition parties that exist besides the dominant party (note, that not all parties other than the dominant party might be in opposition; some might be included by the dominant party in an oversized coalition to neutralize a potential opponent, enable consensus democracy and/or two third majorities in parliament). I argue that their strength and degree of institutionalization defines the self-perceived vulnerability of the dominant party and influences the programmatic responsiveness of both (1) the dominant party and (2) the opposition parties/party.

(1) In a dominant party system, party competition does not lead to actual turnovers, yet it nonetheless produces an opposition party system (or opposition party if there is only

one opposition party) besides the dominant party. I conceptualize the *competitiveness* of the opposition party (system) by its strength and institutionalization, which in turn defines the self-perceived degree of *incumbency vulnerability* and potential danger of turnover to the dominant party. This corresponds to the conceptualization of competition as a "type of interaction which systematically improves the performance of the organization for the social circle of which the competitors are part" (I follow Bartolini's (1999, 442) conzeptualization of competition and vulnerability; see also Bogaards (2000)). In our case, the competitors are the dominant party and the opposition parties and the organization of the social circle is the policy-producing electoral regime of which they are part. Accordingly, the improvement of the electoral regime is a largely *unintended* social value of the parties' competitive hunger for power (cf. Bartolini, 1999, 446–448). More precisely, this means, as long as the dominant party considers itself to be in potentially threatening competition with the opposition parties, it will use its institutionalized position in power to be responsive to the electorate to secure its dominance for the future. Yet, if it perceives the competitive potential of its opposition to be low, its responsiveness towards its electorate will decrease. In sum, the more a dominant party perceives the system to resemble a latent two-party or multiparty-system the higher its responsiveness to the citizenry will be. For example, the former dominant *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) in Italy and the former dominant *Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party* (SAP) in Sweden had always an incentive to be responsive to the citizenry as they faced a constant threat of a relatively strong and institutionalized opposition who would have been ready to take over power.

(2) Besides providing an incentive for the dominant party to be more responsive to the citizenry, stronger and more institutionalized opposition parties provide more responsiveness themselves. If the same opposition parties compete regularly in minimal competitive elections instead of appearing and disappearing from one election to the next, they enable mutual learning and adaptation processes between the electorate and themselves about

their respective policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004). At the same time, if the opposition parties/party display minimal voter strength they appear as a trustworthy alternative to the dominant party and potential opposition voters find it worthy to participate in elections and form long-term linkages to the opposition. Both processes lead to a higher degree of programmatic responsiveness of the opposition, which in turn provides incentives for the dominant party to invest in programmatic responsiveness as well. Additionally, higher opposition responsiveness also provides the basis for accountability on the side of the opposition in case it would win future elections.

Essentially, higher dominant party system responsiveness derives from a relatively stronger and more institutionalized opposition party (system) itself and the concomitant self-perceived higher incumbency vulnerability of the dominant party. Accordingly, the two-headed concept *degree of dominant party vulnerability* and *opposition competitiveness* should include the two dimensions that, in their sum, enhance the incumbency vulnerability of the dominant party by making it more likely that one day the dominant party will be toppled by democratic means and at the same time signal regularity and trustworthiness of the opposition itself: (1) *Opposition party system strength* – at least one opposition party or a coalition of opposition parties should display significant voter strength. At the same time – (2) *opposition party system institutionalization* – opposition parties should not appear and disappear from one election to next or lose or win substantial vote-shares from one election to the next as this impedes orientation and confidence on the side of potential opposition voters and potential long-term linkage with opposition voters. I consider these two dimensions as *necessary and sufficient conditions* for my continuous and two-headed concept of the *degree of dominant party vulnerability* and *opposition party system competitiveness in dominant party systems* (in the following, I mainly use the term *opposition competitiveness* on its own to enhance readability). Considering Africa's young and relatively weakly institutionalized democracies, I prefer the more conservative approach of

requiring necessity of both dimensions for the conceptualization of opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems to a more liberal one where weakness in one dimension of opposition competitiveness can be substituted by strength in the other dimension (cf. Goertz, 2006, 27–67).

The Measurement of the Concept of Opposition Competitiveness in African Dominant Party Systems

In the following, I discuss how we can identify dominant party systems and how we then can measure competitiveness degrees of opposition party systems within different dominant party systems. The measurement is exclusively based on election data. This allows (1) the coding of as many African party systems as possible, (2) to be as transparent as possible and (3) to avoid tautology problems with potentially fruitful determinants and consequences the concept could be related to.

Identifying Dominant Party Systems

Dominant party systems are one possible occurrence among different fragmentation degrees of party systems. Most scholars prefer to measure the fragmentation degree of African party systems by Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) continuos *Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties* Index (ENPP) because of its easy computability, approved application for the description of western countries' party systems, and suitability as a dependent variable in OLS-regression models (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). However, research that deals exclusively with measuring problems regarding the fragmentation of African party systems demonstrates that the ENPP-Index is not suitable in the African context because it overestimates the number of relevant parties and hence a party system's fragmentation when a party has an

absolute majority in parliament (Bogaards, 2004; van Eerd, 2009). This problem is even addressed by Taagepera (1999) himself.

Instead, because I use Sartori's typology to define dominant party systems, I propose to use Sartori's (2005 [1976]) corresponding identification procedure for African party systems (cf. Bogaards, 2004; van Eerd, 2009). I use it for the purpose of discerning dominant from non-dominant party systems:[6]

First, only elections results are included where the country was not rated by the Freedom House *Political Rights* rating with a value higher than 5 for the year of the election (1 indicates most free political system, 7 most unfree political system) so as to only include countries with minimum freeness in party competition and to exclude electoral autocracies that lack the theoretical possibility of incumbency change in elections (cf. section 1).[7] There must be at least some amount of uncertainty about electoral outcomes. This procedure corresponds roughly with Lindberg's (2006) categorization of election observer mission statements: Apart from the Burkina Faso 1992 elections, my large-N sample will include no election that Lindberg codes as completely unfree and unfair. It also corresponds with Levitsky and Way's (2010, 6–13) differentiation between on the one hand "democracy" and "competitive authoritarianism", and on the other hand "full authoritarianism", where democratic institutions like elections are "reduced to façade status" (cf. section 1).

Following Bogaards' (2004) application of Sartori's party system typology, an African party system is identified as a dominant party system if the same party achieves an absolute

[6]Sartori's (2005 [1976], 107–110) identification procedure is based on his rules for counting relevant parties. Thereby, if we count only *one* relevant party in a party system, we identify a dominant party system. To count relevant parties, Sartori focuses on the number of relevant actors in the party competition and in the formation of a government. Only parties with coalition or blackmail potential are relevant for competition, and accordingly, have to be counted. A party has coalition potential, if it could be added on to achieve an absolute majority needed to form a government. A party has blackmail potential, if its existence affects the tactics of the party competition (cf. Bogaards, 2004). In the same way, parties are relevant in presidential systems, if they help or obstruct the president's election and determine the accomplishment or lack of an absolute majority for the president in parliament.

[7]Countries with Political Rights values higher than 5 would correspond to Sartori's category of dominant-*authoritarian* party systems; provided there is only one relevant party according to his counting rules.

majority and the presidency for at least three times in a row. We need this time criterion because we can only make valid claims about the character of a party system by observing it for some time (Coleman, 1970 [1960], 294; cf. Bogaards, 2004). The first and second election in third wave regimes only indicates a tendency towards dominance while the third election either confirms dominance or rupture of alleged dominance. The operationalization follows this standard procedure of dominance identification (cf. Bogaards, 2004): E.g., suppose, I look at three or more subsequent elections of a country, where always the same party dominates since the beginning of the third wave. Regarding the time criterion and with single parliamentary elections as the unit of analysis, as soon as the *third+* elections results in a dominant party system, the first and second election are coded as incidences of dominant party system as well. An additional instance to code an election result as an incidence of a dominant party system outcome occurs when the same party wins an absolute majority and the presidency in a formal multiparty election with minimum freeness degree, and it has already been the dominant-*authoritarian* party in the pre-third wave time period where no formal multiparty elections with minimum freeness degrees have been hold.[8]

The Measurement of Opposition Competitiveness in Dominant Party Systems

After having separated African dominant party systems from African non-dominant party systems, I develop an index that measures the opposition competitiveness degree in dominant party systems in a continuous manner. The index is based on two electoral-data-based indicators that measure the two dimensions of opposition competitiveness in a dominant party system: opposition party system strength and opposition party system institutionalization (dimensions 1 and 2 in section 2).

[8]E.g., after Kenya's transition to formal multiparty elections in 1991, the former sole legal party *Kenya African National Union* (KANU) won an absolute majority in parliament as well as the presidency in the first formal multiparty elections with minimum freeness degrees in 1992.

The seat share of the runner-up party in the lower house measures opposition party system strength. The volatility score of the opposition parties on their own, in turn, measures opposition party system institutionalization, i.e., I compute individual seat shares of opposition parties as shares of the total number of *opposition* seats in the lower house. Volatility scores are based on Pedersen's (1979) volatility index, which adds the net changes of the parties' gained and lost seat shares in an election and divides them by two (**V**olatility $= 1/2 * \sum_{i=1}^{n} |SeatShare_t - SeatShare_{t-1}|$) whereby the values range between 0 and 100 and high scores of volatility indicate a low institutionalization degree of a party system. After that, I rescale the two measures into a scale from 0 to 100, resulting in a continuos competitiveness scale similar to Pederson's volatility index. High values signal a high competitiveness degree:

Hence, as opposition party system strength can reach a theoretical maximum of 50 percent seat share of the runner-up party in the lower house, the measurement has to be multiplied by two. For opposition party system institutionalization, in turn, the inverse of the volatility score of the opposition parties should be taken in order to indicate high opposition institutionalization with high values. As already explained in section 2, to be on the safe side, it is important to consider the two dimensions as necessary conditions for the degree of opposition competitiveness in a dominant party system. This means, to measure the concept *opposition competitiveness degree in a dominant party system* the lower value of the two dimensions opposition party system strength and institutionalization will be used to measure the concept. This procedure ensures that weakness in one dimension *cannot* be substituted by strength in another dimension (cf. Goertz, 2006, 44–46). Such a conservative approach is necessary to err on the safe side when being confronted with emerging party systems, as it is predominantly the case in Africa.

The following paragraphs discuss five special cases regarding the two-dimensional coding rules for the opposition competitiveness index in African dominant party systems:

First, note, that I only rescale but do not standardize the two measures, seat share of the runner-up and opposition volatility, before I include them in the index of opposition competitiveness. Because I use a conservative rule for the index construction (the lower value of the two measures is the final value of the index), the relative impact of the two measures on the final index of competitiveness depends on the empirical variance of the two measures. Because we deal with dominant party systems, it is likely that runner-up seat shares vary generally on a rather low level and accordingly have a bigger impact than the measure of opposition volatility on the final competitiveness index. This would not be problematic, because a higher weight of the opposition party system strength measure vis-à-vis the opposition institutionalization measure in the final competitiveness index would be consistent with theory and therefore welcomed: I.e., I consider the programmatic responsiveness-conducing factor of an institutionalized opposition party system only to come into effect, when the runner-up opposition party has at least some amount of strength. E.g. imagine an opposition party system of one lonely opposition party that achieves every four years one seat in parliament while the dominant party holds the other 199 seats. Such an opposition party system would reach zero percent volatility, i.e. 100 percent institutionalization, but it would hardly be conducive to a feeling of insecurity and incumbency vulnerability on the side of the dominant party. Accordingly, it makes sense that in this case, the low value of 0.5 percent seat share will be reflected in a final competitiveness index of 1 (on a theoretical range from 0–100). Nonetheless, it is still essential to check for opposition institutionalization in the construction of the competitiveness index. E.g., in cases where a newcomer opposition party reaches relatively large seat shares while established opposition parties fall suddenly into oblivion. This is hardly conducive for programmatic orientation and responsiveness. The competitiveness index would nonetheless be sensitive to a repetition of the good result by this particular opposition party in the next elections, because in that case, the volatility score of the opposition would become

low and the impact of the high seat share would be reflected in the final competitiveness index of the second election.

Second, when being confronted with founding first third wave elections, I cannot compute volatility scores for this election. In that case, the opposition competitiveness index is always based on the strength of the runner-up party in the lower house, which is more acceptable – as just outlined due to the relatively higher importance of the strength measure – than the alternative of excluding first elections and losing important observations of party competition in young electoral regimes.

Third, some parties other than the dominant party in a dominant party system might be included by the dominant party in an oversized coalition to neutralize a potential opponent, enable consensus democracy and/or two third majorities in parliament. In case of oversized coalitions, I do not count such additional governing parties as opposition parties but add their seat share to the dominant party.[9]

Fourth, one could find the opposition volatility measure for opposition party system institutionalization problematic in cases where the seat share of the dominant party drops drastically from one election to the next, say from 80 percent to 51 percent. In that case, seat shares from opposition parties could rise strongly but proportionally without fundamentally changing the opposition party system structure; and a high opposition volatility score would falsely indicate a low opposition party system institutionalization value for that election. Therefore, I checked all observations where the final opposition competitiveness index is based on a low opposition institutionalization score and where the seat share of the dominant party dropped for more than 20 percent. For 53 lower house parliamentary

[9]E.g. in Lesotho's 2007 elections, the *National Independent Party* (NIP) obtained four more seats than the main opposition party *All Basotho Convention* ABC. Yet it has been co-opted by the dominant *Lesotho Congress for Democracy* (LCD) (interviews with political experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010). However, adjusting for that did change the final opposition competitiveness index for the 2007 elections only marginally.

elections in 18 African third wave dominant party systems this is only the case for the elections in Ethiopia 2005, Ghana 1996 and Zambia 2001:

In the Ethiopian 2005 elections, the seat share of the dominant party, *Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front* (EPRDF) and its affiliated parties dropped from 88 percent to 60 percent. However, the large opposition volatility score of 99.54 for the 2005 elections is not based on that decline, but on a large restructuring of the opposition landscape in that year. Four newly founded parties reached a seat share of 20 percent while independents and other, minor parties lost 28 of their 29 seats (Nunley, 2009). The same goes for the 2001 Zambian elections where the dominant party, *Movement for Multiparty Democracy* (MMD) even dropped from a comfortable 87 percent to 46 percent and could only uphold its absolute majority due to gains in by-elections and the co-optation of opposition MPs. However, also here, the high opposition volatility score of 98.76 is not an artifact of the large erosion of dominance and a proportional seat share increase of established opposition parties, but on huge gains by the newly formed opposition party, *United Party for National Development* (UPND) (Nunley, 2009; UPND, 2013). However, Ghana's 1996 elections indeed would produce an coding procedure artifact of a falsely identified low opposition party system competitiveness. The main Ghanaian opposition party, *National Patriotic Party* (NPP), to the at that time dominant party, *National Democratic Congress* (NDC), boycotted the founding 1992 third wave elections and participated in the 1996 elections. Accordingly, the dominant NDC's seat share dropped from 94 percent in 1992 to 66 percent in 1996 while the NPP's seat share changed from zero percent to 30 percent in 1996 (Nunley, 2009). As the NPP's roots can be traced back to the Danquah-Busia tradition and the 1947 founded party, *United Gold Coast Convention* (UGCC), it would be wrong to talk of a newcomer opposition party in that case (Morrison, 2004; Osei, 2012). Accordingly, I consider the high 1996 opposition volatility score of 92.54 to be an artifact of the coding procedure and base the opposition competitiveness index for Ghana's 1996

elections on the seat-share of the runner-up party ($30 * 2 = 60$), instead of on the lower value of the inverted volatility score ($100 - 92.54 = 7.46$).

Fifth, in cases where the dominant party is only confronted with one opposition party, i.e. the opposition party system consists of one party, opposition volatility scores will naturally be zero percent as long as this opposition party obtains at least one seat in parliament. Regardless of its seat share in comparison to the total party system, its seat share within the opposition party system will always be 100 percent. In that case, the opposition competitiveness index is exclusively based on twice the total seat share of this party. This procedure somewhat favors latent two-party dominant party systems to latent multi-party dominant party systems, provided that the seat share of this lonely opposition party reaches some amount of significance. This is consistent with my theory, because visibility and concentration of opposition party strength in latent two-party systems is naturally higher than in multi-party systems and should increase opposition competitiveness and incumbency vulnerability to the same degree (cf. Bogaards, 2000). However, if the seat share of this lonely opposition party is rather low, resulting opposition competitiveness scores will correctly remain low, as such an opposition party is unlikely to be a threat to the dominant party.

Because much of the focus of this study is on long-term explanations, it makes sense to analyze opposition competitiveness index *averages* over third wave elections in African dominant party systems to smooth out contemporary fluctuations of opposition competitiveness due to punctual events like election boycotts by important opposition parties, which are naturally more likely to occur in dominant party systems (since opposition parties are more likely to become desperate and/or impatient because of the recurring defeats). When I investigate long term explanations and outcomes of opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems, it would be arbitrary to take competitiveness values of one single election instead of the bigger picture of several elections in a row. Also, as noted in

the subsection before, claims about the character of a party system, and of an opposition party system, have a higher validity if we observe it for some minimal amount of time. The dynamic models on the other hand, will make use of punctual opposition competitiveness, i.e. an observation is one single third wave election.

Regarding the application of the opposition competitiveness measure on *non*-dominant party systems, note that a *non*-dominant party system is more competitive by definition, because it experiences *effective* incumbency change. Hence, it would not make much sense to devise an analogous opposition competitiveness index in non-dominant party systems. Accordingly, it also would not be useful to analytically conflate samples of dominant with non-dominant party systems, because the logic of competition is different and the importance of volatility of the party system is – in my theoretical framework – reduced to the opposition part of the party system in dominant party systems, whereas volatility is an important characteristic of the *whole* party system in *non*-dominant party systems.

Nonetheless, it is possible to devise an analogous measure of incumbent vulnerability and opposition strength for non-dominant party systems. One could measure the seat share of the runner-up party in non-dominant party systems in order to indicate incumbency vulnerability and opposition strength, and combine it with volatility scores of the *whole* party system to indicate party system institutionalization. The two measures can be combined as necessary and sufficient dimensions of the *potential programmatic responsiveness capacity* of a respective non-dominant party system. In the empirical section of the book, I investigate if the variance of this concept has equivalent outcomes and explanations as opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems.

Large-N Case Selection and Data for African Party Systems (for sections 2 and 3)

This book is about African third wave dominant party systems that are situated within democratic electoral regimes (polyarchies) and competitive authoritarian electoral regimes. Dominant *authoritarian* systems, where incumbency change through peaceful elections is impossible under any circumstances, i.e. electoral autocracies (subcategory of Levitsky and Way's (2010) category of "full authoritarianism"), are not of concern here. Accordingly, the book has a regional focus, which is temporarily and conceptually restricted. The history of colonization and democratization in Africa is distinct from other third wave regions like Southern Europe, Latin America or Eastern Europe. If at all, the timing of decolonization and democratization is more similar to some of the Asian third wave countries, but conditions like state capacity were higher in Asia than in Africa with its generally weak states. Nonetheless, if similar conditions apply in some countries of other third wave world regions, I do not want to exclude partial portability of the findings.

The large-N case selection includes all national elections for the lower house in African countries between 1990 and 2008[10] that meet some minimum freeness standards of party competition (see above), and where at least two consecutive multiparty elections took place that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention (cf. Lindberg, 2007; *Freedom House*, 2009): We need at least two consecutive elections to determine important characteristics of the system like stability and institutionalization. Countries in respective election years, which have a Freedom House Political Rights rating of 6 and 7 are excluded (category of "not free" countries in Freedom House) because it is a reasonable assumption to consider their election results to be an exclusively fabricated product with no uncertainty at all about their election outcome (exemptions are Djibouti

[10]Including Botswana's 1989 election.

1992 and Gabon 2006 – both PR value of 6 – because all of their remaining elections in the sample meet the criterium). In doing this, I follow Freedom House's distinction of "free" and "partly free" (political rights values between 1 and 5.5) countries on the one hand and "not free" (political rights values between 6 and 7) countries on the other hand.[11]

I consider the measurement of the Freedom House Political Rights index a sufficiently valid proxy to discern between electoral autocracies on the one hand and competitive authoritarianism and democracies as polyarchies on the other hand. The Political Rights index combines three subcategories about the freeness and fairness of the electoral process, the openness of the political system regarding political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of the government (cf. with *Freedom House* (2009) and section 2 on p. 50). Levitsky and Way (2010, 365) consider an electoral regime to be fully authoritarian if opposition parties and/or candidates are regularly excluded, electoral results severely falsified or major civic and/or opposition groups severely repressed. Analogously, Political Rights indices of 6 and 7 indicate countries that have few and very restricted political rights, opposition groups are severely and violently oppressed, and there is no uncertainty about electoral outcomes (*Freedom House*, 2009).

The resulting sample consists of 53 observations – observations are country years of lower house elections – in 18 sub-Saharan African dominant party systems, which equals approximately 3 observations/election-years per country. Both the large-N analyses in this section of the book as well as the ones in the next section of the book are based on this case selection.

The identification of dominant party systems and the subsequent coding process of the opposition competitiveness index relies on raw electoral data provided by Nunley's (2009)

[11] This procedure allows me to define the boundary between competitive authortarianism and electoral autocracy more narrowly than Levitsky and Way (2010) as it excludes electoral regimes like Cameron and Zimbabwe that became increasingly autocratic shortly after first third wave elections, respectively at the end of the 1990s, to the extent of becoming pure electoral autocracies (Levitsky and Way's (2010, 32–34) case selection includes all countries that were competitive authoritarian according to their criteria at the *beginning* of the 1990s).

African Elections Database and Derksen (2009). Amongst other, the electoral data provides detailed election results of every sub-Saharan African parliamentary and presidential election since independence including elections that have been organized by the colonial powers before independence.[12]

Table 1 on p. 43 reveals the case selection for the large-N section of the book and each case's respective *average* opposition competitiveness index over – on average – three third wave elections. The effective number of consecutive elections between 1990 and 2008 that have not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention is displayed for each country.[13] Also reported are the respective average Political Rights scores (1, highest freedom score, 7, lowest freedom score) of each dominant party system because they are decisive for inclusion of each case in the large-N data set, the respective regime type ("democracy" for Political Rights values between 1 and 2.5, and "competitive authoritarian" for Political Rights values between 2.5 and 5.5), and the total time period of

[12]In cases where these two databases itemized unspecified "others" categories, which subsume the election results for small parties, I tried to research the content of this category by referring to alternative sources, and, if trustable, used their specified election results: Carr's (2007) election archive, data by Freedom House (1991-2002), the database of the *National Electoral Board of Ethiopia*, annual editions of the *Fischer Weltalmanach*, the *Parline Database*, and the data collection *Political Parties of the World*, edited by Day (2002). The same goes for reported vacant seats and undecided, postponed or annulled election results. I also used these sources to check if parties that seemingly belong to the opposition are not part of an oversized coalition of the dominant party.

[13]In some countries, the competitiveness index is based on less than three elections: Gambia's 1992 elections are excluded because of the military coup in 1994 while the 1997 elections are excluded because they were deeply flawed and indexed by Freedom House with the lowest Political Rights value of 7. Ghana's competitiveness index is only based on the 1992 and 1996 elections, because the party system changed its party system status due the results of the 2000 presidential and legislative elections from dominant to non-dominant. The same goes for Kenya, that changed its status from dominance to non-dominance due to the results of the 2002 elections. Additionally, the Kenyan 1997 elections have been excluded because the freeness of multiparty competition deteriorated drastically after the relatively free founding third wave elections in 1992 and only recovered in 2002 (*Freedom House*, 2009). Senegal experienced the end of its dominant party system with the outcome of the presidential elections in 2000. Accordingly, its opposition competitiveness index is only based on the 1993 and 1998 elections. Lesotho's electoral regime was interrupted after the founding third wave elections in 1993 due to a coup led by the constitutional monarch Letsie III in 1994. However, a joint diplomatic action by South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe forced the King to reinstall the government. Likewise, the 1998 election outcome led to widespread violence in the capital Maseru and a joint military intervention by South Africa and Botswana to restore peace and order. A reform of the electoral system was enforced by the invaders, which leads to a new beginning of the electoral cycle in 2002 (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004). Mauritania's 1992 and 1996 elections were deeply flawed and therefore excluded (*Freedom House*, 2009).

dominance for the respective dominant party.[14] Generally, as already discussed in section 1, my Freedom House-based distinction between democracy and competitive authoritarianism is more lenient than the one of Levitsky and Way (2010) as I consider Botswana to be a democracy instead of a competitive authoritarian regime. Lesotho, which is not part of Levitsky and Way's case selection, is also considered to be a democracy, following the Freedom House-based distinction. However, if I would apply Levitsky and Way's criteria of competitive authoritarianism instead, I would consider it to be a case of moderate comparative authoritarianism; analogous to Botswana (van Eerd, forthcoming). Last but not least, during and after its period of dominant party system, Ghana made steady progress in the democratic conduct of its multiparty elections, and changed its status from "competitive authoritarianism" to "democracy" in the 2000s (*Freedom House*, 2009).

Descriptives of the Opposition Competitiveness Index and its Measures

Table 2 on p. 44 shows the descriptive statistics of the opposition competitiveness index in African dominant party systems and its two constituting measures, the seat share of the runner-up party and the opposition volatility. The statistics are based on averages over third wave lower house elections. Note, that the opposition competitiveness index values are divided by 10 (theoretical range from 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 100), as this will ease comparability with other determinants in the inferential statistics that follow further below.

[14]Note, that Botswana already experienced uninterrupted free multiparty elections since independence, which all have been won by the dominant party, *Botswana Democratic Party* (BDP) (*Freedom House*, 2009; Nunley, 2009). However, to allow comparability with the rest of the cases, Botswana's average competitiveness index is based on the four elections since the beginning of the third wave (1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004).

Table 1: *Large-N case selection: African dominant party systems, respective regime type and competitiveness index*

Country	*Regime Type*	*FH PR*	*Years of Dom.*	*N elections*	*Opp. Comp. Index*
Botswana	Democracy	1.75	1965–present	4	38.68
BurkinaFaso	Comp. Authoritarian	4.75	1992–present	4	22.27
Djibouti	Comp. Authoritarian	5.25	1992–present	4	0
Ethiopia	Comp. Authoritarian	4.67	1995–present	3	10.37
Gabon	Comp. Authoritarian	5	1990–present	4	19.21
Gambia	Comp. Authoritarian	4.5	2002–present	2	12.5
Ghana	Comp. Authoritarian	4	1992–2000	2	34
Kenya	Comp. Authoritarian	4	1992–2002	1	31
Lesotho	Democracy	2	2002–2012	2	32.01
Mauritania	Comp. Authoritarian	5	2001–present	2	20.73
Mozambique	Comp. Authoritarian	3	1994–present	3	84.72
Namibia	Democracy	2	1994–present	3	24.99
Nigeria	Comp. Authoritarian	4	1999–present	3	43.67
Senegal	Comp. Authoritarian	4	1993–2000	2	38.93
Seychelles	Comp. Authoritarian	3	1993–present	4	44.33
SouthAfrica	Democracy	1.33	1994–present	3	28.33
Tanzania	Comp. Authoritarian	4	1995–present	3	18.39
Zambia	Comp. Authoritarian	3.75	1991–2011	4	9.26

Table 2: *Descriptive statistics of opposition competitiveness index and its constituting measures*

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*	*N*
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) (average over third wave elections)	2.85	1.87	0	8.47	18
% Seat share runner-up (average over third wave elections)	15.61	8.91	0	42.53	18
Opposition volatility (average over third wave elections)	29.92	26.28	0	79.17	18

The descriptive statistics of the two constituting measures of opposition competitiveness, the seat share of the runner-up opposition party and the opposition party system volatility, confirm the prediction stated further above: The seat share of the runner-up opposition party varies at a lower level than opposition volatility. Hence, it is mostly the decisive measure for the final opposition competitiveness index. More precisely, the average seat share of the opposition in an African dominant party system is 15.61 percent, which is equal to an opposition competitiveness index value of 31.22 ($15.61 * 2$), and close to the effective average competitiveness index of 28.5, while the average opposition volatility is 29.92 percent, which is equal to a much higher index value of 70.08 ($100 - 29.92$).[15] Accordingly, the biggest problem for opposition competitiveness is not opposition volatility but general opposition weakness. The opposition volatility index is only decisive for the final opposition competitiveness index in 6 out of 53 elections (the fourth election in Ethiopia, the second election in Lesotho, the second election in Mozambique and the second to fourth elections in Zamibia) (see figure 36 on p. 304 in the appendix). Accordingly, it influences the final *average* competitiveness index for the 18 cases of dominant party systems only in four instances: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia. Especially in Zambia, and to a lesser degree in Lesotho, the main weakness of the opposition does not derive from generally weak opposition parties but from frequent re-configurations of the opposition landscape from one election to the next, which makes opposition voter's orientation difficult and therefore decreases general opposition competitiveness to a stronger degree than

[15]The medians are not substantially different from the means (not displayed).

the overall potential of the opposition's total vote share would suggest. Hence, it makes sense to include opposition institutionalization in the competitiveness index.

In comparison to that, not surprisingly, the average opposition strength in African *non*-dominant party systems is generally higher (25.39 percent vis-à-vis 15.61 percent) while the overall party system volatility degree is comparable to the volatility degree of the opposition in dominant party systems (26.27 percent vis-à-vis 29.92 percent). And as expected, due to the presence of *effective* competition in non-dominant party systems (i.e. frequent change of incumbency), the respective average level of competitiveness is generally higher than the average level of competitiveness of the opposition parties in dominant party systems (4.63 vis-à-vis 2.85, on a scale from 0 to 10; see descriptive statistic in table 12 on p. 303 in the appendix).

The significant difference of the mean level of competitiveness in dominant vis-à-vis non-dominant African party systems confirms my theoretical presumption that it would be a comparison of apples and oranges to compare competitiveness levels of dominant party systems with competitiveness levels of non-dominant party systems because each group follows its own logic of competition. Whereas theoretical competition is a given to a certain degree in both families of party systems (depending on the fairness of competition), party competition is manifest in non-dominant party systems and latent in dominant party systems; and I am interested in the difference this "latent" competition makes.

Figure 1 on p. 46 visualizes the average opposition competitiveness index for each African dominant party system case in ascending order. There is a steady increase of opposition institutionalization from Djibouti (lowest) to Seychelles (DJ and SC in figure 1).[16] Mozambique is placed at the higher end of the bar graph and clearly an outlier. The former civil-war rebel group and main opposition party *Mozambican National Resistance* (RENAMO) causes this high opposition competitiveness value. Some describe Mozam-

[16]In fact, in Djibouti's third wave elections, no opposition party could ever obtain a single seat in parliament; amongst others, due to the highly disproportional party-block vote system (Nunley, 2009).

Figure 1: *Average opposition competitiveness index in 18 African third wave dominant party systems*



bique's political system as an emerging two-party system (e.g. Carbone, 2005; Manning, 2007, 260) However, it has never experienced change of incumbency since founding third wave elections in 1994.

In the following, I demonstrate the significance of the concept of opposition competitiveness for the quality of democracy in 18 African third wave dominant party systems.

The Empirical Relevance of the Concept of Opposition Competitiveness for the Contemporary Quality Level of Democracy in African Dominant Party Systems

In this subsection, I test the potentially positive effect of the degree of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems. The analysis is based on the case selection of 18 African dominant party systems defined above.

Measuring the Quality of Democracy in a Large-N Design

To test the effects of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy, I refer to a broad conceptualization of the quality of democracy in an electoral regime and use Freedom House' *Civil Liberties* index. Together with the Political Rights index, it is part of Freedom House' annually published data and reports on *Freedom in the World*. Freedom House measures several democratic qualities in society that are distinct from the democratic quality of elections and party competition (cf. Lindberg, 2006, 102), and combines them in its Civil Liberties index. Accordingly, the measure is sufficiently independent from my opposition competitiveness index, which allows to avoid tautology. The index ranges from 1 (wide range of civil liberties realized in society) to 7 (few or no civil liberties present at all in society) and has its emphasis on the *effective* presence of civil liberties "on the ground" compared to their mere constitutional existence (cf. Lindberg, 2006, 101). The Civil Liberties index captures the extent of the freedoms of expression and belief, associational rights (non-partisan related), rule of law, and personal autonomy, and is based on aggregate scores of 15 civil liberties checklist questions, which are currently researched and answered by 70 analysts and academic advisors (for the complete checklist of questions see *Freedom House*, 2009). Freedom House has been criticized for the lack of availability of disaggregated scores of the index and lack of transparency regarding rules of weighting and aggregation (cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).[17] Despite these objections, the index has important advantages over alternative indices: First, the index covers an extensive period of time, since 1972, and every independent country in the world for a dimension of the quality of democracy outside of the immediate electoral arena and party competition. Second, the index is widely accepted as capturing most validly empirical realities and to

[17]Recently, Freedom House made the disaggregated checklist scores for the most recent Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings publicly available. However, they are only dating back to 2006.

be in accordance with evaluations of regional experts and case studies (cf. Lindberg, 2006, 100–103).

To ease interpretation I invert the index so that higher values mean higher quality of democracy. The data is provided by *Freedom House* (2011). Freedom House reports and indices are always based on the precedent year. E.g., for a country's value for 2008, one has to take Freedom House's Civil Liberties assessment of 2009.

Other Determinants of the Quality of Democracy

The model includes two standard explanations of the quality of democracy in a country, the level of modernization and the level of corruption. Additionally, the number of third wave elections are included to control for the number of observations, on which the country average of the opposition competitiveness index is based. The theoretical idea behind the inclusion of this factor is that the regular "exercise" of formal multiparty elections leads to path-dependent learning experiences of the involved actors and to more democratic quality in the society (Lindberg, 2006). Last but not least, the model controls for the freeness and fairness degree of elections because this factor is usually strongly connected with the quality of democracy in society. The inclusion of this last variable should be the most difficult test for my concept of opposition competitiveness because the Political Rights index that I use for the measurement is not only usually empirically highly related to the Civil Liberties index but also includes informations about the significance of the opposition vote in an electoral regime (Pearson's r of 0.26 between opposition competitiveness and Political Rights can be considered as acceptable) (cf. *Freedom House*, 2009).

Amongst others, the modernization theory goes back to Lipset (1959). The theory claims that nations that are economically better off are also more likely to sustain democracy. According to Lipset, socioeconomic development leads to a wealthier and more educated lower strata. This should make the masses less susceptible to extreme and un-

democratic ideologies and demagogues. Additionally, socioeconomic development leads to the growth of a pro-democratic middle class. In turn, income distribution becomes more equal and the upper strata has less to fear from a "tyranny of the majority" that could lead to extreme redistributive laws in a democratic setting (cf. Boix and Stokes, 2003, 539ff.).

To correctly gauge the influence of socioeconomic development on democratic quality, we have to control for the potentially distorting effect of rentier economies on socioeconomic development and democracy. Because "rentier states" have high levels of natural resource wealth, they generate large revenues through the resources' raw export to foreign actors while only an negligible proportion of the national workforce is engaged in the process of the resource extraction. If economic wealth derives from natural resources, the "modernization effect" associated with economic development does not work. Occupational specialization and higher levels of education that usually come along with economic development and cause democracy-promoting social and cultural change are not needed for economic development through the export of raw natural resources. Additionally, governments that receive enough revenues from natural resources are less dependent on taxation and therefore less accountable to their citizens (cf. Ross, 2001; Beblawi, 1987).

Corruption in turn leads to a lower quality of democracy because corruption as an informal institution is one of the main obstacles for a formal democratic regime to become an "effective" democracy "on the ground". Corruption distorts the formally universal access to policies and institutions of the democratic regime into exclusive access for the few; the "for the people" part of Lincoln's famous Gettysburg address becomes dependent on the arbitrariness of bureaucrats and other gate keepers.[18] Especially components F and G of the Civil Liberties checklist questions, "rule of law" (e.g. equal treatment by the courts and the police) and "personal autonomy and individual rights" (e.g. freedom of education or economic freedoms) become severely damaged in the context of rampant corruption.

[18] "[G]overnment of the people, by the people, for the people."

Last but not least, corruption is a sign for a weak and in-effective regime performance. If a regime does not deliver the basic functions of government, it becomes illegitimate, which renders formally democratic regimes to become fragile and weak (Lipset, 1959, 86).

Operationalization of the Other Determinants

Socioeconomic development is measured by the logarithmized Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (PPP constant US-Dollar) per capita. The data is extracted from the *Africa Development Indicators* (WDI) (World Bank, 2009). Resource dependency is measured by adding up the export value (constant 2000 US-Dollar) of mineral-based fuels and the export value of non-fuel ores and metals exports and calculate it as share of GDP (constant 2000 US-Dollar) (cf. Ross, 2001). The World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) provide the raw data (World Bank, 2009).[19] Missing observations are completed by consulting *Der Fischer Weltalmanach* (2009). *Transparency International's* (2009) *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI) measures corruption on a continuous scale from 0 to 10. I invert the index to signify high corruption levels with high values.

Additionally, a count variable of the number of consecutive third wave elections between 1990 and 2008 that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention is included (equivalent to the number of observations per country, on which the average opposition competitiveness index is based). The data is based on Nunley (2009), while interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual Freedom House country reports (*Freedom House*, 2009; *Freedom House*, 1991-2002).

The measurement of the Freedom House Political Rights index is analogous to the Civil Liberties index (*Freedom House*, 2011): The rating process is based on analysts' answers to ten political rights checklist questions. The questions on political rights ask – amongst others – about the freeness and fairness of elections, the openness of the political system

[19]For the export value, a PPP constant US-Dollar measure is not available. Accordingly, to calculate the dependency degree, I took the GDP measure in constant 2000 US-Dollar.

regarding the organization of political parties, the existence of a significant opposition vote and the functioning of the government. Data is provided by *Freedom House* (2011). To ease interpretability, I invert the index so that higher values mean more political rights.

Descriptives of the Contemporary Quality of Democracy and its Determinants, and Methods

I analyze the empirical relevance of opposition competitiveness index *averages* over third wave elections in African dominant party systems on the contemporary quality level of democracy. Whereas the opposition competitiveness index value as a characteristic of a dominant party system is based on the average opposition competitiveness over 2–4 observations/elections between 1990 and 2008 (see section 2), the quality of democracy and the other independent variables are measured for the year 2008. This should test the conduciveness of partially temporally earlier opposition competitiveness to the contemporary quality of democracy. For the three countries that changed their party system status from dominance to non-dominance during the observation period – Ghana and Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002 – (see table 1 on p. 43), I also take the Civil Liberties score of 2008 in the dataset.

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that are involved in the test of the empirical relevance of the opposition competitiveness index for democratic quality.

Table 3: *Descriptive statistics of Freedom House's Civil Liberties index and its determinants*

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*	*N*
Civil liberties (Freedom House, inverted, 1–7)	4.5	1.15	3	6	18
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) (average over third wave elections, 1990–2008)	2.85	1.87	0	8.47	18
GDP / capita (log)	7.77	1.05	6.65	9.89	18
Resource dependency	0.11	0.2	0	0.72	18
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10)	6.63	1.04	4.2	8.1	18
Number of third wave elections	3.33	0.84	2	5	18
Political rights (Freedom House, inverted, 1–7)	4.17	1.42	2	7	18

In 2008, the contemporary and former third wave African dominant party systems' inverted Civil Liberties score varies around a mean of 4.5 between a minimum of 3 in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon and Gambia and a maximum of 6 in Botswana, Ghana, Namibia and South Africa. The descriptives of the average competitiveness are identical to table 2 on p. 44, and are reported here for the sake of completeness in the table.

There is considerable variance of GDP per capita in the data set. It varies between a minimum of 774 PPP constant US-Dollars in Mozambique (not displayed in table, equal to a logarithmized GDP per capita of 6.65 in Mozambique) and a maximum of 19'758 PPP constant US-Dollars in Seychelles (logarithmized GDP per capita of 9.89). The mean is at 4359 PPP constant US-Dollars (median of 1438 PPP constant US-Dollars).

The distribution of the level of resource dependency in the dataset is highly positively skewed as the median is around a low level of 1 percent dependency while the mean is around 11 percent (measured by the export value of fuels and ores as a share of the GDP). In 2008, Gabon is the most resource dependent dominant party system with 72 percent dependency followed in descending order by Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania and South Africa, which are all above the 75 percent percentile of 8 percent resource dependency.

The sample has a generally high level of corruption with a mean of 6.63 on the inverted Corruption Perception Index scale from 0 to 10, with Botswana being the least corrupt

country (index value of 4.2 in 2008) and The Gambia the most corrupt country (index value of 8.1).

The sample's mean Political Rights index is slightly lower than the mean Civil Liberties index (4.17 compared to 4.5 and the range of values is higher because of on the one hand Gabon's deteriorated political rights situation since its elections in 2006 (see section 2) and Mauritania's military coup in 2008, and on the other hand Ghana's perfectly free election in 2008 (*Freedom House*, 2011).[20]

With this set of variables and in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, I run four OLS multiple regression models (m2–m5 in table 4 of the following subsection) based on 18 cases of African third wave dominant party systems (see case selection in table 1 on p. 43) and contrast it with the simple linear regression between average opposition competitiveness and the 2008 quality level of democracy (m1 in table 4). I do not aim at developing a complete model that explains the level of the quality of democracy. Rather I want to show the general significance of my measure for the quality of democracy and test it against the most important standard explanations and potential origins of a spurious relationship.

Results

In all five models of table 4, indeed higher average degrees of opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems over the time period of the third wave are conducive to contemporary high quality levels of democracy (statistical significance level at $p < 0.05$ in models 1 to 5 in table 4). This supports the general argument of the book: First, African dominant party systems are a rather heterogeneous group of electoral regimes compatible with varying quality levels of democracy (cf. also with the descriptive statistics in table 3 in the previous subsection). And second, stronger and more institutionalized opposition

[20]The results in the following subsection are robust to the exclusion of Gabon and Mauritania (not displayed in the book).

parties in African dominant party systems (even if too weak to take power) are conducive to a higher quality of democracy in society.[21]

In detail, when no other variables are present, an increase of an opposition competitiveness value of 1 (remember that the scale of the opposition competitiveness index in table 4 is rescaled from 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 100 to enable comparison with the other determinants in the model) leads to an increase of almost a third of a Civil Liberties index score (see model 1 in table 4 and the scatterplot in figure 2). In other words, an average seat share strengthening of the runner-up opposition party of 5 percent or a decrease of 10 percent volatility in the opposition party system already leads to an increase of almost a third of a Civil Liberties index score. Opposition competitiveness alone explains 17 percent of the variance. The model fit of model 1 would be almost double if we would exclude the case of Mozambique, which has a relatively weak quality of democracy in 2008, contrarily to what we could expect from its extraordinarily high opposition competitiveness index (result not displayed in book; cf. with figure 2 instead). This counter-intuitive concomitance of high opposition strength and institutionalization and a relatively low quality of democracy can be observed in other regions of the third wave: E.g., in Latin America, the party systems of Columbia and Venezuela in the second half of the 20th century were highly institutionalized and seemingly competitive, yet they were not programmatically responsive to their electorate and the quality of democracy was rather low (Bornschier, Forthcoming; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Considering Mozambique's main political parties' past of civil war rivalry, we could argue that the more party loyalties are based on the experience of

[21]First, these results are robust to the exclusion of the cases of Gabon and Mauritania, which both changed from competitive authoritarianism to electoral autocracies since their last elections in 2006 (not displayed in book). And second, these results are also highly robust to an alternative measure of the dependent variable of the quality of democracy: In table 13 in the appendix, I take the mean value for approval of the Afrobarometer 2008 question q21 ("people should be free to speak their minds no matter how unpopular their views") in order to capture the quality of democracy in society by focusing on democratic attitudes in societies in dominant party systems that are confronted with large natural majorities for one party. Yet, the number of cases reduces to 10 because of missing countries that are not captured by the Afrobarometer survey.

Table 4: *Average opposition competitiveness in African third wave dominant party systems as determinant of the 2008 quality level of democracy*

	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5
	b	b	b	b	b
Opposition Competitiveness Index (avg.) (0–10)[1]	0.29∗	0.28∗	0.22∗	0.29∗	0.17∗
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.08)
GDP / capita (log)		0.42+			
		(0.21)			
Resource dependency		−2.72∗			
		(1.10)			
Corruption Perception Index (inverted)			−0.75 ∗ ∗		
			(0.17)		
Number of Third Wave elections				0.41	
				(0.29)	
Political Rights (inverted)					0.62 ∗ ∗
					(0.10)
Constant	3.67 ∗ ∗	0.76	8.86 ∗ ∗	2.33∗	1.42 ∗ ∗
	(0.46)	(1.64)	(1.20)	(1.07)	(0.44)
Adjusted R^2	.17	.41	.62	.22	.75
F	4.60∗	4.93∗	15.06 ∗ ∗	3.39+	26.68 ∗ ∗
N	18	18	18	18	18

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

[1] *Main independent variable is the average of opposition competitiveness over all elections since the beginning of the third wave in an African dominant party system (1990–2008). The dependent variable of the inverted Freedom House Civil Liberties Index and the other independent variables are observations in the year 2008.*

Figure 2: *Scatterplot of the quality of democracy on opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems*



violent conflict in opposition to legacies of non-violent conflict, the less opposition strength and institutionalization necessarily leads to the fulfillment of its promise of programmatic responsiveness and high quality of democracy. Figure 2 shows that Nigeria has a relatively low quality level of democracy despite a competitive opposition in its dominant party system, too. Amongst others, this could be due to Nigeria's strict requirements for parties' electoral registration (Bogaards, 2010b; Bogaards, Basedau and Christof, 2010).[22] This, in turn, would imply that artificial competitiveness of the opposition is not as conducive to higher quality levels of democracy as competitiveness of the opposition reached through non-institutional means.

[22]See also a more detailed discussion on the potential causes of high opposition competitiveness degrees in Nigeria on p. 107.

The influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains significant in the presence of other determinants in models 2 to 5 of table 4. In the presence of the logarithmized GDP per capita and resource dependency (model 2), the positive influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains equally strong and significant while modernization measured by the logarithmized GDP per capita has the expected positive but weak significant influence on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems ($p < 0.1$). Resource dependency has the expected negative and significant influence on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems ($p < 0.05$). E.g. if resource dependency increases 10 percent, the Civil Liberties index decreases 0.27 level points. Most importantly, compared with model 1, my opposition competitiveness index is robust to the inclusion of these two standard explanations of the level of democracy. The level of explained variance increases about 24 percent.

As expected – the influence of corruption on the quality of democracy is highly significant and negative ($p < 0.001$, model 3). The inclusion of this standard explanation results in a model fit of 62 percent explained variance. If corruption increases one Corruption Perception Index point, the quality of democracy decreases 0.75 Civil Liberties index points. In the presence of the corruption determinant, the influence of the opposition competitiveness index becomes somewhat weaker, compared with models 1 and 2, but remains satisfyingly significant.

Whereas the number of third wave elections has no significant influence on the quality of democracy in African dominant party systems (model 4), the inverted Freedom House Political Rights index, which is the measure for the freeness and fairness degree of elections, has the expected highly significant and positive influence on the quality of democracy in society, which is measured by the inverted Freedom House Civil Liberties index ($p < 0.001$). Yet, despite the naturally strong influence when we explain the level of democracy in society with the level of democracy in elections, and despite the fact, that the freeness and

fairness degree of elections includes characteristics of the opposition itself, the influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy remains significant.

Conclusion

In sum, this section of the book demonstrates that the third wave of democratization in Africa can be successful, even if the government remains dominated by one major political party. A competitive opposition party (system) with some minimum amount of strength and institutionalization – even if too weak to take power – can be conducive to a higher quality of democracy. This result is robust to the inclusion of standard explanations of the quality level of democracy.

This means that dominant party systems are compatible with relatively high levels of democracy and that opposition competitiveness in dominant party systems is not automatically on a homogeneously low level, i.e. a direct function of the existence of a dominant party system. Naturally, opposition competitiveness is overall on a lower degree in comparison with the generally more competitive non-dominant party systems as the rather low mean of the opposition competitiveness index and the rather low average seat share of the runner-up party proves. Yet, there is significant opposition competitiveness variation within the group of African dominant party systems, and this variation in turn proves to be an important determinant of the quality of democracy in this special group of party systems, which so far has been misjudged as problematic for democratic consolidation by definition.

I.e., there exists an alternative path to democracy in Africa that works through dominant party systems with competitive opposition parties instead of the generally championed path of non-dominant party systems; likewise to democratic consolidation in the dominant party systems of Mexico at the beginning the 2000s, or Italy and Japan after the Second World War. And this path does not necessarily work through effective incumbency change

as the case of Ghana tentatively suggests. After all, Ghana improved its quality of democracy to a substantial degree already before incumbency change in 2000 (*Freedom House. Freedom in The World.*, 2013). Moreover, incumbency changes in formerly dominant party systems in Senegal 2000, Kenya 2002 and more recently in Zambia 2011 did not lead to significant long-term improvements of their quality of democracy (*Freedom House. Freedom in The World.*, 2013), while countries like Botswana and South Africa, and to a lesser degree Mozambique and Seychelles, have higher qualities of democracy in society without incumbency change.

What could explain the varying degrees of opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems? This is the topic of the following section of the book.

3 Explanations for Varying Opposition Competitiveness in African Party Systems

I follow a "Rokkanian" perspective of critical junctures and historical legacies of political cleavages to explain different degrees of opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems, i.e. different degrees of opposition strength and institutionalization (Rokkan, 2000; cf. Bornschier, 2012b). A Rokkanian approach emphasizes the significance of long-term programmatic linkages between parties and voters. Apart from an approach that emphasizes short-term programmatic and economic voting (Downs, 1957), which is not the focus of this study, a Rokkanian approach stands in contrast (1) to an approach that emphasizes the role of electoral institutions for the configuration of party systems (Duverger, 1959), and (2) an approach that emphasizes clientelistic and charismatic linkages between parties and voters (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

I argue that opposition parties in dominant party systems of contemporary African third wave electoral regimes cannot compete effectively with the dominant party if they cannot draw on historic, ideological and symbolic "capital", i.e., a 'brand identity' from cleavage-based party system structuring and voter-loyalties formed in minimally routinized electoral competition shortly before and after independence. A 'brand identity' and an image of a party that 'stands for something' increases the independence of an opposition party as an organizational body from its current strong-men and -women and enhances non-material cohesiveness among the elite of the party.[23] Additionally, it increases the level of trust among potential opposition voters who would otherwise fear to waste their vote on a 'flash in the pan'.

[23] Cf. with Levitsky and Way's (2010, 376) "non-material sources of [party] cohesion". Cf. also with LeBas (2011).

If legacies of historic cleavages are present in an African dominant party system of the third wave, they provide opposition parties with non-material sources of cohesiveness. On the one hand, non-material sources of cohesiveness enable opposition parties to engage more viably in clientelistic and non-position taking programmatic valence competition because they make voters and party elites more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic and valence promises. On the other hand, non-material sources of cohesiveness also allow opposition parties to invest more viably in position-taking programmatic mobilization strategies. Position-taking programmatic mobilization, in turn, leads to competition on an equal standing with the dominant party (cf. Shefter, 1994; Van de Walle, 2007).

If opposition parties lack salient legacies of historic cleavages, however, they have to exclusively, and also less viably, rely on short-term mobilization strategies of the electorate – clientelism, charisma and valence issues –, which naturally work better for the incumbent and dominant party in an uncertain context of non-routinized and new electoral regimes, and material resources that are mostly concentrated at the state-level (cf. Bleck and van de Walle, 2012; Van de Walle, 2003). The exclusive salience of short-term mobilization strategies leads (1) to the prevalence of opposition parties that only have scarce *material* sources of cohesiveness at hand and are more prone to co-optation by the dominant party, factionalism and floor-crossing ("nomadisme de politique"). In such a political environment, opposition parties are mostly formed by ambitious political outsiders who want to gain the attention of the dominant party, get access to the patronage cake, and eventually jump on the bandwagon of the dominant party. Furthermore, (2) a prevalence of opposition parties without legacies of cleavages and an established collective identity leads to less trusting and less loyal, as well as more easily disillusioned opposition voters who are both less willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursement of promised clientelistic goods and are less receptive to position-taking programmatic mobilization. All these factors weaken and

de-institutionalize opposition parties and decrease the vulnerability degree of the dominant party.

In the following, I first present my "Rokkanian" approach for explaining the degree of contemporary opposition competitiveness and dominant party system vulnerability. After that, I present the main alternative explanation: the salience of clientelistic mobilization strategies. At the same time, I also discuss the relationship between cleavage-based party competition and clientelistic mobilization in more detail. Lastly, I outline other determinants and controls.

Legacies of Cleavages and Contemporary Dominant Party Systems

Salient legacies of cleavages among African elites that structured the embryonic party systems at the time of the introduction of first national pre-independence elections have the potential to strengthen and institutionalize the opposition party/parties in contemporary third wave dominant party systems because they give opposition parties ideological and symbolic 'capital', and an established 'brand identity' to attract voters and retain organizational cohesion in the context of clientelism and valence competition that favors the dominant party. Yet, legacies of pre-independence cleavages can only spill over into third wave dominant party systems if democratic breakdowns after independence did not lead to uninterrupted and long-term autocratic one-party or military regimes between independence and post-Cold War transitions in the 1990s. Otherwise, salient pre-independence cleavages that structured the historic party system have effectively been suppressed and are lost for contemporary African party systems to build on.

Regarding the influence of electoral institutions on party system configurations, I argue that electoral institutions are rather endogenous to the historical processes of party sys-

tem formation (cf. Rokkan, 2000): Around independence, electoral systems were regularly changed to suit the interests of the party/parties in power: E.g. proportional systems were changed to majority systems and parliamentary systems to presidential systems to exclude additional competitors and centralize power (cf. Van de Walle, 2003, 309; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 358–360).

The concept of *cleavage* goes back to Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal contribution on the origin of party systems in Western Europe. Cleavages are conflicts in the social structure that polarize politics in a system. A cleavage is based on at least one division in socio-structural foundations like class, religion or ethno(-regional) affiliation that manifests itself in an element of collective identity and develops an organizational form (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, 213–220). Hence, a conflict in the social structure needs three elements, social-structural foundation, collective identity and organizational form, to be considered a cleavage (cf. Bornschier, 2009). Cleavages develop during *critical junctures* in history that lead to developments ('paths') and concomitant self-reinforcing positive feedback processes that cannot easily be abandoned later (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; cf. Pierson, 2004).

I make a path-dependent argument regarding the formation of salient cleavages at the *first critical juncture* of decolonization and indigenous nationalization in African colonies. The critical juncture of decolonization is common to every contemporary African electoral regime with exception of Ethiopia (which was always independent apart from the short period of Italian occupation from 1936 until 1941). It varies regarding the degree of violence involved in the decolonization process and initiates cleavage formation and concomitant party system structuring in African electoral regimes from independence onwards. After that, I identify a *second critical juncture*, the first post-independence installation of indigenous authoritarian military, de jure or de facto one-party regimes, which varies regarding (1) its occurrence among former African colonies, (2) its timing, (3) the stability of the authoritarian regime that initiated it, and (4) the degree of suppression of existing cleav-

ages during the authoritarian regime. In opposition to other accounts in literature (e.g. Dickovick, 2008, 1120), I do *not* regard the third wave of democratization in Africa in 1990 itself to be a critical juncture for the structure and responsiveness of contemporary party systems (cf. Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). I rather consider the third wave in Africa to be the outcome of an external shock and changing environment, i.e. the end of the Cold War, that had an impact on every African regime and forced most of them to introduce or re-introduce electoral regimes (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010). A focus on the period of third wave transitions neither can explain the large variance of different party system structures after the beginning of the third wave in 1990, nor the resulting large variance regarding contemporary quality levels of democracy or party system responsiveness in African electoral regimes. Rather, I argue, it is the interaction of the first critical juncture at independence and the party system structuring incentives that followed from that in interaction with the second critical juncture that is decisive for the structure of African party systems after the third wave and contemporary levels of the quality of democracy and responsiveness.

Analogous to cleavage formation in Western Europe, processes of nationalization at the first critical juncture of African decolonization are processes of centralization and standardization, and most likely provoke an indigenous territorial, *center-periphery*, conflict during the transformation of the colonial system into independent nations (cf. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 2000, 335–350).[24] Accordingly, I argue that center-periphery conflicts are latent in every African nationalization process. However, their manifestation depends on the (1) modus of the first critical juncture of de-colonization, and (2) the occurrence, timing and character of the second critical juncture of installation of indigenous authoritarianism in order for a potential indigenous center-periphery conflict to manifest itself

[24]In opposition to Western Europe, where processes of centralization and standardization also triggered a state-church conflict besides a territorial center-periphery conflict (Rokkan, 2000, 335–350), I consider African territorial conflicts primarily of a (non-functional) rural-urban nature because African states inherited secularism from their colonizers from the outset.

in a salient cleavage that structures post-independence party competition and develops a path-dependent effect on contemporary African party system structures.

It is important to note, that I do not argue that the initial socio-structural foundation of the center-periphery cleavage did not change over time. Rather I argue, that subsequent party systems over the second critical juncture and during the third wave – depending on the occurrence, timing and fashion of the second critical juncture – still structure political conflicts and expectations of the elite and the mass according to the initial center-periphery antagonism (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 53–63). After analyzing the initial content and socio-structural foundation of the cleavage, I focus on tracing the legacy of this structuring over time, and not so much on the content of new conflicts that are incorporated into the existing structure in order to perpetuate the center-periphery cleavage.

The first critical juncture: formation of a center-periphery cleavage

Regarding the (1) circumstances of decolonization, I consider processes of rather incremental, *non-violent* decolonization and indigenous nationalization to be the most ideal conditions for center-periphery conflicts to transform into salient cleavages and structure historic party system competition, which initiate potential path-dependent developments. Such non-violent decolonization was mostly the case in British and French African colonies; in opposition to mostly violent and enforced decolonization processes in Portuguese colonies and rather violent liberation processes in the settler oligarchies of Namibia and South Africa (as well as Zimbabwe, which is not part of the case selection of the book).

More precisely, in both French and British colonies, the *first critical juncture* of indigenous nationalization, which was decisive for historical party system formation, manifested itself in the first national pre-independence elections that have been held in French and British colonies after the Second World War. These elections were organized by the colonial powers for the local African population to on the one hand attenuate African nationalists'

growing demands for independence and self-determination after having fought for a free Europe in the Second World War, and on the other hand prepare the colonies for future self-governance in the British Commonwealth or political participation in the French National Assembly according to the French doctrine of assimilation (Diamond, 1989; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Osei, 2012).

In contrast to Britain and France, Portugal was not willing to grant independence or self-governance of any kind to its African colonies: No representative institutions were allowed to emerge.[25] Accordingly, the first critical juncture for eventual manifestation of salient cleavages in Portuguese colonies can be found in the largely violent nationalist struggle for independence (most notably in Angola and Mozambique) (Osei, 2012, 75). The same goes for the 'settler oligarchies' South Africa and Namibia, where long-term and mostly armed liberation movements and parties fought against racist and exclusive societies and electoral regimes. Accordingly, in both Portuguese colonies and settler oligarchies, the main line of mostly violent conflict is between the minority of the Portuguese population and white settlers respectively, and the respective black majority that constitutes or supports the liberation movement while potential indigenous lines of conflict are rather suppressed in order to increase chances for a successful liberation. However, this does not preclude the existence of additional indigenous, territorial cleavages inside the liberation or independence movement. Both in the former settler oligarchies of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, as well as in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola potential internal conflicts became salient cleavages during and after liberation, amongst others due to active sponsorship by the South African apartheid regime for one side of latent indigenous cleavages in order to destabilize the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa itself or to destabilize neighboring countries.[26]

[25]Further, lesser important, colonial powers in Africa are not of concern in this study.
[26]Both Zimbabwe and Angola are not part of the case selection of this book.

Generally, I consider the center-periphery conflict to be the only one with potential to transform into a salient cleavage at that time, at least in former British and French African colonies. Amongst others, the second important process for cleavage formation in Western Europe – the industrial revolution – was and is largely absent on the African continent (most trade unions in African countries rather represent public employers and were co-opted by authoritarian one-party regimes that suppressed existing cleavages) (cf. Erdmann and Basedau, 2007, 10; Randall, 2001). A state-church conflict, in turn, is not important because new African states inherited secularism from their colonizers.

Hence, I argue that salient cleavages in French and British African colonies develop after the Second World War, in anticipation of and pushing for pre-independence national elections and nationalization, and structure society according to a territorial, center-periphery conflict. They evolve between a (relatively urban) future center that hopes to gain influence due to independence and a (mostly rural) future periphery that fears to lose influence compared to its pre-independence position in the division of power between the colonial forces and the indigenous society. Generally, a comparatively lesser educated African conservative and/or traditional elite that secured peripheral penetration and control for the colony in the countryside (voluntarily or involuntarily) and benefited from colonial patronage goods for themselves and their clients should be in opposition to a comparatively more educated African elite that was not part of the traditional system or estranged from it. Despite its Western education, this *intelligentsia* was relatively excluded from the spoils and positions of the colonial system. This should lead to resentments and more radical opposition to the colonial system than among the more conservative and traditional elite that hoped for pacted transitions to independence or even no substantial independence at all. The radical intelligentsia is most likely backed by the support of jobless and lesser educated youths in more urban areas that lacked access to the patron-client network in the countryside. So, while the traditional rural and peripheral elites like chiefs have to win

less from radical decolonization and immediate indigenous nationalization, standardization and centralization, the indigenous center of educated Africans, intelligentsia and the urban elite of commoners and estranged aristocrats can only gain with its previous "below value" position by taking over the administrative center from the colonial power. Due to its own indigenous origin, the new center will have more legitimacy than the colonizers to suppress traditional peripheral political systems in the future modern nation. Accordingly, members of the urban elite and intelligentsia are more likely to adopt progressive rhetorics, which are directed against the traditional power of chiefs, who in turn will adopt more conservative rhetoric (in the small-N part of this book, in section 4, I will operationalize the center-periphery cleavage in African British and French colonies precisely according to the three elements of a cleavage).

Due to the international context of the Cold War during decolonization and higher education of African elites in Western and Eastern European universities at that time, the two sides of the center-periphery cleavage are likely to adopt symbols and rhetorics of the class-cleavage, which was and is still salient in many parts of the OECD-world, by identifying themselves with communist/socialist or capitalist ideologies. However, I consider this alleged cleavage to be only a mimicry of the real class-cleavage in Western Europe due to the lack of socio-structural foundation of an organized proletariate in non-industrialized and mainly agrarian African societies. Hence, if a salient cleavage in African societies resembles a bourgeoisie-proletariate divide, I consider it to enrich the rhetorics and strengthen the already existing structuring according to the center-periphery cleavage instead of cross-cut, replace, crowd-out or change its very content. And rather importantly, its function is also to attract external support from one of the Cold War powers, which is another factor that strengthens both sides of the center-periphery cleavage.[27]

[27]E.g. in an interview with a high-ranking minister of the 2010 LCD government in Lesotho, the minister had no trouble to associate the heritage of his party with the Sowjet side at the beginning of the Cold

Hence, the international context of the Cold War and the concomitant left-right divide enriches and reinforces salient center-periphery cleavages among African elites without transforming their fundamental character or being a salient cleavage in its own respect: Due to the combination of opposition to Western colonialism and the feeling of exclusion from the spoils of Western colonial patronage, the more radical African elite and intelligentsia should be likely to be receptive to alternative ideologies and new allies in the emerging Soviet Bloc, which was not involved in colonialism. From their studies abroad the members of this elite bring back marxist, socialist and communist ideas and concepts and combine them with radical nationalism and opposition to the traditionally decentralized African political system of chieftainships and traditional kingdoms. Lacking the socio-structural foundation of an organized proletariate in mainly agrarian African societies they are likely to undertake efforts in mobilizing the so called "peasantariate" in the countryside and the jobless youth in more urban areas for rather radical opposition to the colonial power. In reaction to this and in line with the context of the Cold War, the Western colonial powers in turn feel compelled to support more moderate and conservative African elites, which are part of the traditional system themselves, which cooperated (voluntarily or involuntarily) with colonial powers, or are at least affiliated with it. Accordingly, more moderate and traditional elites most likely intensify anti-communist, pro-capitalist and pro-Western rhetoric. Potential cleavages around independence start to superficially resemble the bourgeoisie-proletariate cleavage in Western Europe without being based on an actual industrial revolution and significant class differences, but rather a national revolution that divides between peripheral and central elites and followers.

The ideology of "Pan-Africanism" is also likely to reinforce the center-periphery cleavage without fulfilling the criteria of being a cleavage itself, because it lacks a socio-structural foundation in the different societies itself: Pan-Africanism aims at the unification of all

War, yet still wanted me to explain to him the fundamental difference between 'left' and 'right' politics in Western European countries (interview in Lesotho, 2010).

African people regardless if they are in diaspora or in different parts of the continent. Naturally, more radical and internationalist African elites were more likely to be inspired by these ideas than more conservative elites that profited from the colonial system, which resembled more the Western concept of the nation state. Accordingly, if Pan-Africanism is present in an African country, it is most likely incorporated by more radical elites that push for immediate independence and are more sympathetic to marxist ideologies.

Decolonization of most former British and French African colonies happened in a relatively short amount of time of less than a decade. Accordingly, ideologies like communism and Pan-Africanism diffused widely on the continent, amongst the African elite, which often visited the same universities in Western Europe, Eastern Europe or South Africa. Hence, nationalization processes and political cleavage formation in cases that decolonized earlier – e.g. most notably Ghana in 1957 – influenced nationalization process in cases that colonized at a later point in time.

The only potential alternative cleavages that are likely to strengthen, supplement, cross-cut or even replace the main cleavage between central and peripheral African elites are religious or ethnic affiliations (we already ruled out religious cleavages to some degree because African states inherited secularism from their colonizers). Yet, I argue that ethnic affiliations are mostly not invoked for cultural dominance at the state by one ethnic group over others but rather to secure access to the patronage cake for an ethnic group (cf. Erdmann, 2007, 11). Likewise to the exploitation of the traditional system of rule by the colonizers, ethnic boundaries were also politicized, redrawn, emphasized or suppressed to suit the purposes of the colonial powers and facilitate control of the periphery. The more dominant the center-side was in the initiation of the process of nationalization and the development of the embryonic party system, the more peripheral-ethnic elites that profited from the colonial system of indirect rule had to unite their forces with peripheral-traditional forces from other privileged ethnic groups and put on hold their more narrow

ethnopolitical aspirations to effectively meet the competition from the center-side. Hence, the more salient the territorial cleavage, the more different ethnic and/or religious groups unite behind one side of the center-periphery cleavage rather than constituting a political cleavage in their own right. And the more salient the territorial cleavage, the less likely that ethnic cleavages replace or cross-cut it, but rather reinforce it. Generally, I assume that it depends on an ethnic group's previous position of power in the colonial system for choosing one side or the other of the territorial cleavage. The more an ethnic or religious group has to fear from radical breaches with the colonial power the more it will support peripheral and conservative forces. The more it felt marginalized under the colonial system and lacked access to the spoils of patronage the more it will support radical-center forces.

Favorable conditions for a salient territorial cleavage to prevail over ethnic cleavages are leaders and party elites on the center or peripheral side that belong to minority ethnic groups that are too small in order to form a viable, mono-ethnic party (cf. Dickovick, 2008). Moreover, it also depends on the general ethnic structure of an African country. The more ethnically homogeneous the country, the less incentives to mobilize ethnopolitical conflicts in the formation of the embryonic party system.

Accordingly, this book does not intend to neglect the role of ethnopolitical cleavages or rule out that ethnic and/or religious cleavages cross-cut, suppress or even replace the initial latent cleavage between center/radical and peripheral/conservative forces. After all, in the political history of African countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda, ethnic cleavages certainly play a prominent role.

Despite the potential cleavage strengtheners of the context of Cold War ideologies and superpower politics, Pan-Africanism and aligned ethnopolitical cleavages, the special circumstance of nationalization in the context of decolonization and lack of subsequent industrialization leads to political cleavages at the beginning of party system formation that are comparatively fewer and weaker than in Western Europe, and comparatively less

likely to "freeze" over time: First, nationalization processes mainly provoke divisions and elements of collective identity among the elite of a country. Their saliency decreases over time and needs to be supplemented by processes like industrialization and/or the state-church conflict, which more easily mobilize larger segments in society. Yet, party formation in Africa has so far not been confronted with industrialization and/or a state-church conflict and politics therefore mainly remained a business amongst elites without considerable involvement of a narrow middle class and a large "peasantariate". Second, as previously noted, in case of the violent decolonization processes in Portuguese colonies and settler oligarchies, in order to unify their forces against colonialism, national independence and liberation parties and movements had strong incentives to suppress dissent and dividing cleavage formation inside the movement and emphasize the "transcending" and more immanent "supra"-center-periphery cleavage between the colonial center and the peripheral African society (cf. Randall, 2001, 246f.). Consequently, after reaching independence, nationalist liberation movements and parties are tempted to monopolize power and nationalist rhetorics and suppress opposition. Even in British and French African colonies, which experienced largely peaceful decolonization through pre-independence elections, winning parties are tempted to avoid the crystallization of salient territorial cleavages, and concomitant dissent and vote dispersion among the nationalist movement. Consequently, these (more or less forced) unification processes are likely to lead to the *second critical juncture* of the abolishment of potentially cleavage-strengthening post-independence electoral regimes and the installation of authoritarian one-party regimes or counter-revolutionary military regimes. And it depends largely on the timing of the second critical juncture and the subsequent durability of the authoritarian regime to allow third wave party systems to rely on party system-structuring legacies of territorial cleavages:

Second critical juncture: establishment or suppression of center-periphery cleavage

While the first critical juncture of pre-independence elections causes similar developments in former British and French African colonies for party competition and structuring, I argue that the (1) occurrence, the (2) timing and the (3) fashion of the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the post-independence electoral regimes determine the structuring of future party systems and set previously similar cases apart. The sooner the second critical juncture of the abolishment of post-independence electoral regimes follows the first one of the introduction of pre-independence elections, the less time for the routinization of electoral politics and the establishment of stable political identities and party linkages in the electorate.[28] If such a breakdown of the electoral regime did not occur yet, the better the conditions for the establishment of structured party competition around a center-periphery cleavage. If it did occur, the longer the experience of minimally competitive elections between the first critical juncture and the second critical juncture of the breakdown, the better for the establishment of structured party competition. The strength and stability of the first post-independence authoritarian regime, in turn, determines both the degree of suppression of an existing center-periphery cleavage in itself and the likeliness of pre-third wave breakdown of the authoritarian regime, which would lead to pre-third wave renaissance of a minimally competitive electoral regime. Accordingly, the less strong and stable the first post-independence authoritarian regime, the more likely another round of pre-third wave routinization around established cleavages and subsequent spill-over into the third wave.

In other words, chances that political identities and ideological (party) traditions are lost for third wave party systems to rely on are biggest if the abolishment of post-independence electoral regimes leads to the stable installation of an authoritarian one-party regime

[28] Cf. with Kitschelt et al. (2010, 177–208) who argue that historic routinization of electoral politics in Latin America influences future party system structuring.

or the abolishment of any political party by military regimes. In both cases, opposing parties and their radical and/or conservative ideological traditions are suppressed for a long time. In the case of stable authoritarian one-party regimes, the associated side of the cleavage loses its significance as well due to the lack of electoral competition with its suppressed antagonist.

Consequently, my argument is a path-dependent one (cf. Pierson, 2004): First, I argue, that the content of the cleavage is based on the first critical juncture of national revolution in former African colonies. Second, successful spill-over of this cleavage into third wave party systems, i.e. the historical cleavage has still some amount of saliency in the structuring of third wave party systems, depends on the timing and fashion of the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the first post-independence electoral regime. The more time passes after the first national elections until this second critical juncture (or the second critical juncture remains absent), the better for successful spill-over of cleavages into present third wave party systems.

Figure 3 visualizes an ideal-typical (British- or French-)African case regarding the development of party competition, structured around political cleavages over authoritarian interruptions. Decisive for salient survival of political structuring around the legacy of a territorial political cleavage in the third wave are the duration and saliency of party competition around this political cleavage during pre-third wave electoral regimes, visualized by the two continuos arrows before the beginning of the third wave. Negatively speaking, the longer the authoritarian phase(s), marked by transparent and broken arrows, and the more strongly suppressed the territorial political cleavage during that time, the less likely salient survival in the third wave.

In sum, the less electoral politics after independence could routinize and the longer the era of uninterrupted authoritarian one-party or military rule, the less able are opposition

Figure 3: *Timeline of party competition around territorial political cleavage in ideal-typical African case*



parties in post-cold war third wave electoral regimes to base their programmatic identity and mobilization on "frozen" political structures and identities from the embryonic party system around the time of independence (this does not necessitate that the initial socio-structural foundation and the effective content of the cleavage is still salient). The less they are able to profit from symbolic 'capital' and a historic 'brand identity', in turn, the more they have to exclusively and also less viably resort to short-term programmatic mobilization and to clientelistic mobilization, which, because of its incumbency and access to government resources, is the natural strategy of the dominant party and rather weakens and de-institutionalizes opposition parties in dominant party systems (see following section).

Hypothesis 1.1: *The more cleavage-based party competition established itself in* ***pre****-third wave national parliamentary elections, the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.*

Alternative Hypotheses:

Alternatively, one could hypothesize that it is not so much the establishment of cleavages around independence, but rather the modernization and "sophistication level" of the citizenry at the moment of first national elections at the time of independence that is

responsible for the establishment of party competition around salient cleavages. I.e., contemporary opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems would be rather a long-term effect of the modernization level around independence than established cleavages around independence.

And finally, alternatively to the routinization of *pre*-third wave electoral politics, we could look into the influence of the routinization of third wave electoral competition itself (cf. Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Lindberg, 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). We could hypothesize that the learning experience of the temporarily nearer third wave elections are more important than the more distant combination of routinization of pre-third wave elections and significant cleavage formation around independence. I will test these alternative hypotheses in the large-N section of the book.

Alternative Hypothesis 1.2: *The higher the modernization level around the time of independence, the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.*

Alternative Hypothesis 1.3: *The more* ***post****-third wave national parliamentary elections have been held in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems, the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.*

Clientelistic Mobilization and Opposition Competitiveness

Parties can mobilize their voters by three strategies, which are seldom exclusive in a country: So far, this section mostly dealt with (1) (historic) programmatic mobilization strategies that work through the promise and provision of public and universalistic goods from whose consumption opponent voters or non-voters can not be excluded, and which have long-term effects on the viability of contemporary mobilization strategies and party sys-

tems. (2) Traditional mobilization works through the voters having a traditional and/or emotional loyalty towards the politicians and the parties they vote for. And finally, (3) clientelistic mobilization strategies are prevalent if parties mainly provide voters private goods or club goods in exchange for their vote (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

A prevalence of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters generally works to the advantage of the dominant party and leads to the weakness and de-institutionalization of the opposition parties in the context of a dominant party system. The more clientelistic mobilization strategies prevail in electoral systems where the required resources for clientelistic mobilization are concentrated at the state level, the more the usual incumbency advantage is inflated (cf. Van de Walle, 2003).[29] The dominant party can use such a clientelistic monopoly to co-opt opposition parties and their politicians and turn them into further clients (cf. Van de Walle, 2003). The less access opposition parties and their leaders have to the necessary resources for clientelistic party competition the more prone they will be to these co-optation efforts. Co-optation offers deter opposition parties and politicians from strategically coordinating their campaigns with other opposition parties, from building successful coalitions, and from establishing programmatic identities to which party members and voters can relate and form loyalties. The result are weak and non-institutionalized opposition parties. Under these circumstances of low vulnerability in electoral competition, the dominant party has no incentive to additionally invest in long-term programmatic mobilization strategies and responsiveness as long as it has enough resources to "feed" its clientelistic electorate.

[29]In a more recent contribution, Van de Walle (2007) coins prominently the term "prebendalism" for the predominant African version of clientelism. He discerns between the more organized "Latin American" form of clientelism that is targeted at grass-roots voters and the less organized "African" form of clientelism that combines clientelistic mobilization strategies with traditional mobilization strategies and patterns of deference and targets rather elite-voters/vote-brokers instead of grass-roots voters (cf. Scott, 1969). In this study, I assume that the boundaries between "African" prebendalism and "classic"/"Latin American" clientelism are not fixed and can be measured with the same proxy indicators.

Opposition parties are more likely to survive in the context of rampant clientelism or even profitably sidestep from potentially harmful clientelistic competition to programmatic mobilization strategies (cf. Shefter, 1994) if they have access to long-term traditions of established party-voter-loyalties and linkages, and socialize potential new opposition voters into these structures.

Opposition parties that have to build a brand identity and party-voter linkages from scratch, in turn, are unlikely to be successful against the clientelistic (and non-position-taking programmatic) offerings of the dominant party: (1) In opposition to the dominant governing party, they lack material resources and have to mostly rely on clientelistic *promises* in election campaigns instead of concrete material offerings. (2) Another potential disadvantage for opposition parties without legacies of cleavages is the prevalence of programmatic party competition around *valence issues* in African electoral regimes of the third wave. Valence issues are about public policies that are favored by everyone and non-conflictive (e.g. "development", "fight against corruption", "fight against crime", etc.). Valence issues are a rational choice for party competition in the context of scarce information about potential electorates and weakly established electoral and democratic rules in young electoral regimes (cf. Bleck and van de Walle, 2012). And they work better as a complementary strategy in the context of clientelistic competition, because their non-conflictive nature relaxes party-loyalty constraints and allows potentially rewarding co-optation, shifting of alliances and floor-crossing more easily. Because valence issues are mainly about the competence of a party in achieving goods of valence, they lead to an inherent advantage for the dominant and incumbent party: E.g., the dominant party as the governing party in a weakly developed country can prove its capacity to provide development and other goods of valence by investing in highly visible infrastructure projects in the foresight of electoral campaigns (cf. Young, 2004). Hence, if opposition parties engage in non-position-taking programmatic valence competition with the dominant party,

due to lack of incumbency, they cannot prove their competence in providing public and universalistic goods of valence. (3) Lastly, voters in a context of rampant clientelism are unlikely to vote for the alternative of a position-taking programmatic opposition if it lacks historic credentials. I.e., in the unlikely case that a new position-taking programmatic opposition would win the elections, voters would know that they could not be excluded from the promised public goods, regardless if they have voted for the programmatic opposition or not. Yet, they would not want to risk their access to clientelistic goods in the more likely case that the dominant party is reelected (cf. Van de Walle, 2007, 67). Accordingly, stronger and long-term loyalties are needed to counter such "opportunistic" but rational voter-behavior in the context of a rather poor electorate. Otherwise, voters favor the short-term bird in the hand than the two in the distant bush that they would get anyway in the unlikely case of a distant future with a governing party that has been voted in office on the basis of the programmatic promise of public goods. In contrast, opposition voters and party elites that are socialized into structures of historic cleavages are more likely to have a feeling of belonging to the opposition party as an organization, have longer time horizons, and are more likely to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic and valence promises. Moreover, they are also more receptive to position-taking programmatic mobilization. Hence, it becomes more likely that (1) an opposition party survives recurring frustration of clientelistic expectations and (2) is able to more viably sidestep to programmatic mobilization strategies. Thus, it becomes more likely that such an opposition party will make it through another round in the 'wilderness' of opposition after electoral defeat.

In sum, the less opposition parties can rely on established structures of political cleavages, the more they have to exclusively and also less viably compete with the dominant party on the terrain of clientelistic and non-position taking programmatic valence mobilization. This advantages the dominant party because it can prove its competence in both

areas whereas the opposition can only rely on promises. The prevalence of clientelistic politics makes opposition parties prone to defections and co-optation by the dominant party. Furthermore, it makes potential opposition voters more likely to abstain from voting or even opportunistically jump on the bandwagon of the dominant party.

Finally, even if legacies of historical cleavages are present in contemporary African party systems, I consider it nonetheless unlikely that they manage to crowd out clientelistic mobilization strategies completely.[30] I rather suspect that the two explanations for the competitiveness degree of the opposition parties are empirically independent of each other in the context of African third wave regimes. Hence, in the large-N section of the book, I test both explanations together in one model. Nonetheless, I will test for potential collinearity.

Hypothesis 2: *The more salient clientelistic mobilization strategies in African third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.*

Incentives for Clientelistic Mobilization Strategies:

Whereas the legacy of a cleavage-based party system around independence can be a viable counterforce to the detrimental effects of the dominant party's clientelistic monopoly and push the dominant party system to be programmatically more responsive overall, there are factors on the other hand, which directly influence the feasibility of clientelistic mobilization strategies in a dominant party system in the first place: (1) The fairness degree in party competition (skewness of the playing field), (2) the access to large state resources, and (3) the salience of traditional and ethnic loyalties in voting:

[30] Cf. with Singer and Kitschelt's (2011) "Do Everything" (DoE) parties, which combine clientelistic and programmatic mobilization.

(1) The more a dominant party relies on a skewed playing field in electoral competition, the cheaper and more feasible clientelistic mobilization strategies. The dominant party can concentrate its clientelistic efforts on the relatively few people, who secure the skewness of the playing field (e.g. the electoral commission, the courts, civil servants, the media, private donators) than on the masses of the electorate.[31] Nonetheless, in opposition to electoral autocracies or pure autocracies, the dominant party cannot totally ignore the electorate because elections are basically free and their outcomes partially insecure.

(2) Accordingly, clientelistic strategies in democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes require relatively large state resources to enable the offering of private goods or club goods to large parts of the electorate. This will be most feasible, if the dominant party has access to large state resources. In Africa, this is usually the case, if a country is rich in natural resources like oil, diamonds and/or other ore.[32]

(3) The more traditional patterns of deference and ethno-regional loyalties are salient the more feasible are clientelistic mobilization strategies in democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes (cf. Scott, 1969). If a clientelistic party relies on a critical number of strategic individuals like chiefs of the traditional system or ethnopolitical, regional and religious leaders, it can lower the costs of clientelistic mobilization. These vote brokers provide a bloc of votes to the clientelistic party due to their traditional and/or charismatic capital to a fraction of the electorate. In that case, the clientelistic party can reduce the number of people significantly, whom it needs to win for an absolute majority. It only needs to promise the vote brokers private goods, while they provide the votes of their followers thanks to their traditional linkages. This option will be most feasible if there is still a large fraction of the electorate significantly linked to traditional structures of power in an African country (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt and

[31] Cf. with Bueno de Mesquita et alii's (2003) more formalized political economy approach of *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cf. with Levitsky and Way (2010) regarding the significance of a "skewed playing field" in electoral competition.

[32] See the large body of literature on the so called "resource curse" (cf. Ross, 2001).

Galaich, 2003; O'Brien, 1999; Smith, 1986; Scott, 1969; Van de Walle, 2003). I.e., I assume that high numbers of identifiable and geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups make clientelistic mobilization strategies more feasible for the dominant party and are therefore detrimental to opposition party system strength and institutionalization. First, because they allow clientelistic mobilization strategies for the dominant party at lower costs. Second, higher numbers of ethnopolitical groups lead directly to weaker and less institutionalized opposition parties. They give ethnopolitical "entrepreneurs" and outsiders to the dominant party an incentive to form their own party and to show off to the dominant party their strategic significance in electoral competition. This makes it more likely for them to "earn" co-optation by the dominant party for their political support in parliament and/or run-off second rounds in presidential elections. Consequently, it is unlikely that ethnopolitically mobilized opposition parties form coalitions and alliances with each other. Accordingly, they are generally weaker and less institutionalized than opposition parties that are based on long-term legacies of programmatic political cleavages and have non-material sources of cohesiveness.

In sum, I assume that higher numbers of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical and regional groups create incentives for viable clientelistic mobilization strategies by the dominant party, which in turn weakens opposition parties (high effective numbers of ethnopolitical groups that are *not* geographically concentrated should lead to the opposite effect as it does not make sense for a candidate to mobilize selectively among ethnically mixed constituencies). Alternatively, as outlined in the last section, it is possible that ethnopolitical cleavages are congruent with legacies of significant cleavages (see partial evidence for that in Bleck and van de Walle, 2012). In this case, the detrimental effects of clientelism on opposition party system strength and institutionalization should be neutralized by the favorable and strengthening circumstances for viable programmatic mobilization by opposition parties.

The weaker incentives (1) to (3), the more likely that clientelistic mobilization is difficult to sustain for the dominant party and the more likely that programmatic mobilization strategies become more attractive to "externally mobilized" opposition parties that lack access to state resources because it allows party competition on an equal standing (cf. Shefter, 1994). And the more these programmatic mobilization strategies are rooted in legacies of historical cleavages instead of valence competition the more committed and less prone to defections opposition politicians become. This makes opposition parties more stronger and more institutionalized, which in turn renders the dominant party programmatically more responsive as well.

Mediating Hypothesis' 3.1 to 3.3: *The stronger incentives (1) to (3), the more salient clientelistic mobilization strategies in African third wave dominant party systems.*

Hypothesis 3.1 *The more skewed the playing field (minimally free but unfair elections) in African third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.*

Hypothesis 3.2 *The more natural resources rents in African third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.*

Hypothesis 3.3 *The more geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups in African third wave dominant party systems, the weaker and less institutionalized the opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.*

Other Determinants of Opposition Competitiveness

I hypothesize that the incentives for mobilizing voters clientelistically are higher in countries with high poverty levels, because voters can be bought at relatively low costs (cf. Kitschelt

and Wilkinson, 2007). Hence, the opposition party system should be weaker and less institutionalized in poorer African dominant party systems.

As already mentioned, I consider electoral institutions to be rather endogenous to the processes of party system formation after independence. Nonetheless, it is important to control for their exogenous influence on *contemporary* opposition party system strength and institutionalization: In the context of majoritarian systems, the negative effect of stronger incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies and salient clientelism on opposition competitiveness should be aggravated. The emphasis on candidate visibility to the detriment of party visibility in majoritarian electoral systems strengthens political entrepreneurs and potentially influential outsiders to the dominant party to use potential opposition parties to show off their co-optation potential to the dominant party. In the context of proportional or mixed systems, the negative effect should be weakened or insignificant.

Founding first elections of third wave electoral regimes should lead to (a) stronger and more institutionalized opposition party/parties than second and third elections. First third wave elections in former autocratic one-party or military regimes are in the limelight of national and international observers, which weakens the former autocrats' incumbency advantage. And naturally, a winning newcomer party can not yet profit from an inflated incumbency advantage. Winner and looser images about the parties are not yet established among the electorate, which makes them less likely to vote strategically according to the logics of clientelism. Naturally, the splits and the defections inside the opposition parties in the new electoral regime occur only after the first third wave election.

High degrees of development aid dependency in countries with dominant party systems can be detrimental to opposition party system strength and institutionalization. Usually, development aid is tied to conditions like good governance and minimal free elections, but not to the provision of a level playing field in party competition, i.e. the provision of equal access to the state media, party finance and/or party organizational capacities.

On the contrary, the usual promotion of good governance enhances the governing party's organizational capacity while opposition parties have difficulties to organize themselves and to penetrate the periphery of their countries, which is necessary to win significant vote shares in most African elections. At the same time, uneducated and poor voters in the periphery regard the satisfaction of basic needs like food, shelter and access to medicinal facilities – often provided by development aid instead of the government – as something that is directly provided by the governing party, because there is no difference between the state and the governing party in their perception. To ensure the ongoing satisfaction of the basic needs they assume they have to vote for the governing party; to the disadvantage of the opposition.[33]

Furthermore, high degrees of development aid signify potential donor leverage on political parties' policy platforms. Too specific policy-platforms and positions are difficult to credibly maintain because they could stand in contrast to budget constraints and conditionalities that have been imposed by donors (cf. Bleck and van de Walle, 2012; Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle, 2008). This would favor clientelistic and/or valence party competition, which rather strengthens the dominant party and weakens and de-institutionalizes the opposition party system.

I check if former liberation movements and parties that led partially armed and successful struggles against settler oligarchies or Portuguese colonization, and did *not* experience civil war with rival liberation movements or internal faction after liberation, participate in third wave elections. Because of their important historical role and claim to represent the whole nation against oppression, I expect voters to vote loyally for them regardless of their programmatic positions and performance. Accordingly, opposition parties, which have no

[33]Interviews with political experts and opposition politicians in Botswana and Lesotho (2010), and an unpublished paper by Schüepp (2009) inspired me to include the factor of aid dependency in the analysis.

Figure 4: *Model*



"historical capital" to rely on, should have a strong disadvantage to compete effectively and are weak and non-institutionalized.[34]

Last but not least, I control for electoral boycotts by opposition parties in dominant party systems because this factor naturally goes hand in hand with lower opposition competitiveness degrees.

Figure 4 summarizes the complete model of the determinants of opposition competitiveness in third wave African dominant party systems.

Explaining Opposition Competitiveness Degrees

In order to test the postulated positive influence of a salient legacy of cleavage-based party competition around independence on the degree of contemporary opposition com-

[34]Most impressive example for that is Nambia's former liberation movement and current dominant party *South West Africa People's Organization* (SWAPO) (Melber, 2011), which is surrounded by a weak and non-institutionalized opposition.

petitiveness in African dominant party systems, I first define the operationalization of the independent variables (the dependent variable of opposition competitiveness has already been defined in the previous section of the book). Afterwards, I present the descriptive statistics and explain the choice of method. The models will be based on the sample of 18 African dominant party systems defined above (see table 1 on p. 43 and discussion in the previous section of the book). Apart from explaining opposition competitiveness averages over third wave elections, I will also investigate some dynamic models that explain *punctual* third wave opposition competitiveness, i.e. models where an observation is based on a single third wave election. Lastly, I present and discuss the results.

Operationalization and Data

In the small-N section of the book, I will be able to identify salient legacies of cleavages in detail in a comparative historical analysis using process tracing (see next section of the book). For the large-N analysis, I identify salient legacies of conflict through a proxy, which is based on two measures that do not reflect the content of concrete cleavages per se but rather reflect the probability degree of contemporary presence of legacies of programmatically structured pre-third wave party competition: (1) The age of the runner-up opposition party in relation to the number of years since independence resulting in values between 0 and 1 (in instances where a contemporary opposition party was founded before independence the value can be higher than one), and (2) the number of minimally competitive elections before the beginning of the third wave in 1990. The maximum value of minimally competitive pre-third wave elections in the sample will be used to divide the values of the measure and bring them on a scale from 0 to 1. Then, the two measures are combined in an additive index because I consider each of the two measures as sufficient proxies to capture contemporary presence of salient legacies of political cleavages of the pre-third wave area:

If the most important opposition party in a contemporary dominant party system is relatively old in relation to the number of years since independence, i.e. the closer to / or above a ratio value of one, this indicates that it could survive since the formation of the embryonic party system around independence. Hence, (1) such an opposition party managed to resist self-destructive splits and defections in the context of rampant clientelism, and (2), the prevailing breakdowns of democratic electoral regimes after independence did not extinct this pre-third wave political party successfully. Survival despite these rather adversary circumstances, in turn, indicates (1), that a source of non-material cohesiveness like significant political cleavages must be present and (2), non-democratic periods did not manage to extinct these non-material sources of cohesiveness: According to the logic of path-dependency, cleavages in African politics developed during the critical juncture of first national elections for the local population in French and British colonies after the Second World War and during independence struggles in Portuguese colonies and liberation struggles in the Southern African settler oligarchies. Hence, if old opposition parties are present in contemporary dominant party systems, I assume that they draw on long-term programmatic and ideological loyalties formed in routinized electoral competition shortly before and after independence, or violent struggles for independence and liberation.

Another mechanism accounting for spill-over of old cleavages into contemporary dominant party systems, is a relatively high number of minimally competitive pre-third wave parliamentary elections in the history of a contemporary third wave African dominant party system. A higher number of pre-third wave elections indicates (1) that democratic breakdowns after independence happened relatively late or not at all and allowed routinization of electoral politics and the establishment of more stable cleavage-based political identities; and/or (2), democratic breakdowns have not been pervasive and allowed for pre-third wave renaissances of minimally competitive electoral regimes, which enhances the potential for survival and re-vitalization of independence cleavages and political identities before the

beginning of the third wave. Lastly, because it is likely that historical legacies of cleavage hide behind superficially "new" third wave opposition parties, which we could miss in large-N samples, the inclusion of the second measure helps to compensate for such potential mistakes.[35]

Accordingly, I formulate an "operationalized" version of hypothesis 1.1 of p. 75 for the large-N analysis:

Operationalized Large-N Hypothesis 1.1 (cf. with p. 75): *The older the strongest contemporary opposition party in African third wave dominant party systems and/or the more* ***pre****-third wave national parliamentary elections have been held in the history of contemporary African third wave dominant party systems, the more competitive (i.e. stronger and more institutionalized) the contemporary opposition party system in African third wave dominant party systems.*

The founding year of third wave runner-up opposition parties has to be retrieved through a variety of sources (Azevedo, Nnadozie and João, 2003; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008; Rupley, Bangali and Diamitani, 2013; Szajkowski, 2005; Tonchi, Lindeke and Grotpeter, 2012; UFP, 2013; COD, 2013; CUF, 2013) (cf. also with Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001). *Der Fischer Weltalmanach* (2009), in turn, determines the year of independence. For Ethiopia, which was

[35]E.g. the 1996 Ghana election's main opposition party, NPP, which was officially founded as a political party in 1992, actually has roots that can be traced back to the Danquah-Busia tradition: i.e. the *Popular Front Party* (PFP), which participated in the 1979 elections, the *Progress Party* (PP) under Kofi Abrefa Busia, which participated in the 1969 elections, and both the *United Party* (UP), which participated in the 1960 presidential election, as well as the UGCC, which participated in the pre-independence 1951 election, which were both under the leadership of Joseph Danquah. What looks like a new party founded in 1992, is actually an old political tradition that goes back to the foundation of the UGCC in 1947 (Ayee, 2008; Jeffries, 1980; Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Morrison, 2004; Nunley, 2009; Osei, 2012). Because we lack similar detailed knowledge of the party history in some of the remaining African countries in the large-N sample, I can imagine that other putatively "new" opposition parties in African dominant party systems have actually older roots. This would be most likely in the case of relatively large numbers of pre-third wave elections without concomitant old aged opposition parties. Accordingly, in such cases, the second measure of the number of pre-third wave elections should compensate for this potential deficit to some degree.

always independent, the year 1941, the end of five years of Italian occupation, will be taken. Namibia (ex-South-West Africa) became independent from South Africa in 1990. It experienced regular but racially exclusive national elections during the period of (internationally disputed) South African administration between 1919 and 1990. The main liberation movement and contemporary third wave dominant party, *South West Africa People's Organization* (SWAPO), has already been founded in 1960. The 1994 runner-up opposition party, *Democratic Turnhalle Alliance* (DTA), was founded in 1977. Accordingly, computing the ratio of the runner-up opposition age in relation to Namibia's independence year of 1990 would led to a heavily overestimated proxy value for the existence of historical legacies of cleavage-based party competition in relation to the rest of the sample. E.g. the value for Namibia's 1994 election would be more than four times larger than one ($(1994 - 1977)/(1994 - 1990) = 4.25$), while the average value for the rest of the sample is 0.48 and the standard deviation 0.5. Accordingly, to compute the proxy value for the case of Namibia, I take the fictive independence year of 1960. This is equal to the sample's mean independence year and results in a rather average proxy value for Namibia's 1994 elections ($(1994 - 1977)/(1994 - 1960) = 0.5$).

Nunley's (2009) *African Elections Database* provides the data for the number of pre-third wave parliamentary elections. All pre- and post-independence national lower house parliamentary elections before the beginning of the third wave in 1990 are counted, provided that at least two parties managed to capture seats in parliament, i.e., elections were minimally competitive.[36] Because national pre-third wave elections in the settler oligarchies of South-West Africa (contemporary Namibia) and South Africa were racially exclusive to the disadvantage of the local non-European black and colored population, I count zero pre-third wave elections in both cases.

[36]Botswana's 1989 election is counted as a third wave election.

Maddison (2009) provides historical GDP per capita data to measure the modernization level of an African country at the time of first minimally competitive national elections at independence. The value of the year before the actual election will be taken. In cases where no minimally elections around independence have been held the value of the respective year before independence will be taken. The GDP per capita is in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. This is a hypothetical currency with the same purchasing power of an US-Dollar at a given point in time (cf. QoG, 2013).

A count variable of the number of consecutive third wave elections between 1990 and 2008 that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a foreign military intervention measures the number of post-third wave elections. The data is based on Nunley (2009), while interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual Freedom House country reports (*Freedom House*, 2009; *Freedom House*, 1991-2002).

Whereas definitions and conceptualizations of clientelism are abundant (cf. Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Lemarchand, 1972; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972), measures are notoriously few. We cannot ask politicians in surveys about their own clientelistic mobilization strategies because they most likely would conceal it (cf. Kitschelt, 2000, 869) (exemptions excluded, of course; cf. with the author's experience in asking that question to parliamentarians in Lesotho in the next section of the book). Therefore, I use *Transparency International's* (2009) inverted *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI) to proxy the saliency of clientelistic mobilization strategies in African third wave dominant party systems.[37] The inverted index goes from 0 to 10 and high values signify high corruption levels. Corruption is usually highly correlated with clientelism: Amongst others, salient practices of clientelism entail that politicians use their discretionary power to offer money and favorable administrative treatment (access to housing, medical treatment, state contracts, etc.) in exchange for vote

[37]See `http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview` for details about the method of this meta-index, which is based on several surveys and assessments from various sources.

blocs offered by political brokers. In a formally universalistic polity, such particularistic and targeted behavior with the goal of reelection and support leads usually to corrupt behavior, i.e. use of public office for private gain (cf. Kitschelt, 2000, 870f.; Singer, 2009).

Because it is hard to validly proxy clientelistic mobilization strategies, I also defined factors in section 3 above, which directly influence the feasibility of clientelistic mobilization strategies in African dominant party systems:

The skewness degree of the playing field in third wave electoral party competition (minimally free, but varyingly fair) will be measured through Freedom House's (2009) Political Rights index for the respective year of the lower house election.[38] The index ranges on a theoretical scale from 1 to 7, but will actually range between 1 to 5 because of the rules of this book's case selection, which aims at excluding electoral autocracies to the benefit of democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarian regimes (see section 2). In doing so, high values will proxy high skewness degrees in the playing field of party competition.[39] The inclusion of Freedom House's Political Rights index should be a difficult test for the main hypothesis of the influence of the presence of legacies of cleavages because the Political Rights index has an element of in-built endogeneity to the dependent variable of opposition competitiveness: It includes informations about the significance of the opposition in an electoral regime (*Freedom House*, 2011).

The degree of resource dependency will be measured by adding up the export value (constant 2000 US-Dollar) of mineral-based fuels and the export value of non-fuel ores and metals exports calculated as a share of the GDP (constant 2000 US-Dollar) (cf. Ross, 2001). World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) provides the data (World Bank, 2009). Missing observations are completed through the consultation of *Der Fischer Weltalmanach* (2009).

[38] E.g. for Botswana's lower house election in 1989 I take Freedom House's Political Rights assessment for Botswana that has been published in 1990 (reports and indices are always based on the precedent year).

[39] Further information on Freedom House's Political Rights index will not be repeated here and can be consulted on p. 50.

The measurement of (1) the number and (2) geographic concentration of ethnopolitical groups relies on Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich's (2003) data:

(1) To avoid problems of endogeneity, (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003) define those groups as ethnopolitical groups that "have demonstrated their actual political relevance or high potential political relevance based on past relevance, apart from or prior to particization", i.e. before effectively forming a political party. The following forms of politicization are necessary and sufficient indicators to identify an ethnopolitical group: (a) organized group mobilization not related to party formation; (b) articulation of grievances by leaders claiming to speak for a group rather than a party; (c) participation in collective action or conflict with other groups or the state and being subjected to state violence; (d) domination of an officially designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a disproportionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy or the military; and (f) controlling disproportionate socioeconomic resources.[40] The *Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation* index is based on the share of the politicized population that belongs to each ethnopolitical group or subgroup. Mozaffar et al. use a modified Herfindahl concentration formula, likewise to Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) *Effective Number of Political Parties* index (ENP), to operationalize the fragmentation degree of ethnopolitical groups ($EthnopoliticalFragmentation = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} GroupShareofPoliticizedPopulation^2$). Missing data is obtained from Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) and Posner (2004, 856).

(2) While Mozaffar et al. conceptualize, operationalize and collect the effective number of ethnopolitical groups themselves, the corresponding measure for the geographical concentration of ethnopolitical groups in a country is based on the *Minorities at Risk* (Phase III) data set (Gurr, 1993). The index measures geographical concentration of a group on a scale from 0 to 3 whereas a value of 0 means "widely dispersed", 1 indicates

[40] See Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003, 382–384) for a more detailed discussion of the definition and measurement of ethnopolitical groups and Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) for a comprehensive data set of all 48 sub-Saharan African countries.

"primarily urban or minority in one region", 2 "majority in one region, dispersed in others", and 3 "concentrated in one region". To get the aggregated concentration score for a country, the concentration value for a each specific group is multiplied by its respective population's share in the respective country and summed up ($GeographicConcentration = \sum_{i=1}^{n}(GroupShareofPoliticizedPopulation_i * GeographicConcentration_i)$)

Note, that both measures do not vary over time. Because I hypothesize that higher effective numbers of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups create incentives for ethnic brokerage, I center the two measures and create a multiplicative index.

The average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over two elections/observations of an election cycle captures an African dominant party system's poverty level, i.e, the last incentive for clientelistic mobilization. Note, that in the context of a resource-rich continent, I construct a measure for GDP per capita (constant 2000 US-Dollar) that is already adjusted for high natural resource dependency by taking the residuals of a simple linear regression of the GDP per capita on resource dependency. This is necessary, because natural resource wealth not only enhances the capacity of the dominant party to buy votes, but it also facilitates vote buying on the supply side: Only marginal proportions of the citizens are involved in the production and consumption of a country's revenues from natural resources and remain poor. In such a case, non-adjusted GDP per capita data is "distorted" so that resource-rich country appear to produce a rich and sophisticated citizenry while most likely the opposite is true. The *World Bank Development Indicators* (WDI) (2009) provide the data. Missing observations in the WDI are completed by consultation of *Der Fischer Weltalmanach* (2009).

Finally, the analysis includes the dichotomous measure for the electoral system, where a value of one indicates a majoritarian system and zero indicates a proportional or mixed electoral system. The data is based on Lindberg (2007; 2006) and Nunley (2009). Note, that the electoral systems in this dataset do not vary over time. The clientelism proxy,

CPI, or the incentives for clientelism will be centered and a multiplicative index of each will be created in combination with the electoral system dummy.

Regarding the other determinants, elections are coded as "first" elections when they are the first founding elections of the third wave or when they are first elections after interruption of the electoral cycle due to a military coup or foreign military intervention (this is the case for Gambia's and Lesotho's respective 2002 election). The data is based on Nunley (2009), while interruptions of the election cycle are identified on basis of the annual Freedom House country reports (*Freedom House*, 2009; *Freedom House*, 1991-2002).

Aid dependency is measured as average Official Development Assistance (ODA) net disbursements between two elections of an electoral cycle as a share of a country's average GDP (constant 2000 US-Dollar) between two elections of an electoral cycle. Aid data relies on the *Development Database on Aid from DAC Members* (OECD, 2010). The GDP data is from the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank, 2009).

The presence of a former liberation movement is captured with a dummy variable where the value of "1" indicates the presence of such a movement in parliamentary elections of third wave dominant party systems. Various sources determine the respective status of a country (Azevedo, Nnadozie and João, 2003; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008; Rupley, Bangali and Diamitani, 2013; Szajkowski, 2005; Tonchi, Lindeke and Grotpeter, 2012).

Finally, the number of parties boycotting a parliamentary election captures electoral boycotts by opposition parties in African dominant party systems. Data is provided by Lindberg (2006). See Lindberg (2006, 45–51) for a discussion of the data collection and primary sources of information.

Descriptive Statistics and Methods

As discussed in the first section of the book, it makes sense to rather analyze opposition competitiveness averages over third wave elections than punctual competitiveness degrees for single third wave elections; especially, because this book is basically interested in the effects of long term explanations like legacies of cleavages or modernization levels at the time of decolonization.

Nonetheless, after having analyzed explanatory models of average competitiveness degrees over third wave elections, I also analyze several dynamic explanatory models of punctual opposition competitiveness in single third wave elections. I assume that the discussed factors, which are relevant *between* different African dominant party systems, are also relevant *within* a dominant party system over time; from one election to the next.

Accordingly, the descriptive statistics below are divided in two tables. Table 5 includes the full set of variables and shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of country averages over third wave elections. Table 6 shows the descriptives for the sample of single elections. To avoid redundancy, table 6 does not include variables, which are not dynamic at all or lack significant variation over time (i.e., resource dependency and aid dependency).

Both tables 5 and 6 are based on the same case selection as in the previous section of the book (cf. with table 1 on p. 43). However, the case of The Gambia is excluded here as well as in all the models that follow. The Gambia is a special case that does not (yet) fit into this book's theoretical framework of historical legacies of cleavages in the explanation of contemporary opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems:

For more than three decades it looked like The Gamiba – likewise to Botswana and Mauritius – would be spared the fate of almost every newly independent African state where electoral regimes experienced breakdown and military dictatorships, and/or de jure one-party regimes were installed by the end of the 1960s / beginning of the 1970s (Nunley, 2009). However, the military coup in 1994 led to the non-democratic installation of army

Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh as president and deposition of the in 1992 regularly re-elected dominant party, *People's Progressive Party* (PPP). In the subsequent and deeply flawed 1996 presidential and 1997 parliamentary elections the PPP was officially banned. Not very surprisingly, Yahya Jammeh and his newly founded *Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction* (APRC) won both elections and "democratized" their previous non-democratic grip to power. The freeness degree of the 2002 and 2007 elections ameliorated slightly so that these elections are part of the book's large-N case selection, but nonetheless led to the confirmation and consolidation of Jammeh's rule (Hughes and Perfect, 2008). The recent 2011 elections however were deeply flawed again, likewise to 1996 and 1997 (*Freedom House. Freedom in The World.*, 2013). Accordingly, as long as this "behind schedule" autocratic phase in The Gambia's history is not over, the effect of a strong record of seven pre-third wave elections between 1960 and 1990 should not come into play. Consequently, I exclude the 2002 and 2007 elections of The Gambia from the subsequent analyses.

The descriptives of the average opposition competitiveness index over third wave elections in table 5 is basically a repetition of the descriptive statistic in the second section of the book (cf. with table 2 on 44). The exclusion of The Gambia accounts for the slightly higher mean of 2.95 on a scale from 0 to 10 (the original index ranges from 0 to 100; it is divided by 10 to ease comparability with other determinants).

The first constituting indicator for the legacy of cleavages index, the ratio of the age of the runner-up opposition party as a share of the years since independence varies around a mean of 0.45, between a minimum of 0.01 in Ethiopia and 1.03 in Botswana (note, that values can exceed 1 when parties have been founded before independence). Seven of 17 countries did not experience any minimally competitive elections before the beginning of the third wave (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritania and Mozambique, as well

Table 5: *Descriptive statistics of country sample (averages over third wave elections in African dominant party systems)*

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*	*N*
Dependent variable:					
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10)	2.95	1.89	0	8.47	17
Independent variable and its measures:					
Legacy of Cleavages Index	0.81	0.58	0.01	2.03	17
Age runner-up / ys. since independence	0.45	0.34	0.01	1.03	17
No. of elections before 1990	1.82	1.81	0	5	17
Alternative explanations:					
GDP per capita at Independence ($ 1000 Geary-Khamis)	1.35	1	0.39	3.72	17
Number of third wave elections	3	0.94	1	4	17
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10)	6.57	1.1	3.93	8.27	17
Incentives for clientelism:					
Political Rights Index (1–7)	3.64	1.24	1.33	5.25	17
Resource dependency	0.11	0.18	0	0.67	17
Effective number of ethnopolitical groups	4.41	3.1	1	9.91	17
Geographic concentration of ethnopolitical groups (0–3)	1.43	0.99	0	2.63	17
GDP per capita (adj. for resource dependency)	−0.19	1.83	−1.68	5.36	17
Majoritarian electoral system (dummy)	0.53	0.51	0	1	17
Other determinants:					
Aid / GDP	0.11	0.09	0	0.36	17
Liberation movement (dummy)	0.18	0.39	0	1	17
No. of parties boycotting election	0.37	0.61	0	1.5	17

as Namibia and South Africa due to the coding rules stated further above). Botswana and Ghana experienced the sample's maximum of 5 pre-1990 elections. The median is at two pre-1990 elections (mean of 1.82). Accordingly, Botswana has the highest legacy of cleavages index value, 2.03, while Ethiopia has the lowest with 0.01.

The GDP per capita at the critical juncture of first elections at the time of independence varies around a mean of 1350 international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (median at Zambia's 902 dollars). Ethiopia used to be the poorest country with 390 dollars, and rather noteworthy, Botswana the second poorest country with 430 dollars. Gabon used to be the richest country with 3718 dollars (in 2008, Ethiopia is still one of the poorest and Gabon one of the richest countries in the dataset; Botswana however, is third richest after Seychelles and Gabon; cf. with p. 51 in the second section of the book). African third wave dominant party systems in the case selection experienced on average three uninterrupted third wave parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2008. The inverted Corruption Perception Index varies around 6.63 with Botswana being the averagely least corrupt country between 1990 and 2008 (index value of 3.93) and Nigeria the most corrupt one (index value of 8.27).

With a Political Rights index of averagely 1.33 between 1990 and 2008, South Africa has the least skewed playing field in party competition and Djibouti the most skewed one (5.25). The mean skewness degree in part competition is at 3.64. Mean resource dependency is at 11 percent. Gabon has the highest dependency with averagely 67 percent dependency over third wave elections. Lesotho has the lowest declared dependency in the WDI with 0 percent. The average third wave dominant party system is situated in a context of almost 4.5 ethnopolitical groups and a geographic concentration degree of almost 1.5 on a scale from 0 (widely dispersed) to 3 (concentrated in one region). With almost 10 ethnopolitical groups, Namibia is the ethnically most fractionalized country whereas ethnopolitical groups in Nigeria are geographically most concentrated, i.e. least dispersed

(value of 2.62). Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Seychelles have only one effective ethnopolitical group. Regarding the GDP per capita that is accounted for resource dependency, Seychelles is the richest country in the case selection over third wave elections (value of 5.36). Because Nigeria's GDP per capita is to a large degree built on its oil wealth, it becomes the poorest country in the case selection if we account for resource dependency (value of –1.68). Nine countries in the case selection have majoritarian electoral systems and eight have proportional or mixed electoral system (only Lesotho and Seychelles have a mixed electoral system).

With 36 percent, Mozambique has the highest aid dependency as a share of its GDP between 1990 and 2008. South Africa is generally not aid dependent at all. The mean is around 11 percent aid dependency. Only in Namibia and South Africa, liberation movements participate in elections that did not experience civil war after liberation; SWAPO and the *African National Congress* (ANC), respectively. Five out of 17 dominant party systems experience electoral boycotts by opposition parties in third wave parliamentary election (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Zambia, Gabon and Ghana). This results in an overall mean of "0.37 opposition parties" that boycott third wave elections.

Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables of the dynamic models. The sample is based on 51 elections in the 17 African third wave dominant party systems. Of course, the descriptives are more or less comparable to the ones in table 5. The high maximum for the ratio value of the age of the runner-up opposition party in relation to the years since independence points out to several elections in African dominant party systems where opposition parties came second after the dominant party that were founded before independence (in descending order: Seychelles 1993 and 2007, Burkina Faso 2002 and 2007, Ghana 1996, South Africa 1994, Lesotho 2002, Zambia 1991, and every election in Botswana). Obviously, the data for electoral boycotts is more revealing when we look at the sample of single elections instead of country averages over elections: Djibouti

is the only country that experienced in more than one parliamentary election boycotts by opposition parties (three parties boycotted the 1992 elections, two the 1997 elections and one the 2008 elections). And Zambia experienced in 1996 an electoral boycott by the sample's maximum of six opposition parties.

Table 6: *Descriptive statistics of elections sample (country years of lower house elections in African third wave dominant party systems)*

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*	*N*
Dependent variable:					
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10)	2.84	2.27	0	9.26	51
Independent variable and its measures:					
Legacy of Cleavages Index	0.83	0.69	0	2.26	51
Age runner-up / ys. since independence	0.47	0.5	0	1.71	51
No. of elections before 1990	1.8	1.77	0	5	51
Alternative explanations:					
Election's number since 1990	2.22	1.05	1	4	51
Corruption perception index (inverted, 0–10)	6.47	1.16	3.9	8.6	51
Incentives for clientelism:					
Political Rights Index (1–7)	3.65	1.37	1	6	51
GDP per capita (adj. for resource dependency)	0.04	1.99	−1.85	6.05	51
Other determinants:					
First election	0.27	0.45	0	1	51
No. of parties boycotting election	0.41	1.17	0	6	51

In the following cross-sectional OLS multiple regression analysis of the sample of country averages over third wave elections in dominant party systems, the approach is to first conduct a simple linear regression between the main independent variable, the legacy of cleavages index, and the dependent variable, opposition competitiveness (m1 in table 7 of the following subsection). After that, four OLS multiple regression models are conducted by step-wise introduction of the alternative explanations and other determinants (m2a-m5a) (cf. with table 5 on p. 98 or the model figure on p. 86): first, the proxy for clientelistic mobilization strategies, the Corruption Perception Index in interaction with the electoral system dummy, second, GDP per capita at independence and the number of third wave elections, third, the other determinants, aid dependency, the liberation movement

dummy and the number of parties boycotting the election.[41] Lastly, the analysis presents a complete model that includes both the legacy of cleavages index, as well as the alternative explanations and the other determinants that reached significance in the previous steps. Additionally, the effect of the incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies – ethnic brokerage, political rights, resource dependency and GDP per capita – instead of the proxy for clientelistic mobilization strategies is tested. Table 7 reports these results if they reach statistical significance (m2b, m5b).

Conceptually, there is no in-built problem of endogeneity in the main hypothesis because contemporary opposition competitiveness degrees cannot influence the legacy of cleavages, which are based on historical events in the relatively distant past of the times of decolonization. However, one component of the proxy for salient legacies of cleavages (the independent variable), the age of the runner-up opposition party, is worth scrutinization: Extreme values of the volatility degree of the opposition party system, one component of the opposition competitiveness index (the dependent variable), could be an indicator for the presence of a newly founded, maximally young, runner-up opposition party. If the value of volatility approaches 100 percent volatility, and if this value is *not* based on large losses of the dominant party that led to proportional gains of established opposition parties, the high volatility derives from one or several newcomer opposition parties that made relatively large gains on the cost of more established opposition parties. Newcomer parties are recently founded and cannot be old by definition. Despite the potential endogeneity this could cause, only in four election observations out of 51, the competitiveness index is actually based on an opposition volatility that approaches 100 percent volatility: in Ethiopia's fourth election and Zambia's second to fourth elections. To make sure that the

[41] The supposed influence of the clientelism incentives, GDP per capita, the Political Rights index and the measure for ethnic brokerage, on the Corruption Perception index itself is significant and in the expected direction with an explained variance of 78 percent (results not shown in book).

results are not driven by these observations, I will report the results of robustness tests where I exclude these two countries or the election observations in question, respectively.

The dynamic analysis follows the same approach of step-wise introduction of alternative explanations and controls. All models are with random effects, include the lagged dependent variable and use cluster-robust standard errors to take care of serial-correlation, equicorrelated errors and panel-heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson, 2008; Kittel, 1999). The potentially confounding fact that variables like the GDP per capita usually increase over time is accounted for by the inclusion of the number of consecutive third wave elections in a country, which increases over time by definition. The results of several additional robustness-tests will be reported as well.

Results

Table 7 reports the results for the determinants of average opposition competitiveness degrees over third wave parliamentary elections in African dominant party system. And indeed, all models (m1-m5b) point to the same result: An opposition party (system) that can draw on legacies of historical cleavages is more competitive in contemporary third wave African dominant party systems than an opposition party that lacks legacies of historical cleavages. Accordingly, legacies of cleavages can be an effective counterforce against the opposition-weakening effect of the clientelistic monopoly in African dominant party systems. Legacies of cleavages provide opposition parties with sources of non-material cohesiveness that increase party elites and voters' loyalties and make the party more fit for party-competition in a difficult context.[42]

[42]The sample of table 7 and figure 5 excludes the case of Mozambique due to its outlaying status: Mozambique's dominant party system features by far the most competitive opposition party of the sample despite a rather average index value of legacies of cleavages, which is caused by the absence of minimally competitive pre-third wave elections in Mozambique's history (see scatterplot of opposition competitiveness on the legacy of cleavages index in figure 37 on p. 304 in the Appendix; cf. also with figure 1 on p. 46). Obviously, if contemporary opposition parties have been involved in longterm and fierce civil war

Table 7: *Determinants of average opposition competitiveness in third wave African dominant party systems (observations are party system means over third wave parliamentary elections)*

	m1	m2a	m3	m4	m5a	m2b	m5b
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
Legacy of cleavages index	1.46 ∗ ∗	2.20 ∗ ∗	1.62 ∗ ∗	1.08 ∗ ∗	1.76 ∗ ∗∗	1.57∗	1.46 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.51)	(0.22)
CPI X maj. electoral system		1.46∗			0.88∗		
		(0.58)			(0.33)		
CPI (inverse, centered)		−0.81+			−0.39		
		(0.43)			(0.25)		
Maj. electoral system (dummy)		0.06			0.43	−0.36	0.25
		(0.50)			(0.27)	(0.60)	(0.26)
GDP per capita at independence			0.25				
			(0.24)				
No. of third wave elections			−0.59∗	−0.40∗	−0.25+		−0.35∗
			(0.25)	(0.16)	(0.13)		(0.14)
Aid/GDP				−7.74∗	−5.57+		−5.75∗
				(3.17)	(2.47)		(2.41)
Liberation movement (dummy)				−0.37			
				(0.53)			
No. of parties boycotting election				−0.62∗	−0.75 ∗ ∗		−0.87 ∗ ∗
				(0.28)	(0.22)		(0.23)
GDP per capita (adj.) X						−0.46	−0.58∗
maj. elect. system						(0.45)	(0.20)
GDP per capita						0.16	0.17+
(adj. for resource dep., centered)						(0.18)	(0.09)
Constant	1.43 ∗ ∗	0.50	2.75 ∗ ∗	3.95 ∗ ∗∗	2.33 ∗ ∗	1.36+	2.99 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.42)	(0.67)	(0.76)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.53)
Adjusted R^2	.42	.56	.54	.81	.89	.37	.89
F	12.00 ∗ ∗	5.76 ∗ ∗	6.93 ∗ ∗	13.42 ∗ ∗∗	18.27 ∗ ∗∗	3.21+	18.94 ∗ ∗∗
N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Standard errors in parantheses.

In the simple linear regression of opposition competitiveness on the legacy of cleavages index, an increase of the index value of one[43] leads to an increase of opposition competitiveness of 14.6 points on the opposition competitiveness scale from 0–100 (1.46 on the scale from 0 to 10 as it is applied in table 7) (level of significance at $p < 0.01$). This is equal to an increase of 7.3 percent seat share of the runner-up opposition party or a decrease of 14.6 percent opposition party system volatility. Legacies of cleavages alone explain 42 percent of the variance of opposition competitiveness in African dominant party systems. The scatterplot in figure 5 shows the good linear fit between the two variables.

In models 2a and 3, the positive effect of the legacy of cleavages index remains robust to the inclusion of the main rival determinant, the saliency of clientelistic mobilization – proxied by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in interaction with the electoral system – and the other alternative explanations, the modernization level at independence and the number of third wave elections. In both models 2a and 3, the positive effect of legacies of cleavages on opposition competitiveness is even stronger than in model 1. Moreover, as expected, the results of model 2a imply that salient legacies of cleavages can exist side by side with salient clientelistic mobilization strategies, despite the slightly negative relation between the two variables (Pearson's r of -0.46). Hence, it seems that legacies of cleavages not only make programmatic mobilization strategies more effective in the context

with the contemporary dominant party, they reach above-average non-material cohesiveness, voter loyalty and contemporary competitiveness despite a lack of pre-third wave routinization of non-violent party competition. Due to the lack of further cases that experienced fierce and long-term civil war and where rival civil war groups subsequently turned into political parties after the beginning of the third wave, this remains an untested, preliminary hypothesis. Nonetheless, Angola's history of civil war, and its election results of 1992 and 2012 seem to support this hypothesis (see Nunley, 2009). Table 14 on p. 306 in the appendix includes the case of Mozambique and applies the same models as in table 7. The results for the main independent variable, legacy of cleavages, are rather robust to the inclusion of Mozambique. The overall model fit decreases, however, and other independent variables become insignificant.

[43] An increase of a legacy of cleavages index of one is equal to a an increase from a newcomer runner-up opposition party to a runner-up opposition party that relies on roots going back to independence and a constant record of zero minimally competitive pre-third wave elections, or an increase from a newcomer runner-up opposition party to a runner-up that was formed approximately half way between independence and the present and a concomitant increase from zero to two pre-third wave elections.

Figure 5: *Scatterplot of opposition competitiveness on legacy of cleavages index in African dominant party systems*



of dominant party systems and rampant clientelism, they also reduce the self-destructive effect of clientelistic mobilization strategies by a resource-poor opposition because they make opposition elites and voters more loyal and more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic promises. Opposition parties can become "Do Everything" parties that successfully combine programmatic and clientelistic mobilization (cf. Singer and Kitschelt, 2011). In a context of rampant clientelism, this is an important step towards more democratic responsiveness.

The interactive effect of the clientelism proxy, corruption in interaction with the electoral system, is statistically significant in model 2a.[44] However, the interactive effect does not behave as expected. If we assume a majoritarian electoral system for the electoral

[44]Yet, the multiplicative proxy of clientelistic mobilization is only significant due to the concomitant presence of the legacy of cleavages index as a test of a separate model without the legacy of cleavages index shows (not displayed in the book).

system dummy, an increase of the corruption level leads to a slightly significant and moderate increase of opposition competitiveness instead of the expected heightened decrease ($y = b_0 + b_{elect.sys} + b_{cpi} * x_{cpi} + b_{interaction} * x_{cpi}$).[45] This unexpected positive relationship stems from the relatively highly competitive opposition party systems in Nigeria and to a lesser degree Kenya, which both have majoritarian electoral systems and high degrees of corruption.[46] Among the group of dominant party systems with proportional or mixed electoral systems there is a significant negative relationship between the clientelism proxy and opposition competitiveness ($p < 0.1$).

The modernization level at independence has no significant effect on higher opposition competitiveness degrees (model 3). This supports the general argument of the book: Rather legacies of independence cleavages set paths of party system developments until and beyond the beginning of the third wave apart than the historic context of the level of modernization, from which embryonic party systems started their journey through time. The other alternative explanation in model 3, the number of third wave elections, against predictions, decreases the opposition competitiveness degree slightly, but significantly. Accordingly, the hypothesized opposition competitiveness boosting effect of founding first third wave elections counters and overshadows the expected positive effect of the routinization of third wave party competition so far.

Model 4 includes the controls together with the number of third wave elections. The legacy of cleavages index remains robust to the inclusion of the controls despite the strong contribution they make to the level of explained variance (81 percent vis-à-vis 42 percent

[45] Coefficient: $1.46 - 0.81 = 0.65$; Coefficient SE: $\sqrt{var(CPI * maj) + var(CPI) + 2 * cov} = 0.31$

[46] On the one hand, Nigeria's opposition is rather competitive due to a legacy of four pre-third wave elections, which is in accordance with the main argument of this book. On the other hand, the relatively high opposition competitiveness degree in Nigeria's dominant party system may also be explained by the presence of electoral engineering to deter the formation of ethnic parties. Nigeria has one of the most strict requirements for political parties' electoral registration in Africa. Nigerian parties are forced to be present with party offices in the majority of states, and for becoming president, a candidate not only needs to win the majority of votes but also a quarter of the vote in the majority of states (Bogaards, 2010b; Bogaards, Basedau and Christof, 2010). This prevents the inflationary creation of new opposition parties in Nigeria.

in model 1). Yet, the legacy of cleavages index' positive effect looses in strength in comparison with models 1 to 3. More detailed, while the liberation movement dummy does not reach statistical significance, both aid dependency and electoral boycotts have the expected significant negative effect on opposition competitiveness. An increase of aid dependency of 10 percent leads to a decrease of the opposition competitiveness index of 7.7 points (in the 0-100 version, 0.77 points in the 0-10 version as it is applied in the table). This is equivalent to a decrease of the seat share of the runner-up party of almost 4 percent or an increase of opposition volatility of 7.7 percent. This is bad news for the aid community. In dominant party systems, aid decreases the competitiveness of the opposition, because it increases the capacity of the governing dominant party due to investments in governance capacity and externally induced development of the country that is (falsely) associated with the governing party. Regarding electoral boycotts, in turn, if averagely one party boycotts the elections during the third wave, opposition competitiveness decreases 6 points on the scale from 0 to 100.

Model 5a includes the legacy of cleavages index together with the proxy for the significance of clientelistic mobilization strategies, corruption in interaction with the electoral system, as well as the alternative explanations and controls that reached statistical significance in the previous steps. The legacy of cleavages index is highly statistically significant and has the second highest positive effect on opposition competitiveness of the five models ($p < 0.001$). Apart from the electoral boycotts variable, which has a stronger negative effect than in model 4, the effect of clientelism in interaction with the electoral system, as well as the negative effects of the number of third wave elections and aid dependency are weaker in comparison with models 2a to 4. Amongst others, the negative effect of clientelistic mobilization in proportional or mixed electoral system looses statistical signifi-

cance, while the positive effect of clientelistic mobilization in majoritarian electoral systems becomes weaker in comparison with model 2a, but remains statistically significant.[47]

The results are robust to the exclusion of the potentially tautologically coded cases of Ethiopia and Zambia (regarding the potentially related measurement of opposition competitiveness on the left hand side of the equation and the legacy of cleavages index on the right hand side of the equation; see above, section 3). The results are also robust to the exclusion of cases that are on the edge of the case selection regarding their freeness degree in party competition (Djibouti, Mauritania and Gabon; both robustness tests not displayed in the book).

The positive effect of the legacy of cleavages index is also robust to a battery of models that test the influence of the incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies (cf. with figure 4 on p. 86). Table 7 only displays additional results where effects of the incentive variables for clientelistic mobilization reached statistical significance. I.e., because neither the interactive effect of the skewness degree of the playing field in party competition (Political Rights index) and the electoral system dummy, nor the multiple interactive effect of the number of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups in interaction with the electoral system, nor resource dependency reached statistical significance, models 2b and 5b in table 7 only include the interactive effect of GDP per capita (adjusted for resource dependency) and the electoral system dummy. In detail, according to model 5b, where the interactive effect of GDP per capita is slightly significant, the richer a country, the less competitive the opposition party system in majoritarian electoral systems, which runs counter to Kitschelt and Wilkinson's (2007) expectation that richer voters are less easily mobilized by clientelistic means.[48] However, this result has to be interpreted with caution as it is driven by the case of Nigeria, which has a relatively high opposition competitiveness

[47] Coefficient: $0.88 - 0.39 = 0.49$; Coefficient SE: $\sqrt{var(CPI * maj) + var(CPI) + 2 * cov} = 0.17$

[48] Coefficient: $-0.58 + 0.17 = -0.41$; Coefficient SE: $\sqrt{var(CPI * maj) + var(CPI) + 2 * cov} = 0.19$

degree despite a majoritarian electoral system and a relatively low level of modernization (see discussion above).

Last but not least, the legacy of cleavages index is robust to all the incentives for clientelistic mobilization strategies without interaction with the electoral system (not displayed in the book; neither the interactive effect of ethnic brokerage nor the other incentives without the interaction with the electoral system reach statistical significance).

In sum, it is safe to say that the legacy of cleavages index is the much more convincing explanation for opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems than the standard explanation of clientelism. And, we can conclude that, to some degree, salient legacies of cleavages can exist side by side with salient clientelistic mobilization strategies.

In addition, I also tested the portability of the general argument for the set of *non*-dominant African party systems of the third wave. The results are not as convincing as for the set of dominant party systems because of countries like Malawi and Niger, which have competitive and institutionalized non-dominant party systems despite relatively young parties and a record of only one pre-third wave election. Nonetheless, generally, we could also speak of a positive relationship between legacies of cleavages that are present in contemporary party competition, and more competitive party systems in non-dominant African party systems (results not displayed in book).

Table 8 reports the results of the dynamic analyses. The step-wise introduction of alternative explanations and controls follows the same rationale as in table 7. The results support the general argument of the book: The legacy of cleavages index is not only a powerful instrument to explain different degrees of opposition competitiveness *between* third wave dominant party systems, but also *within* third wave dominant party systems. E.g., imagine a dominant party system where a relatively young runner-up opposition party looses its runner-up position to an opposition party that has already been founded between

the pre-independence phase and the pre-third wave phase. The latter will be comparatively stronger than the former was before. Vice versa, in a dominant party system where an old runner-up opposition party looses its runner-up position, a new and younger runner-up opposition party will not manage to become as strong and threatening as the old opposition party used to be.

More detailed, in model 1 of table 8, an increase of the legacy of cleavages index of one unit[49] leads to an increase of opposition competitiveness of 18.9 points on the original competitiveness scale from 0 to 100. This is equal to an increase of 9.5 percent seat share of the runner-up opposition party or a decrease of 18.9 percent volatility of the opposition party system. Furthermore, model 1 features an acceptable "within" explanatory power of 20 percent explained variance. This result is – amongst others – robust to the stepwise inclusion of the proxy for clientelistic mobilization in interaction with the electoral system (model 2a), the GDP per capita at independence (model 3), aid dependency and the number of parties boycotting the election (model 4), as well as the complete model that includes the significant variables of steps 2a-4 (model 5b).

In table 8, the contemporary modernization level in interaction with the electoral system, which is an incentive for clientelistic mobilization strategies, proves to be the more powerful explanation for opposition competitiveness degrees within African dominant party systems than the proxy variable for clientelism, the Corruption Perception Index in interaction with the electoral system (models 2b and 5b in contrast to models 2a and 5a). Similar to table 7, GDP per capita (adjusted for resource dependency) has a negative effect on opposition competitiveness degrees within African dominant party systems in the context of a majoritarian electoral system. In proportional or mixed systems, the effect of GDP

[49] An increase of one unite of the legacy of cleavages index is equal to an increase from a value of the age of the runner-up party in relation to years since independence from 0.0 to 1.0 and a constant record of zero pre-third wave elections.

Table 8: *Determinants of punctual opposition competitiveness in third wave African dominant party systems (observations are at the time of parliamentary elections)*

	m1	m2a	m3	m4	m5a	m2b	m5b
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
Legacy of cleavages index	1.89 * **	2.38 * **	2.05 * **	1.74 * **	2.32 * **	2.25 * **	2.16 * **
	(0.34)	(0.50)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.31)
Opposition competitiveness (lagged)	0.04	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.06	−0.08	−0.07
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
CPI X maj. electoral system		1.56 * *			1.31*		
		(0.52)			(0.62)		
CPI (inverse, centered)		−1.23 * *			−0.86		
		(0.41)			(0.52)		
Maj. electoral system (dummy)		0.10			0.47	0.01	0.24
		(0.55)			(0.37)	(0.59)	(0.40)
GDP per capita at independence			0.08				
			(0.31)				
Election's number (since 1990)			−0.26	−0.39	−0.37	−0.32	−0.42
			(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Aid/GDP				−10.32+	−9.90 * **		−10.33 * **
				(5.75)	(2.03)		(2.18)
Liberation movement (dummy)				−0.31			
				(0.66)			
No. of parties boycotting election				−0.05			
				(0.23)			
GDP per capita (adj.) X						−0.74 * *	−0.80 * **
maj. elect. system						(0.28)	(0.22)
GDP per capita						0.44 * **	0.28*
(adj. for resource dep., centered)						(0.11)	(0.13)
Constant	0.91+	0.32	1.58	3.14*	2.18+	1.44	2.50*
	(0.52)	(0.56)	(1.17)	(1.27)	(1.16)	(1.01)	(1.15)
R^2: within	.20	.24	.28	.26	.29	.37	.36
R^2: between	.62	.72	.58	.74	.80	.67	.80
R^2: overall	.50	.62	.49	.65	.73	.63	.74
Countries	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Elections (average)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

per capita is positive, in turn. The effect is robust to the variable that indicates the third wave sequence number of an election in a dominant party system.

Finally, the dynamic results for the legacy of cleavages index in table 8 are also robust to the exclusion of the potentially tautological cases of the Ethiopian 2005 election and all Zambian elections; as well as to the exclusion of cases that are on the edge of the case selection regarding their freeness degree in elections.[50]

Conclusion

On the basis of the large-N research design, the third section of the book delivered evidence that the context of clientelism in African dominant party systems does not automatically lead to weak and volatile opposition parties. If opposition parties of the third wave have access to a heritage of historic cleavages that has been formed around the time of independence or liberation from settler oligarchies, they are stronger and less volatile, and become more threatening to the dominant party. Old opposition parties with pre-third wave experience of electoral competition can rely on established images and symbolic capital, i.e., a 'brand identity' that has been formed during independence – times of hope and trust in the changing power of politics. This non-material source of cohesiveness increases both opposition party elites and voters' loyalty. It makes old opposition parties more immune against co-optation efforts by the dominant party and dangers of internal factionalism; in contrast to newcomer opposition parties, which have to earn the trust of relatively critical and sometimes disgruntled potential opposition voters from scratch. Therefore, old opposition parties can more viably follow a position-taking programmatic mobilization strategy in electoral competition with the dominant party. And, at the same

[50]Political Rights values of 5; every election in Djibouti and Mauritania, the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections in Burkina Faso, the 2000 and 2005 elections in Ethiopia, the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections in Gabon, the 1992 election in Ghana, the 1995 election in Tanzania, and the 1996 and 2001 elections in Zambia.

time, non-material sources of cohesiveness also lead to more success in clientelistic competition because opposition party elites and voters are more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursements of clientelistic promises.

Standard explanations like the significance of clientelistic mobilization strategies and the modernization level contribute their share to the explanation of opposition competitiveness degrees in African dominant party systems. Yet, their influence is less robust than the influence of salient legacies of cleavages. Hence, the pre-third wave history of African party systems matters for contemporary dominant party systems and their potential for higher quality levels of democracy and democratic consolidation.

As expected, salient legacies of cleavages can exist side by side with salient clientelistic mobilization strategies to some degree. The two variables are only slightly negatively related. This finding contrasts with common wisdom and accounts in the literature that postulate a crowding-out effect of salient programmatic and non-material mobilization on clientelistic mobilization (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000). Rather, I argue that opposition parties with non-material sources of cohesiveness are also more successful in clientelistic competition in contrast to their opposition counterparts that lack historic capital. Voters seem to have higher trust in clientelistic promises of historically established opposition parties and are more willing to suspend demands for immediate disbursement. Hence, even in a context of rampant clientelism and heightened incumbency advantage, salient legacies of cleavages and historic capital manage to strengthen opposition parties, which eventually leads to increasing quality levels of democracy.

Some caveats remain that cannot be corrected for in quantitative large-N designs: First, the measure for legacy of cleavages is rather an approximation to the party system reality around the times of independence and the historical formation of political cleavages as well as its path-dependent spill-over into contemporary third wave dominant party systems. Second, the path-dependent chain of causality from the cleavage formation in the

embryonic party system at the time of independence over democratic breakdown and subsequent renaissance of the electoral regime to spill-over into third wave dominant party systems is difficult to trace in large-N designs. Hence, it is important to re-test the large-N results in a more qualitative small-N analysis. Accordingly, the next section of the book will examine four crucial cases regarding (1) their embryonic party system and cleavage formation history around the time of independence and their spill-over into present party system configurations (section 4), and (2) demonstrate the resulting contemporary democratic responsiveness level (section 5), which is an important element of the quality level of democracy.

4 Historical Roots of Opposition Competitiveness in Four African Cases

It is the intention of this and the following section to refine shortcomings of the previous two parts that are owed to the nature of quantitative large-N designs. I do this by retesting the robustness of the book's two main arguments – (1) salient legacies of cleavages lead to more competitive opposition parties in third wave dominant party systems, and (2) more competitive opposition parties in turn are conducive to third wave dominant party systems that have a comparatively higher level of democratic responsiveness and quality of democracy – in (1) a qualitative and variable-centered comparative-historical analysis, and (2) by measuring the contemporary democratic responsiveness level by the distinctiveness of programmatic offers and the extent of party representatives' and partisan voters' programmatic issue congruence.

The small-N analyses follow the logic of Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis approach in mixed-method designs of comparative research: Because I consider the results of the previous large-N analyses to be rather robust, I chose a case selection strategy for the qualitative small-N analyses that corresponds to the case selection strategy of a "model-testing small-N analysis" (Lieberman, 2005, 442). Such a case strategy aims at re-testing the robustness of the large-N results in a small-N setting. This allows retesting the arguments with more fine-grained qualitative measures for the central concepts and to open the "black box" of the causal mechanism between the X and Y of the arguments.

Small-N Case Selection (for sections 4 and 5) and Ceteris Paribus Assumptions

In order to conduct the model-testing small-N analyses of this and the following section, it makes sense to select cases that the large-N analysis predicts relatively accurately, and that exhibit a considerable degree of variation on the independent and the dependent variable (Lieberman, 2005, 444). Additionally, to enable analytical isolation of the main arguments, I strive to hold contextual factors constant ("ceteris paribus assumptions") that could potentially disturb the analysis (Lijphart, 1975): Hence, in the first place, I am looking for cases in my large-N case selection that do not vary to strongly on the regime variable regarding the skewness degree of the playing field in third wave party competition. I also want to exclude former settler colonies or Portuguese colonies because historical cleavages in these cases evolved rather in the context of violent conflict than non-violent conflict. The electoral system variable should be held constant to some degree as well. And the saliency of ethno-politics should not vary too much among the cases. Last but not least, the level of modernization around independence and the level of contemporary corruption, a sign for the saliency of contemporary clientelism (Singer, 2009), should be rather constant within the small-N case selection.

Case Selection:

To begin with, I select two cases that featured dominant party systems in 2010,[51] and are comparable regarding their skewness degree of the playing field in party competition (measured by Freedom House' Political Rights index). Additionally, the two cases should display considerable variation regarding the competitiveness degree of their opposition party system, which is the independent variable in the second section of the book, and the

[51] The respective elite survey for the subsequent section, where I measure democratic responsiveness, has been conducted by the author in 2010 and 2012.

dependent variable in the third section of the book. And they should display variation both on the independent variable of the third section of the book, the legacy of cleavages index, and the dependent variable of the second section of the book, the quality of democracy.

Figure 6 on p. 119 demonstrates that Botswana and Lesotho fit best into these case selection criteria: Both countries belong to the group of dominant party systems in 2010 (formerly dominant party systems in 2010 with capital letters in figure 6). And both belong to the group of democracies as polyarchies or democracies that are on the borderline between democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarianism with relatively less skewed playing fields in party competition (average Political Rights index values over third wave elections of 3.0 or below; countries with grey dots in figure 6). And Botswana and Lesotho display the necessary variation on the independent and the dependent variable. The variation on the independent variable of the third section of the book, the legacy of cleavages index, is substantial. The variation of opposition competitiveness is interesting because the difference is bigger than we think: While Lesotho's 2002 and 2007 elections in the dataset belong to the stronger half of the large-N sample in the previous sections of the book regarding the seat share of the runner-up opposition party, the country performs considerably weaker regarding the degree of opposition institutionalization, where the country's observations belong to the weaker half of the sample.

In more qualitative terms, Botswana's dominant party, *Botswana Democratic Party* (BDP), is confronted with a stable, yet varyingly strong opposition (between 9 and 33 percent seat share over third wave elections), embodied in the *Botswana National Front* (BNF). The BNF achieved the runner-up position in Botswana's national parliament in every single election since independence in 1966. Lesotho's opposition, in turn, is rather non-institutionalized. After the former authoritarian *Basotho National Party* (BNP) seemed to establish itself as the runner-up opposition party behind the dominant *Lesotho Congress for*

Figure 6: *Small-N Case Selection based on opposition competitiveness and legacy of cleavages index*



Democracy (LCD) in the 2002 elections, it sank into insignificance in the 2007 elections by dropping from a seat share of 17.8 percent to 2.5 percent in 2007 with a concomitant drop in vote shares. On the other hand, the newcomer opposition party, *All Basotho Convention* (ABC), which has just been founded less than a six months before the 2007 elections gained 14.17 percent from scratch and became the new runner-up opposition party. Additionally, the opposition party *Lesotho Worker's Party* (LWP) rose from less than 1 percent seat share in 2002 to 8 percent seat share in 2007 while the *National Independent Party* rose from 4 percent in 2002 to 17 percent in 2007 and changed from opposition in 2002 to becoming a co-opted junior partner of the dominant LCD in 2007 (interviews with political experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010).

The high rank of the legacy of cleavages index for Botswana derives (1) from the fact that the runner-up opposition party BNF was already founded in 1965, and (2) that Botswana experienced 5 pre-third wave elections; both facts point to the high probability

that legacies of independence cleavages are still present in the contemporary party system. In Lesotho by contrast, only in the 2002 elections the runner-up opposition party was relatively old, whereas this was not at all the case in 2007 (the 2002 runner-up, BNP, was founded in 1959 whereas the 2007 runner-up, ABC, was founded in 2006). Additionally, Lesotho experienced two pre-third wave elections less than Botswana.

The two cases also suit the criteria for the case selection of a model-testing small-N analysis regarding their quality of democracy, the dependent variable in the second section of the book. The first scatter plot in figure 7 shows that Botswana has an inverted Civil Liberties index of 6 in 2008 (the last observation year in the large-N sample), while Lesotho only reaches a value of 5. The difference is more impressive in the second scatter plot, where I measure the quality of democracy in society with 2008 Afrobarometer data using individual citizen's perceptions of the quality of democracy in society, a survey-based equivalent to Freedom House's expert based Civil Liberties index: The measurement is based on the mean values of African countries of two Afrobarometer questions; "In this country, how free are you: To say what you think?" (q15a), and "In this country, how free are you: To join any political organization you want?" (q15b), which both range from "not at all free" (value of 1) to "completely free" (value of 4), and are combined in a factor that is based on the principal-component factor method.[52]

It is crucial to match and compare the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho with two cases of the group of formerly dominant party systems in 2010 in terms of the variance of their opposition competitiveness degree during their dominant party system phase, the legacy of cleavages, and the quality of democracy. I regard this special sub-

[52]Note, that two outliers are not included in the second scatter plot of figure 7: Tanzania has a higher quality of democracy in society according to its citizens' evaluation than expected on the basis of its relatively low average opposition competitiveness index. Nigeria in turn has a comparatively extremely low quality of democracy in society according to its citizens' evaluation despite a high opposition competitiveness index. Both countries belong to the group of countries with averagely stronger skewed playing fields in party competition.

Figure 7: *Small-N Case Selection based on indices of the quality of democracy and opposition competitiveness*



group of *non*-dominant party systems as analytically most valuable benchmark against which any positive assessment of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness has to be tested: First, non-dominant party systems are so far generally regarded as favorable for the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness, in contrast to dominant party systems, and therefore set a high benchmark. Second, the fact that cases of the special sub-category of non-dominant party systems used to be dominant party systems themselves makes them most comparable to contemporary dominant party systems and helps to evaluate if change from a dominant party system to a non-dominant party system is automatically associated with contemporary higher levels in the quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness in comparison with contemporary dominant party systems.

In figure 6 on p. 119, ex-dominant party systems in 2010 are marked with capital letters. Clearly, Ghana matches Botswana most adequately, as it had a relatively competitive opposition party system during its dominant party system phase between 1992 and 2000, and a legacy of cleavages index that comes closest to the value of Botswana due to an old runner-up opposition party in 1996, the *National Patriotic Party* (NPP), and five pre-third wave elections. And, as Botswana and Lesotho, Ghana belongs to the group of African democracies as polyarchies or borderline cases between democracy as polyarchy and competitive authoritarianism (grey dots in figure 6), which additionally enhances its analytical value.

In 1992, the main opposition party, NPP, its roots go back to the 1947 founded party *United Gold Coast Convention* (UGCC), boycotted the founding elections. When the NPP participated in the subsequent 1996 elections, it instantly achieved a runner-up position of 30 percent seat share in the national parliament. In 2000, the NPP even won the elections and the third wave dominant party system of Ghana ended. The former dominant party, *National Democratic Congress* (NDC), however, retained its former strength despite strong man Jerry Rawlings' retirement and the 2000 defeat by its successor John Atta Mills, and regained incumbency in the 2008 elections. Hence, the institutionalization and competitiveness of the opposition in the dominant party system, which became apparent in the 1996 elections, spilled over into the non-dominant party system of the 2000s, and made Ghana one of the few truly institutionalized and competitive two-party systems in Africa. In sum, both the quantitative and qualitative extent of opposition competitiveness in Ghana's party system are highly interesting and analytically most valuable.

Senegal and Kenya are the only countries in the large-N sample besides Ghana that changed their status from a dominant party system to a non-dominant party system between the beginning of the third wave and 2010, and could potentially match Lesotho and serve as an antipode to the Ghanaian case in terms of the competitiveness of the opposition

party system, the legacy of cleavages and quality of democracy.[53] Yet, the two countries are clear cases of competitive authoritarianism, in contrast to Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana.[54] Furthermore, ethnic mobilization strategies and the general saliency of ethnicity in politics are much more pronounced in Kenya than in Botswana and Ghana where ethnic politics have been more strongly suppressed, and ethnic cleavages been cross-cut or multilayered to some degree by other, non-ethnic salient cleavages.[55] And Lesotho is one of the ethnically most homogeneous nations in Africa. In sum, we could not analytically isolate the relationship between legacies of cleavages and opposition competitiveness in Kenya from the potentially confounding factors of salient ethnopolitical fragmentation *and* a relatively

[53]Zambia changed from a dominant party system to a non-dominant party system in 2011 as well, and Lesotho in 2012. Yet, these events happened too recently and there has not passed enough time in order to research and validly cover them in this book.

Also note, that we cannot compare the democratic responsiveness degree of Ghana, Kenya or Senegal during the non-dominant party system phase of the 2000s with their democratic responsiveness degree during the dominant party system phase of the 1990s due to lack of responsiveness data for the 1990s. I would expect rather the competitiveness degree of the opposition to be the decisive factor for explaining the contemporary degree of responsiveness than actual change of incumbency. Accordingly, Ghana should have already been more responsive during its dominant party system phase than dominant party systems with lesser competitive opposition parties. In the case of Zambia and Lesotho in turn, I would expect that their party systems cannot transform from a dominant party system to an institutionalized non-dominant party system with a higher quality of democracy and democratic responsiveness as in the case of Ghana, but rather resemble non-institutionalized non-dominant party systems with rather lower responsiveness degrees due to their past of a lesser competitive opposition party system during their dominant party system phase (cf. van Eerd, forthcoming).

[54]Provided that we neglect Senegal's and Kenya's status as clear cases of competitive authoritarianism, they could potentially match the case of Lesotho, because their party systems followed much more chaotic paths after incumbency change in 2000, respectively 2002, as it could be assumed by their relatively high opposition competitiveness degree during their phase of dominant party system in the 1990s. Yet, apart of the fact that it belongs to the group of competitive authoritarian regimes, Kenya is also not an ideal case for a model-testing small-N analysis because its opposition competitiveness index is not well predicted by the model as we can see in figure 6. Its opposition competitiveness index is too high in comparison to what we could expect by its rather low legacy of cleavages index, which is based on a record of only two pre-third wave elections and a runner-up opposition party in 1992 that has just been founded. If we neglect its potentially confounding status as competitive authoritarian regime with a relatively stronger skewed playing field than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, Senegal could be an analytically more suitable candidate than Kenya as it is predicted more accurately than Kenya in figure 6. However, its opposition competitiveness degree is still slightly higher than expected by its legacy of cleavages index value, especially in comparison with Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana. In this regard, it would be a more suitable candidate to match Botswana instead of matching Lesotho.

[55]For the significance of ethnopolitical fragmentation in Kenya see Elischer (2008), LeBas (2011, 231–236) and Wahman (forthcoming); for cross-cutting cleavages in Botswana see Charlton (1993); and for Ghana see Bebler (1973), Dickovick (2008), Whitfield (2009) and Osei (2012))

stronger skewed playing field in party competition. The Senegalese party system of the 2000s, in turn, resembled more a new dominant party system, this time with an extremely weak and non-institutionalized opposition, than a non-dominant and non-institutionalized party system, which could match the case of Lesotho.[56]

Due to that fact that I have run out of formerly dominant cases that could complete the small-N case selection of Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, I open the field for potential cases that do not fit my large-N case selection constituting time criteria – at least three consecutive electoral victories with an absolute majority and the presidency in a row, or such an electoral victory in the founding third wave elections for the previously authoritarian party – but that are considered instances of one-party dominance in the literature and achieved absolute majorities and the presidency in at least *two* consecutive elections after the beginning of the third wave. The national Malian elections in 1992 and 1997 clearly conform to these criteria and make Mali an ideal (almost-)formerly dominant party system case to serve as the antipode to the formerly dominant party system of Ghana and complete the small-N case selection. As shown in figure 6, the Malian party system completes the case selection more adequately than Senegal and Kenya as it varies strongly both on the x- and y-axis in comparison with Ghana due to (1) a non-competitive opposition party system in the 1990s and (2) a concomitant low legacy of cleavages index due to newly founded runner-up opposition parties and a low record of only one pre-third wave election. Apart from the fact that the Malian case is predicted rather accurately in figure 6, the case is also better suited to complete the small-N cases selection in opposition to Kenya and Senegal because the Malian electoral regime between the beginning of the third wave and 2010 also belongs to the group of democracies as polyarchies or borderline cases

[56]More detailed, the former Senegalese dominant *Parti Socialiste* (PS) was confronted with a relatively competitive opposition, embodied in the 1974 founded *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS). However, in opposition to Ghana's former dominant party NDC, the PS did not manage to retain its strength after its loss of dominance in 2000 and imploded dramatically during the 2000s on the one hand due to its own failures, and on the other hand due to electoral reforms and a skewed playing field to the advantage of Abdoulaye Wade's new PDS government (cf. Osei, 2012; Wahman, forthcoming; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

between democracies as polyarchies and competitive authoritarianism with an average Political Rights index over third wave elections of 2.25, i.e. a relatively low skewness degree of the playing field in party competition.[57] The following paragraph exemplifies the dominant party system character of the Malian party system during the 1990s and the concomitant non-institutionalization and weakness of the opposition, which led to a non-dominant, but generally non-institutionalized, party system in the 2000s.

First, both in 1992 and 1997, the former democracy movement and newly founded party, *Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali* (ADEMA), won a two third majority in parliament and the presidency. According to more qualitative criteria, this period in Mali's third wave electoral regime is considered to be one of dominance by the ADEMA and its president, Alpha Oumar Konaré (Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; van Vliet, 2013; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2013). Second, the opposition in both 1992 and 1997 was formed by an extremely weak and non-institutionalized opposition with an average opposition party system competitiveness index of 13.2 on a scale of 0 to 100 (cf. with figure 6). Yet in 2002, ADEMA lost its dominant position before even contesting the elections, due to internal factions over who should replace Konaré, who was banned by the constitution from running for a third term (Boilley, 2002, 174f.; cf. Moestrup, 2006): The ADEMA prime minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita ("IBK") resigned and formed a new political grouping, *Alternative 2002*, that evolved into a new party, the *Rassemblement pour le Mali* (RPM), which formed an umbrella for a significant number of disgruntled former ADEMA members. Apart from IBK and the ADEMA candidate, Soumaïla Cissé, who tried to inherit the presidency from Konaré, the former lieutenant colonel Amadou Toumani Touré ("ATT"), who was very popular due to his performance as head of the transitory government from

[57] The categorization of the Malian electoral system as democracy as polyarchy or borderline case between democracy as polyarchy and competitive authoritarianism is true until the recent military coup on March 22, 2012. Quite "lucky" in the case of this book, the respective elite survey for the measurement of democratic responsiveness has just been finished in the beginning of March 2012, and is therefore still a valid assessment of democratic responsiveness in Mali's third wave electoral regime as respondents have not been influenced in their answers by the new, and non-democratic environment of a quasi-military regime.

1991 to 1992, ran as an independent candidate, and won the necessary run-off presidential election. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, the ADEMA also lost its absolute majority in parliament due to huge gains by its splinter RPM. Due to the split inside the ADEMA, subsequent "birth" of the RPM in the advent of the 2002 elections and changes between smaller opposition parties, the opposition volatility and weakness of the 1990s spilled over into opposition parties' and formerly dominant party system's overall volatility in the 2000s. This general non-institutionalized nature of the party system became even worse due to the independent president ATT's governing style to forge support in parliament through changing coalitions, of which some important parties strategically changed back to opposition status in the advent of the 2007 general elections. On top of that, another split inside the ADEMA amongst supporters of the former presidential candidate Soumaïla Cissé led to the formation of the party *Union pour la république et la démocratie* (URD). Whereas ADEMA and URD decided to back independent president ATT's bid for reelection in the 2007 elections, IBK and his party RPM made another attempt to gain power. Yet ATT was re-elected. This proved to be disastrous for the RPM in the following parliamentary elections. The party lost 35 of its 46 seats while ADEMA consolidated its position as strongest party without absolute majority and no presidency and the newly founded URD gained 34 seat from scratch. Following the 2007 elections, ATT further intensified his strategy of coalition government among the several parties in parliament. He formed a largely oversized coalition by adding the initially opposing parties, RPM and *Parti pour la renaissance nationale* (PARENA), to his already oversized coalition of 12 parties, *Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès* (ADP). By doing this, he increased his support base in parliament to 143 of 147 seats in parliament. Only one party, *Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance* (SADI), remained in the opposition (interviews with political experts in Mali, 2012; Imperato and Imperato, 2008; Nunley, 2009).

Figure 8: *Genealogical tree of the Malian parties between 1991 and 2006 (CMDID, 2007)*

The genealogical tree of the Malian parties between 1991 and 2006 in figure 8, which was made by a local artist on behalf of the non-governmental organization, *Centre Malien pour le dialouge inter-partis et la Democratie* (CMDID), should give a good impression of the extremely volatile and increasingly fragmented party system landscape in the Malian third wave electoral history (CMDID, 2007).

Both Ghana and Mali are also analytically valuable cases in order to re-test the main arguments of this book in a comparative small-N analysis because they match Botswana and Lesotho not only in terms of the legacy of cleavages argument (section 3 of the book), but also in terms of the influence of opposition competitiveness on the quality of democracy

(party II of the book). As shown in the left-hand side scatter plot in figure 7 on p. 121, in 2008, both Botswana and Ghana have a higher quality of democracy in society according to Freedom House's inverted Civil Liberties index than Lesotho and Mali. And the match is confirmed in the right-hand side scatter plot in figure 7 where the quality of democracy is measured with 2008 Afrobarometer data on individual citizen's perceptions of the quality of democracy in society (see above, based on citizen's evaluation of freedom of expression and organizational freedom in a country). In the following, I discuss the ceteris paribus assumptions and potentially confounding variables for the four selected cases.

Ceteris Paribus Assumptions and Potentially Confounding Variables:
Regarding the minimization of potentially confounding variables, Botswana and Lesotho are ideal cases because these two southern African and culturally cousin countries share many contextual variables (cf. Lijphart, 1975; Lieberman, 2005): Both countries have been British protectorates, which benefited the colonizers as well as the colonized in fending off the Boers. Both gained independence in 1966 and established parliamentarian democracies. Botswana became a parliamentary republic, Lesotho a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The two countries are culturally related as both belong to the Sotho-Tswana Bantu language sub-group. The Basotho are the only ethnic group in Lesotho while the Tswana (eight 'major' tribes) form an 80 percent ethnic dominance in Botswana and the remaining 20 percent are constituted by the ethnically distinct 'minority' tribes. Both countries have a traditional chief system, which parallels and complements the modern government structures. The paramount chiefs of both countries have seats in the countries' respective mainly advisory second chamber (Düsing, 2002; Good, 2008; Maundeni, 2001; Coplan, 1997; Olaleye, 2003).[58]

[58]Constitution-wise, both Ghana and Mali have an unicameral parliamentary system in opposition to Botswana and Lesotho. Yet, this constitutional variation should not be over-emphasized as the role of the second chambers in both Botswana and Lesotho are rather of advisory character. The formal and informal

Likewise to Botswana and Lesotho, both in Ghana and Mali, the traditional chief system used to play an important role during in the indirect-rule system of both the British as well as the French colonial administration (Apter, 1963; Rathbone, 2000; Foltz, 1965). In this respect, Schachter Morgenthau (1964) points out to the fact that in the case of Mali, which was much less urbanized and peripheral than the French beacons of West-African colonialism, Senegal and Ivory Coast, the colonial power was never able to implement its official policy of direct rule and "assimilation" that intended to put meritocratically selected Africans in charge of the local political system instead of the traditional "chefferie". Accordingly, the Malian traditional political system was preserved to some degree during the colonial phase (Foltz, 1965, 11–13); as in the case of Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana, and most other British colonies in Africa. Due to this similarity and the comparable timing of colonialization and de-colonization as well as the granting of political rights to the African population after the Second World War in French and British African colonies in opposition to Portuguese colonies or Southern African settler oligarchies, I find it interesting to mix former French and British African colonies in a comparative small-N analysis (Foltz, 1965, 22; Awoonor, 1990, 133f.). It is an additional advantage of such a "mixed" small-N case selection that it speaks to both the French-speaking and English-speaking parts of Africa and echoes the large-N selection in that respect as well.[59]

Generally, however, it is safe to say that in contemporary Malian politics, chiefs are to some degree of lesser importance than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana. Nonetheless, people in Mali still know who is of noble descent and who not. Likewise, they still highly respect the "chefferie" even in Mali's most urban and modern place, the capital

power of chiefs in *local* rather than national politics is much more important (Düsing, 2002; Coplan, 1997; Olaleye, 2003; interviews with political experts, traditional chiefs, and politicians in Botswana and Lesotho, 2010).

[59]Note, that British colonialism had no significant influence on both the contemporary quality of democracy in the second section of the book, as well as the opposition competitiveness index in the third section of the book.

Bamako (interviews with political experts, traditional chiefs, and politicians in Botswana and Lesotho, 2010, and Ghana and Mali, 2012).

As in Botswana and Ghana, ethnopolitical cleavages are of generally lesser salience than in other African electoral regimes (Lesotho is ethnically homogeneous, anyway). On the one hand, a considerable plurality of different ethnic groups certainly exists in Mali, on the other hand, they are geographically too scattered to allow efficient ethnopolitical mobilization in plurality single-member constituencies (Gurr, 1993; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999). And, as in the case of Botswana and Ghana, ethnopolitical cleavages have been overlayered and/or cross-cut by other, non-ethnic, political cleavages (Bebler, 1973; Dickovick, 2008).[60]

As in Botswana, Ghanaians and Malians select their parliament through single-member constituencies. Ghana, like Botswana, uses the first-past-the-post (FPTP), Mali uses plurality. Lesotho deviates in this respect somewhat as it changed from single-member constituency FPTP-system to a mixed system by adopting the mixed member proportional system (MMP) in 2002. While this strengthened the representation of the opposition in comparison to the 1993 and 1998 elections, the majoritarian element is still dominant. Constitutionally, the four countries differ because Lesotho and Botswana have parliamentary systems, Mali a semi-presidential system and Ghana a purely presidential system. However, these differences are de facto of minor importance. Although Botswana's president is elected by the national assembly, he has as much executive power as any directly elected president in African electoral regimes. In some respects, his executive powers even excel the ones of most other, directly elected African presidents (Good, 2008; Good and Taylor, 2008). In Mali's semi-presidential system in turn, the prime minister is directly

[60]Of course, recent events in Mali, and the periodical re-ignition of violent conflict between the lighter-skinned Northern Tuareg minority groups and the mostly Southern and rather black-skinned majority groups since independence seems to contradict this notion. However, neither are the Tuareg an ethnically and politically homogeneous group that would speak with one voice nor do they have a critical mass in the Malian population share to be electorally highly relevant.

appointed by the president (Moestrup, 2006; Nunley, 2009). And the logic of presidentialism is pervasive in Mali, too (interviews with political experts in Mali, 2012). Lesotho's parliamentary constitutional monarchy comes nearest to a classical parliamentary system (the monarch has only ceremonial duties). This is a potentially confounding fact that has to be kept in mind when we interpret the results of the small-N analyses.

Regarding socioeconomic development, Botswana is one of the few upper-middle income economies in Africa while Lesotho belongs to the lower-middle income countries (World Bank, 2012). Yet, more importantly, both countries started on a very weak modernization level around independence: In 1964, Botswana had a GDP per capita of 430 international 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, and Lesotho one of 435 Dollars (second poorest and third poorest countries of the large-N selection at that time) (cf. with figure 10 on p. 142). Ghana, like Lesotho, belongs to the lower-middle income economies whereas Mali is categorized as low-income economy (World Bank, 2012). Because Botswana in turn belongs to the group of upper-middle income countries (see further above), the variance between Botswana and Mali in this respect could disturb the validity of the small-N results somewhat. Nonetheless, the contemporary modernization level already proved to be the weaker explanatory large-N factor in both the second and third section of the book. Regarding the historic modernization level around independence, Mali started on a comparable low level, with a GDP per capita of 504 international 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, slightly more than the 430 and 435 of Botswana and Lesotho. Yet Ghana belonged to one of the more advanced colonies, with a GPD per capita of 1122 Dollars. Hence, this is another potentially confounding factor that we have to keep in mind when we interpret the results of the ensuing small-N analyses. In general, however, the large-N analyses in the previous sections of the book already have proven, that the modernization level around independence has no path-dependent influence on contemporary party systems in African third wave electoral regimes (cf. also with figure 10 on p. 142).

Figure 9: *Small-N case selection typology*



Last but not least, Mali is most similar to Lesotho and Ghana regarding the level of corruption according to *Transparency International's* Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which points out to a comparable saliency level of clientelistic mobilization strategies (cf. Singer, 2009). Here, Botswana deviates with a rather low level of corruption.

Summary of the Small-N Case Selection:

Figure 9 summarizes the small-N case selection of this book. I select four cases that vary on two party system dimensions, the competitiveness degree of the opposition party system since the beginning of the third wave (x-axis in figure 9), and the fact wheter they are contemporary dominant party systems or contemporary non-dominant party systems, which used to be dominant party systems between 1990 and incumbency change in 2000 (Ghana) and 2002 (Mali) (y-axis).

The four cases vary on the independent variable in the third section of the book, the legacy of cleavages index, which leads to the expectation that in the historical small-N analysis, we should be able to trace path-dependent spill-over from (1) cleavage-based party competition in the first minimally competitive national elections around the time of independence over (2) first breakdowns of the electoral regime after independence to (3) pre-third wave renaissance of the electoral regime finally (4) into current third wave electoral regimes and party systems. Last but not least, the four cases vary on the dependent variable in the second section of the book, the quality of democracy, which leads to the expectation that they will vary accordingly regarding their party system responsiveness degree, i.e. the distinctiveness of programmatic offers and the congruence between partisan voter's preferences and their political representative' policy preferences, which will be analyzed in the subsequent section of the book (cf. with section 1).

The four cases are most similar regarding their skewness degree of the playing field in third wave electoral party competition, as their third wave elections are overall basically free but not perfectly fair, yet belong to the most fair ones of the large-N selection. They are also rather similar regarding a rather low saliency degree of ethnopolitical mobilization in third wave elections. Botswana, Ghana and Mali all feature parliamentary electoral systems based on vote through single-member constituencies, while the largest part of Lesotho's parliament is also voted for through single-member constituencies. And, apart from Botswana, which has a rather low level, they are similar regarding their corruption level, which points out to a comparable saliency level of clientelistic mobilization strategies.

In the following, I discuss the operationalization, data and methods for the comparative historical analysis regarding the influence of salient legacies of cleavages on opposition competitiveness in third wave dominant party systems. The first subsection of section 5, in turn, will start with the operationalization, data and methods for measuring the degree of party system responsiveness in the four cases.

Operationalization, Data and Methods for Comparative Historical Analysis

The empirical subsection of section 4 is about retesting section 3's results regarding the argument that salient legacies of cleavages lead to more competitive opposition parties in third wave dominant party systems, i.e.:

Hypothesis 1.1 (cf. section 3): *The more cleavage-based party competition established itself in* ***pre****-third wave national parliamentary elections, the stronger and more institutionalized the opposition party system in contemporary African third wave dominant party systems.*

Accordingly, the general theoretical argument and the definition of the main concepts (e.g. *political cleavages*, *critical junctures*) are the same as in section 3 and can be consulted there. Nonetheless, I briefly repeat the main theoretical argument below, which I have visualized in figure 3 on p. 75.

Generally, I argued in section 3 that the *first critical juncture* of de-colonization and indigenous nationalization processes most likely provoked embryonic political party competition around a *center-periphery* cleavage in advent of first pre-independence elections. Furthermore, I argued that ethnical cleavages and alleged bourgeoisie-proletariate cleavages are rather incorporated in the dominant center-periphery cleavage than representing real cleavages in their own right. After that, the timing and fashion of the eventual *second critical* juncture of the first post-independence breakdown of the minimally competitive electoral regime determines the chances for the degree of establishment of the center-periphery cleavage and its subsequent spill-over into third wave party competition. I used figure 3 on p. 75 to visualize an ideal-typical African case regarding the development of party competition, structured around a center-periphery cleavages over authoritarian interruptions into final spill-over into contemporary third wave party competition. Decisive for

salient survival of political structuring around a legacy of a center-periphery cleavage in the third wave are the duration and saliency of party competition around a center-periphery cleavage during pre-third wave electoral regimes, visualized by the two continuos arrows in figure 3 before the beginning of the third wave. Negatively speaking, the longer the authoritarian phase(s), marked by transparent and broken arrows, and the more strongly suppressed political cleavages during that time, the less likely survival and spill-over into the third wave. If third wave opposition parties cannot rely on established legacies of cleavages that structure political competition, they have no ideological and symbolic "capital" to rely on in competition with the dominant party and have to exclusively and also less viably refer to mobilization strategies that advantage the dominant party because of its incumbency, i.e. clientelistic mobilization strategies and valence competition.

While the first critical juncture of de-colonization is identical regarding its non-violent nature through first pre-independence elections to every former British and French African colony, the second critical juncture of the breakdown of the first post-independence electoral regime varies regarding (1) whether it occurred at all until present, and (2) if yes, regarding its timing, as well as (3) whether it was initiated by a stable authoritarian force or an instable authoritarian force. If it did not occur yet (1), the better for present political structuring around a legacy of a center-periphery cleavage. If it did (1), the later after independence (2), the better. And if it was initiated by an unstable authoritarian force (3), the lower the degree of suppression of political cleavages and the higher the likeliness for subsequent pre-third wave renaissance of electoral regimes where minimally political competition is structured around the same territorial political cleavage.

Operationalization

In the following, I operationalize the main concept *degree of establishment of center-periphery (territorial) cleavage* for the comparative historical small-N analysis, which is

based on (1) the identification of a salient center-periphery cleavage in pre-independence party competition in the advent of first pre-independence elections and (2) the degree of subsequent establishment of this cleavage. In opposition to the large-N part where I had to proxy the existence of salient legacies of cleavages in third wave party competition by the age of the strongest opposition party and the number of pre-third wave elections, I will be able to (1) directly measure the existence of a salient territorial cleavage at the first critical juncture of first pre-independence elections and indigenous nationalization and (2) to trace its development and eventual establishment over subsequent pre- and post-independence elections and the second critical juncture of first breakdown of the electoral regime until eventual salient-spill over into third wave party competition. The center-periphery cleavage's development after first pre-independence elections, and during the pre-third wave area (see figure 3), will indicate the cleavage's *degree of establishment* and depends on the occurrence, timing and fashion of the second critical juncture of the first first post-independence installation of an authoritarian regime. Last but not least, (3) third wave party system structuring around the legacy of the same center-periphery cleavage will complete the chain of causality from cleavage-based party competition at independence to strength and institutionalization of the opposition in third wave dominant party systems because it is temporally most proximal to the dependent variable.

More precisely, (1) I consider a territorial center-periphery political cleavage to be *salient* in the advent of pre-independence elections if I am able to identify two political groups/parties (*organizational form* of the cleavage) after the Second World War and in advent of first pre-independence elections that are based on two different sets of elites, which have different *socio-structural* affiliations: One set of elites is rather urban, higher educated according to Western Europe, Eastern Europe or South African standards (i.e. part of the indigenous *intelligentsia*), relatively estranged from the traditional indigenous political system, and of lesser importance for the colonial system of indirect rule, the other

set of elites is rather rural, lesser educated, part of the traditional indigenous political system and of importance for the colonial system of indirect rule. Possibly, but not necessarily, one set of elites has a different ethno-regional association than the other set of elites, i.e. ethno-regional affiliations are non-randomly distributed among the two sets of elites. Hence, whether ethnicity is salient depends on the saliency of the center-periphery conflict. Initially, the rather urban intelligentsia should have the following of an urban and unemployed youth, which is excluded from the colonial patronage network. The rather rural traditional elite in turn should have the backing of rather rural followers that indirectly profit from the spoils and patronage of indirect rule. The two sets of elites in turn should be aware of their own preferences and values as a *group* and the ones of their antagonists (*element of collective identity*) (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 57f.): I.e. while the urban intelligentsia prefers radical and immediate decolonization and considers the traditional indigenous system as a stumbling block on the way to indigenous nationalization and centralization, the rural elite prefers incremental and pacted transition to an independent nation and wants to preserve the traditional system of rule and its conservative values. As argued in section 3, the values of the elites that represent the center should be associated and enriched with preferences for communist/socialist and pan-africanist ideas and ideologies while the peripheral elites most likely associates themselves with capitalism and lack of explicit sympathies or even open rejection of pan-africanist ideas.

In sum, I consider a center-periphery cleavage to be salient if it is present in post-Second World War political groups and pre-election political parties and its issues are explicitly invoked by influential leaders of theses political groups and parties after the Second World War and in the advent of first national elections.

To measure (2) the degree of subsequent *establishment* of territorial cleavage-based party competition, I conduct a historical analysis to assess whether the central issues of the political cleavage are invoked again in subsequent pre-independence and post-independence

elections, prior to the second critical juncture, i.e. the first post-independence electoral breakdown, and manifest themselves in the same political parties as before or not. If parties change their name, I check whether they invoke the same issues and explicitly refer to the programmatic and symbolic legacy of their forerunner party or not. If this is not the case, I consider the establishment of territorial cleavage-based party competition to be failed. If this is the case, I consider territorial cleavage-based party competition to be medium established. In order to consider it "more than medium" established, the territorial cleavage should "survive" the second critical juncture of the installation of the first post-independence authoritarian regime. Whereas the chances of pre-authoritarian establishment depend on the time given for electoral routinization, i.e. the number of elections before the second critical juncture, the chances for survival of the authoritarian phase depend on the stability of the authoritarian phase, i.e. the longer the authoritarian phase the more likely effective suppression of the center-periphery cleavage, and the less likely the renaissance of an electoral regime prior to the third wave. We detect the second critical juncture itself by the installation of de jure or de facto authoritarian one-party regimes by the winning party of the previous minimally competitive election. Subsequent elections under the rule of this party – if at all – are façade elections with no party or candidate from alternative parties to vote for. Alternatively, the abolishment comes through "counter-revolutionary" military regimes that fear the dominance and eventual authoritarianism by the previously electorally successful side of the cleavage. Hence, I analyze if parties of the pre-authoritarian period are again present in eventual post-authoritarian but pre-third wave elections and invoke the same issues and/or refer to their pre-authoritarian territorial cleavage-related programmatic and symbolic heritage. If the parties have new names, I analyze if they invoke the same issues and/or explicitly refer to the legacy of their forerunner party in the pre-authoritarian phase. It is important to note that I do not expect that the socio-structural foundation of the cleavage is necessarily still identical to

the immediate pre- and post-independence phase. I am mainly interested if political competition is still structured according to the historic center-periphery cleavage, and whether actors expectations are still structured according to that (cf. Bornschier, 2010, 53–63). If yes, I consider the pre-third wave establishment degree as "more than medium". If the second critical juncture did not occur, I consider this generally to be a sign of "more than medium" establishment, given a salient center-periphery cleavage at independence that can be successfully traced in subsequent post-independence elections over pre-third wave elections during the 1970s and 1980s.

Finally (3), in order to trace path-dependent spill-over into third wave electoral regimes, I analyze if the historic parties re-appear in the elections of the third wave and/or newer parties explicitly refer to the heritage of one of the historic independence parties and leaders in speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles. Again, I do not expect that third wave parties still explicitly formulate concrete policies and pamphlets associated with the historic territorial center-periphery cleavage, or even base themselves on the unmodified socio-structural foundation since then. Rather, I want to analyze if such third wave parties are still explicitly associated with one side of the historic cleavage, regardless if self-ascribed or externally ascribed, by other parties and citizens. And I expect new conflicts to be incorporated into the existing structure rather than to trigger the formation of new cleavages. If all this applies, the party system is still structured according to the historic center-periphery cleavage, and opposition parties have a chance to uphold internal cohesion and concomitant strength and institutionalization, despite a context of a dominant party system and heightened incumbency advantage through rampant clientelism (cf. with section 3).

Method

I use comparative history to track the sketched-out process of political structuring around a territorial cleavage and its establishment (see above and section 3). In line with George and Bennett's (2005) strategy of "process tracing", I focus the ensuing empirical part on the systematic analysis of the previously discussed most important "process stations" in the timeline from first pre-independence elections to third wave elections (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2006, 276f.). As visualized in figure 3, important process stations are first, the foundation of political groupings and political parties in the post-Second World War phase, in advent of first pre-independence national elections for the African population. At this first station ("birth"), I mainly need to assess the saliency of a center-periphery cleavage in party competition, based on the three elements of a cleavage. At stations two ("establishment"), three ("suppression") and four ("re-establishment"), I measure the degree of establishment of the center-periphery cleavage at three process stations: (2, "establishment") after independence in advent of the subsequent post-independence national election(s) before the second critical juncture, i.e. the saliency of the same center-periphery cleavage in party competition; (3, "suppression"), I research the timing of the second critical juncture, on which the duration of (2, "establishment") depends, and the degree of stability of the authoritarian regime and the concomitant degree of suppression of the center-periphery cleavage during that time, on which (4, "re-establishment") depends; The fourth process station (4, "re-establishment") is the eventual pre-third wave renaissance of the electoral regime where I assess whether the political parties and their leaders are still structured around the same center-periphery cleavage and explicitly refer to this heritage. In case of the absence of the second critical juncture, process points (3) and (4) are represented by pre-third wave elections during the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. an extension of process station (2, "establishment"), in fact. Finally (5, "legacy"), I assess the degree of structuring in

third wave party competition around a legacy of the same center-periphery cleavage as at independence.[61]

Data Sources

A considerable variety of country-specific accounts over the time period between 1945 and 2010 exists for all four cases, which allows me to base my comparative historical analysis on secondary sources without risking distortion of results. Hence, in the following analysis, I will interpret the secondary sources according to my comparative framework and according to my identified process stations. Generally, the quantity of the literature on political developments in the four cases is somewhat skewed in favor of Ghana, and to a lesser degree Botswana, in opposition to Lesotho and Mali. Nonetheless, I consider the amount of material for Lesotho and Mali to be enough for the purposes of this study.

Pre-Analysis: Historic Modernization Levels Do Not Drive Subsequent Party System Development

Figure 10 shows that the level of modernization before the first pre-independence elections does not drive the subsequent party system development in the four cases.

[61] In case of former Portuguese colonies or settler oligarchies, I assume that an equivalent process tracing strategy with process stations before the outburst of violent liberation or decolonization processes, during the process, and after liberation or independence, and finally during the third wave could be practicable. Yet, cleavage formation in the context of violent conflict and absence of pre-third wave elections should harm either (1) the existence of subsequent structuring around a heritage of cleavages at all, or, (2) if such a structuring is still present and strengthens the opposition, hamper its positive effects for the quality of democracy or party system responsiveness; (1) because one side of the cleavage could successfully claim to represent the whole nation against the colonizer or settler side of the supra-cleavage between the local population and the Portuguese colonial power or the settlers; (2) because the cohesiveness of both sides of the cleavage is mainly based on the heritage of the violent conflict and both sides do not have to be programmatically responsive to get voted for. At least, the results of the large-N analysis in this book seem to support this assumption for the cases of Namibia and Mozambique, and to a lesser degree, South Africa.

Figure 10: *GDP per capita of Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho and Mali between 1950 and 1990*



At the beginning of the third wave in 1990, the richest country of the four, Botswana,[62] also relies on a more than medium established legacy of cleavages (which will be shown in the subsequent analysis). However, the cross-sectional comparison in 1990 is deceiving. Botswana was actually the least modernized of the four countries in the crucial years before the first pre-independence elections in 1965. And it remained in this position during the subsequent first establishment phase of the territorial cleavage between 1965 and 1969. Only thereafter, Botswana's modernization level started to increase. Ghana, in turn, could build on the most established territorial cleavage of the four cases at the beginning of the third wave in 1990, although its modernization level was lower than both Botswana and Lesotho. Certainly, Ghana was the most modernized country before its first pre-independence elections in 1951. However, its modernization level dropped after 1974 below the levels of both Botswana and later Lesotho. Nonetheless, this did not initiate any de-

[62] According to GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollars, provided by Maddison (2009).

establishment of the territorial cleavage. Finally, Mali's modernization level was slightly higher than the one of Lesotho and Botswana in advent of the first pre-independence elections. Yet, the country was the first one to experience the abolishment of its first electoral regime, and turned out to be the one with the least established legacy of territorial cleavage at the beginning of the third wave in 1990.

Analysis

In the following, I will analyze every potential process station for all four cases, one station after another, with a brief summarizing comparison and a final conclusion at the end of this section of the book. Table 9 provides an overview of the critical junctures and the start and end dates of the process stations for each case:[63]

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, at process station "birth", due to the common first critical juncture of non-violent decolonization and nationalization (in opposition to Portuguese colonies and settler oligarchies) all four cases initially follow a similar path. Ghana – as the first colony on the continent that became independent – experienced its first critical juncture of decolonization manifested in first pre-independence elections before Mali, and later Botswana and Lesotho. Hence, process station "birth" can be analyzed for each of the four cases in similar fashion. In Ghana, the years until the first pre-independence election in 1951 are decisive, in Mali the years until 1957, in Lesotho until 1960, and in Botswana until 1965.

The analysis of process station "establishment" is rather straightforward, too. However, in Botswana, the electoral regime never experienced a breakdown so far. Hence, the second critical juncture is absent in Botswana and the case derivates from the general route followed by the other countries. Because of this, the empirical analysis process

[63]Dates in table 9 are retrieved from Nunley (2009).

Table 9: *Empirical timeline of critical junctures and start/end dates of process stations in Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali*

		Botswana	Lesotho	Ghana	Mali	Process Station
First critical juncture	**First pre-independence elections:**	**1965**	**1960**	**1951**	**1957**	"Birth"
	N-th pre-independence elections (*non-competitive in brackets)*:	--	1965	1954 1956	*(1959)*	"Establishment"
	Independence:	**1966**	**1966**	**1957**	**1960**	
	First post-independence elections:	1969	1970	1960	--	
Second critical juncture	**First abolishment of post-independence electoral regime:**	**--**	**1970**	**1964**	**1962**	"Suppression"
	Renaissance of electoral regime / *Post-independence electoral regime during 1970s:*	*Election in 1974*	--	1969	--	*"Establishment"* / "Re-establishment"
	Second abolishment of post-independence electoral regime:	--	--	1972	--	"Suppression"
	Renaissance of electoral regime / *Post-independence electoral regime during 1980s:*	*Elections in 1979 and 1984*	--	1979	--	*"Establishment"* / "Re-establishment"
	Third abolishment of post-independence electoral regime:	--	--	1981	--	"Suppression"
Beginning of the third wave in 1990	Founding third wave election / *first election during the third wave:*	*Election in 1989*	Founding election in 1993	Founding election in 1992	Founding election in 1992	"Legacy"

station "establishment" will encompass a more extended time-span in Botswana and a larger number of post-independence elections than in Lesotho, Ghana and Mali. Accordingly, process station "suppression" is absent in Botswana and station "re-establishment" rather a repetition of process station "establishment" at later points in time. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze process station "re-establishment" together with "establishment" in Botswana. In sum, the years 1966 until 1984 are decisive in Botswana for an extended process station "establishment", which also includes station "re-establishment" (elections in 1969, 1974, 1979 and 1984).[64] In opposition to Botswana and Mali, both Lesotho and Ghana experienced more than just one pre-independence election. I consider party competition in pre-independence elections *after* the first pre-independence election already as first *establishing* points of the center-periphery cleavage and analyze them together with the first post-independence election. This means that for the process station "establishment" in Lesotho the years 1961 until 1970 are of interest (second pre-independence election in 1965 and first post-independence election in 1970) while in Ghana these are the years between 1952 and 1964 (second and third pre-independence elections in 1954 and 1956, and first post-independence election in 1960). In Mali, the time-span for process station "establishment" is rather short. It only comprises the years from 1958 until the arrest of the "on-off"-opposition leader, Fily Dabo Sissoko, in 1962. On top of that, the second pre-independence elections in 1959 were already non-competitive due to the interim co-optation of Fily Dabo Sissoko and his party, *Parti Progressiste Soudanais* (PPS), into president Modibo Keita's party, *Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (US-RDA) (Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 272). To enhance readability for each country case, I analyze process stations "birth" and "establishment", in chronological manner and in one separate subsection for each of the four countries.

[64] I consider Botswana's 1989 election already to be part of the third wave, i.e. part of the analysis of process station "legacy".

While the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the post-independence electoral regimes is absent in Botswana it manifests itself in Ghana in 1964 with the installation of Kwame Nkrumah's *Convention People's Party* (CPP) as the sole legal party (Owusu-Ansah, 2005, liii). With the arrest of Fily Dabo Sissoko in Mali in 1962, Modibo Keita and his US-RDA left no doubt about their intentions to install a one-party state, too (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 300). Accordingly, in the 1964 elections, US-RDA was already the sole legal party (Nunley, 2009). In Lesotho in turn, the results of the first post-independence elections in 1970 led to the annulation of the elections results and declaration of a state of emergency by the loosing incumbent, Leabua Jonathan, and his party BNP, and the subsequent installation of the de facto one-party regime (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxix). As both Lesotho and Mali did not experience a renaissance of the electoral regime until the advent of the third wave in 1990, their time span for the process station "suppression" is relatively long and process station "re-establishment" absent in both cases. In Lesotho, process station "suppression" comprises the years between 1970 and 1990. In Mali, the years between 1962 and 1990 are relevant.

Ghana, is somewhat peculiar as it experienced, after the first abolishment of the electoral regime in 1964, and subsequent renaissance of the electoral regime in 1969, another breakdown in 1972, second renaissance in 1979, and third and last breakdown in 1981 before the advent of the third wave in 1990 (Nunley, 2009; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). Accordingly, phases that belong to process station "suppression" and phases that belong to station "re-establishment" alternate over time. Hence, it makes sense to analyze the developments between the second critical juncture in 1964 and the third wave 1990 together and in a chronological manner (figure 11 illustrates the time-span of the different phases in the four countries).

Figure 11: *Length of process stations in Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali*



Already this overview, table 9 and figure 11 should have given an impression about the chances of the four cases to develop cleavage-based party competition that has path-dependent effects on contemporary party competition structured around a legacy of a center-periphery cleavage. Clearly, Botswana's historic cleavage should have good chances for survival due to the lack of a second critical juncture of electoral breakdown. And clearly, Mali's historic cleavage should have rather few chances for survival due to the very early installation of an authoritarian regime without pre-third wave renaissance of the electoral regime. Ghana's back and forth between electoral regime phases and authoritarian phases during its pre-third wave history accounts for a more complex development of party competition around a legacy of pre-independence cleavages. Nonetheless, the relatively large number of pre-independence elections and the subsequent periodic pre-third wave flare-up of electoral competition should provide potential for survival of party system structuring around a pre-independence cleavage. Also Lesotho experienced a significant phase of pre-independence party competition. Yet in opposition to Ghana, it did not experience a pre-third wave renaissance of electoral competition. So the chances for salient survival will depend on the vibrancy of the pre-independence cleavage itself and the degree of suppression during the authoritarian phase.

The subsections below will follow the rationale outlined above. I analyze process stations "birth" and "establishment" together and for every case one after another (with Botswana receiving relatively larger space because of its extended "establishment" station). After that, process station "suppression" is analyzed in Lesotho and Mali whereas stations "suppression" and "re-establishment" in Ghana receive their own subsection. Last but not least, I analyze station "legacy" for all four cases in one subsection. Finally, I conclude this section of the book.

Pre- and Post-Independence Party Competition Based on Center-Periphery Cleavage before the Second Critical Juncture

Botswana

As in Lesotho, British engagement in Botswana was initially reduced to a minimum in comparison with "regular" British African colonies as the Gold Coast (*Ghana* after independence). The establishment of the *Bechuanaland Protectorate* by the British in 1885 was mostly strategically motivated in order to prevent Boer or German rule over Tswana polities (Picard, 1987, 29).[65] The British administration intended to keep the costs of the protectorate as low as possible. The initial idea was to install a system of "parallel rule", i.e. the British administration protected Tswana societies from outside forces while the traditional political relationship between the chiefs and their subjects would remain untouched. However, soon the British administration started to interfere in the affairs of the chiefs, until finally, by 1934, the generally more interfering concept of "indirect rule" was also adopted in Bechuanaland, and the protectorate started to resemble the average British African colony. Yet, British engagement remained comparatively modest in comparison with other British African colonies like the Gold Coast (Picard, 1987, 28–50). The idea of indirect rule was for British administrators to govern the indigenous population through their own traditional institutions. In practice, it both emphasized the role of the chief while at the same time undermined his autonomy from British interference by subordinating him directly to the British hierarchy of colonial administration.

As in other African colonies, the experience of Batswana soldiers on the side of the Allied Forces in World War Two, catalyzed aspirations for independence and indigenous nationalization (Picard, 1987, 124f.). Nonetheless, indigenous nationalist political movements formed comparatively late in Botswana. First, due to the relatively low engagement

[65]Tswana is a general term for persons who speak "Setswana" as their first language and usually belong to the major Tswana tribes. A person of Tswana origin is called "Motswana", more than one person are called "Batswana" (cf. Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 345).

of the British Empire in Botswana in general, which led to a very narrow basis of indigenous educated elites, from which any indigenous nationalization impulse could originate (Picard, 1987, 85–91). And second, because most of the elites that initiated the formation of the most important nationalist political movements before independence have been educated in proximate South Africa and also worked there. Accordingly, they were preoccupied with engagements for the South African anti-apartheid movements *African National Congress* (ANC) and its splinter *Pan-Africanist Congress* (PAC). After the banning of the ANC and PAC, and the diminishing prospects for change in South Africa, Batswana elites returned home and shifted their focus to nationalization in their own country (Picard, 1987, 123f.).

The first successfully organized political party in pre-independent Botswana, the *Bechuanaland People's Party* (BPP) (*Botswana People's Party* after independence), was formed in 1960 in response to the establishment of an indigenous, non-partisan legislative council in preparation for future independence, whose membership consisted mainly of chiefs (Kowet, 1978, 150f.; Picard, 1987, 135–137). The founding leaders of the BPP, K. T. Motsetse, Philip Matante and Motsamai Mpho, shared a common experience of higher education and work in South Africa, and political activism in South African anti-apartheid movements. And none of them was a chief (Kowet, 1978, 154, 166; Polhemus, 1983, 400; Picard, 1987, 123). Accordingly, they did not play a role in the administrative system of the protectorate; neither as traditional leaders in the system of indirect rule nor in the newly established advisory council or legislative council. The party was anti-traditional as it demanded that people should obtain political office only based on merits. And it was progressive. It demanded immediate independence and africanization of the civil service (Halpern, 1965, 287; Polhemus, 1983, 399f.; cf. Mogalakwe, 1997, 37). The BPP drew its support from the small urban proletariate in Botswana's major towns, along the rail line between Gaborone, the newly established center and future capital, and Francistown (Kowet, 1978,

154; Picard, 1987, 137; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 266). It also tried to find its future voters among the Batswana migrant workers in South African mines. However, most of these migrants settled in the more traditional villages upon return to their home country, and became skeptical of the BPP's anti-traditionalist campaign (Gulbrandsen, 2012, 95). The BPP was sympathetic to Pan-Africanist ideas and was soon associated with socialist and communist ideas (Kowet, 1978, 156; Picard, 1987, 137–140; Gulbrandsen, 2012, 97). The alliance between the three leaders of the BPP was an uneasy one. The split between the South African anti-apartheid movements ANC and PAC was reproduced in the BPP because of the different sympathies of the three leaders to the two splinters. There was a pro-ANC faction led by secretary general Mpho and an anti-communist and Pan-Africanist pro-PAC faction led by vice-president Matante (Mogalakwe, 1997, 37). From these quarrel three BPPs resulted, one led by Motsetse, one by Matante, and one by Mpho. Before the founding pre-independence elections in 1965, Mpho renamed his splinter into *Bechuanaland Independence Party* (BIP). All three parties contested the 1965 elections (Polhemus, 1983, 400f.). Nonetheless, they basically represented all the same, rather urban, progressive and anti-traditional, side of a the center-periphery cleavage. Yet, both the BPP's factionalism and the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Batswana still lived in traditionally ruled villages led to the BPP's failure to penetrate the rural periphery, which was and is still necessary to make substantial gains in elections in Botswana (Kowet, 1978, 154; Picard, 1987, 139; interviews with Politicians in Botswana, 2010).

The formation of the BPP both alarmed the colonial administration and members of the newly formed legislative council, which had no partisan affiliation so far. In 1962, Seretse Khama, an executive member of the legislative council and heir to the regency of the important Bangwato tribe, formed the *Bechuanaland Democratic Party* (BDP) (*Botswana Democratic Party* after independence) mainly in reaction to the threat posed by the BPP. Khama's person represented a more moderate Batswana elite, which let itself be co-opted

by the colonial administration to some degree, had an aristocratic or royal heritage and a strive for moderate modernization and nationalization. Some of them were substantial cattle owners, had considerable wealth, and were well educated. Although to some degree also critical of the traditional system of rule and the colonial administration, the members of this elite were not involved in South-African anti-apartheid struggles and were ready to collaborate with the colonial administration during the last decade of its existence (Polhemus, 1983, 401; Picard, 1987, 136; Mogalakwe, 1997, 36–38; Gulbrandsen, 2012, 96). Before the founding of the party itself, the BDP's future leadership was already part of the indigenous "[d]e [f]acto [g]overnment" manifested in the legislative council and trained by the British colonial administration for smooth transition to independence (Picard, 1987, 138). Accordingly, the BDP's rhetoric was much less confrontative than the BPP's. In opposition to the BPP, the party did not demand immediate independence and did not threaten the authority of the chiefs. Rather it intended to attenuate the chiefs' traditional authority in a less confrontative way by constitutionalizing their role in the new republic (Kowet, 1978, 156). The BDP also did not approve of the BPP's confrontative rhetoric against apartheid South Africa and the small white settler community in Botswana. It did not approve rather out of strategic reasons – in line with the British colonial administration – than with regards to its content. Khama and the BDP did not consider it wise to provoke neighboring South Africa on the eve of Botswana's independence. Affiliated with an emerging class of entrepreneurs and substantial cattle owners, the BDP also had no sympathies for the alleged socialism or communism of the BPP (Gulbrandsen, 2012, 96).

In sum, the moderate rhetoric and the unique combination of a BDP leadership, which feature both a traditional heritage and Western education, manifested in the charismatic person of Seretse Khama, who was also not affiliated with the South African anti-apartheid movements, made the BDP an acceptable party to support both for the numerous traditional leaders, the population-wise dominating rural population, the emerging Batswana

Figure 12: *Embryonic Party System Structuring in Botswana 1965*



bourgeoisie, the British colonial administration, and the small minority of white settlers (cf. Kowet, 1978, 156). And the party also received financial and organizational support from European and Asian communities in Botswana who feared the more radical BPP (Picard, 1987, 138f.; Mogalakwe, 1997, 38) Clearly, this were decisive factors for the comfortable electoral victory of the BDP in the first pre-independence election (cf. Picard, 1987, 138–140).

Consequently, the BDP represents the "periphery" side of the center-periphery cleavage, although the term "periphery" sounds somewhat debatable in the case of the largely non-urbanized Botswana around independence. With Botswana colonial administration headquarters outside the country in Mafikeng, and Gaborone installed only in 1961 as the future capital city, the center was almost non-existent and manifested itself in labor-migration and anti-apartheid engagement in South Africa or in peripheral Francistown. Migrant Batswana in South Africa's mines, who constituted the potential electorate for the BPP, were not able to cast their vote from outside the borders while the traditional and rural fraction of the Batswana population amounted for the lion's share of the relevant electorate and was more likely to sympathize with the less anti-traditional BDP and its leader of royal descent (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 12).

After the elections in 1965 but before independence in 1966, Kenneth Koma founded the *Botswana National Front* (BNF), which proved to become the most durable and strongest opposition party in Botswana. Like Seretse Khama, Kenneth Koma was a member of the influential Bangwato tribe, and allegedly had some sort of royal background (Polhemus, 1983, 401f.; Makgala, 2005, 304). However, he was neither a chief nor was he a member of the legislative council despite his higher education, which makes him more comparable in terms of his socio-structural basis to Motsetse, Matante and Mpho of the BPP. Koma spent most of the decisive years for the formation of political parties in advent of the 1965 elections abroad in South Africa, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union, where he received a doctorate in political science (Polhemus, 1983, 401f.; Picard, 1987, 152; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 181). Upon return in 1965, he intended to unite the factions of the BPP by the formation of the BNF. While Koma managed to incorporate the Motsetse wing of the BPP into the BNF, the Matante wing of the BPP and Mpho's BIP remained independent political parties (Stevens, 1975, 26f.; Polhemus, 1983, 402; Picard, 1987, 152, 156; Charlton, 1993, 346; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 236f.). According to his socio-structural standing of an outsider to both the system of indirect rule and the legislative council, Koma initially was against chieftainship in general, like the BPP and the BIP have been themselves in advent of the 1965 elections (Makgala, 2005, 306). He criticized heavily the BDP's association with the chiefs, which he regarded as a continuation of the system of indirect rule and "neo-colonialist" regime (Polhemus, 1983, 406). Regarding ideology, Koma shared the fate of the BPP leaders in being associated with communism while he himself associated his BNF with "scientific socialism" (Polhemus, 1983, 406; Picard, 1987, 140; Makgala, 2005, 307f.).

Both the BPP's failure to penetrate the rural periphery, which is necessary for electoral victory in Botswana, and the fact that the BDP won the elections due to its general association with chiefs who secured political mobilization and success in the periphery,

and the BDP having many chief members in its own ranks, soon convinced Koma that it would be strategically wise to associate itself with chiefs as well and have them as members and potential candidates. Therefore, already the BNF's *Pamphlet No. 1* states that "[w]e must not be afraid of temporary alliances even with those groups which it is our ultimate patriotic duty to annihilate" (cit. in Polhemus, 1983, 406). It was not difficult for the BNF to find disgruntled chiefs to forge its uneasy alliance of intellectual lefts and urban dwellers on the one hand, and traditional chiefs on the other hand, who would gain traditional voters from more rural constituencies who were loyal to their chiefs and therefore also to the BNF (Stevens, 1975, 27; Polhemus, 1983, 406f.; Picard, 1987, 147). One of the reasons for increasing disgruntlement of chiefs was the introduction of the Tribal Land Act before the first post-independence elections in 1969, which reduced the chiefs' official status to payed civil servants and led to increasing tensions with the BDP government and significant fissures in the bond between chiefs and the BDP. Most prominently, Bathoen II, influential chief of the Bangwaketse, one of the other big Batswana tribe beside Khama's Bangwato, and first chairman in the House of Chiefs, realized the impotency of chiefs under the constitution of newly independent Botswana, resigned and turned to the BNF (Wiseman, 1977, 73; Kowet, 1978, 204f.; Polhemus, 1983, 406f.; Picard, 1987, 152, 157–159; Charlton, 1993, 335, 338; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 2008, 42f.). In order to gain the rural vote from the BDP, the BNF even nominated Bathoen II as its presidential candidate instead of Koma, and Bathoen II challenged BDP Vice-President Quett Masire in his own district (in Botswana, the president, which is endowed with large executive powers, is indirectly elected through the parliament and an ex-officio member of the parliament itself) (Picard, 1987, 158).

The contradictory, even "schizoid", alliance of commoners, who had the same socio-structural foundation and ideological disposition as its forerunner, the Motsetse wing of the BPP, and disgruntled chiefs of the traditional system who disapproved of the BDP leader's

increasing centralizing tendencies after their victory in the 1965 elections, proved to have double-edged effects in the first post-independence elections in 1969. On the one hand, the BNF and Bathoen II indeed won three seats in Bathoen's Bangwaketse areas along many local District Council seats, on the other hand, urban voters found it difficult to vote for a party that portrayed a chief as its presidential candidate. Accordingly, Gaborone and Lobatse remained in the hand of the BDP despite of a growing class of civil servants in Gaborone who voted for the BNF. And Francistown remained in the hand of the BPP. Koma himself was not elected for the National Assembly and also lost the party presidency to Bathoen II.

In comparison with the 1965 elections, the BDP lost some of its popular support, but nonetheless retained a considerable absolute majority in the National Assembly with 24 seats vis-à-vis three seats for each the BNF and the BPP and one for the BIP (Polhemus, 1983, 407f.; Picard, 1987, 158, 161; Charlton, 1993, 335; Wiseman, 1998, 256; Nunley, 2009). Yet, turnout was considerably lower compared with 1965 because a remarkable number of disillusioned chiefs ordered their following to abstain from voting (Kowet, 1978, 205–207).

Thus, while the original leadership and following of the BNF belonged to the center-side of the territorial cleavage alongside the remainder of the BPP, the Matante faction, and the other splinter of the BPP, the BIP, the new, more traditional allies of the BNF belonged to the peripheral side and opted for reversal of the centralizing tendencies of the BDP government. The platform of the BNF tried to reflect the peripheral side by demanding a federal system with an upper house of tribes that would have the final word in legislation (Picard, 1987, 158).

Hence, while the territorial cleavage certainly remained salient in Botswana after the 1965 elections due to the survival of the first political parties BDP, BIP and BPP, and the BNF, which was founded shortly after the 1965 elections and took over the heritage

of Motsetse's BPP faction, the correspondence between the socio-structural foundation of its leaders and the respective programmatic platform became blurred. On the side of the BDP this was caused by its capturing of power of a constitutionally increasingly centralized state, whose centralization the previously peripheral forces even further intensified. This disgruntled influential chiefs who were increasingly excluded from the center of power like Bathoen II or more subordinate chiefs who remained in the periphery and were degraded to mere civil workers. Koma and the BNF in turn realized, due to the negative examples of its forerunners BPP and BIP, the difficulty to capture power in a rather traditional and rural Botswana without the support of chiefs who act as a bridgehead to the rural population. Hence, with the increasing modernizing and centralizing tendencies of the more traditional BDP after the 1965 elections and an uneasy alliance inside the new progressive opposition party, BNF, between traditionalist forces, who wanted to conserve traditional powers, and progressive non-traditional forces, who sympathized with socialist ideas, the difference of the territorial cleavage became blurred both regarding the element of collective identity and regarding the socio-structural foundation, which became an uneasy alliance on the side of the BNF (cf. Wiseman, 1998, 256). Nonetheless, the organizational form of the cleavage and hence the structure of the Botswana party system perpetuated and established itself to some degree in the 1969 elections. And the BPP-split that was led by Matante and became the "sole" BPP after incorporation of Motsete's wing into BNF remained most coherently in its socio-structural foundation and rhetorical platform and retained its urban stronghold in Francistown (Polhemus, 1983, 405; Picard, 1987, 158). The BIP however, which was already weak in the 1965, had even less popular support in the 1969 and turned into a one-man show of his ANC-sympathizing president Mpho and had a low-key rhetorical platform (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 13) (Polhemus, 1983, 403f.; Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla; 2008, 238f.).

Figure 13: *Party System Structuring in Botswana 1969 and 1974*



Despite retaining power, regarding the number of seats, the vote share, and the general turnout, the 1969 elections came as a shock to the BDP in comparison with its landslide victory of 1965. It reminded the party leaders of the BDP that peripheral and rural support is not guaranteed by the fact that the party leadership could refer to its own socio-structural affiliation of a traditional-peripheral heritage. The recent urban and centralizing tendencies in the platform and policies of the governing BDP, which were somehow inevitable due to the construction of the new capital Gaborone and the installation of a civil service, led to an impression of neglect on the side of its rural basis in the periphery. And the centralization of power in the hands of the BDP political elites in turn led to the concomitant disgruntlement of chiefs who did not belong to the inner circles of the BDP or had subordinate positions in the periphery but still had substantial influence on the rural following of the BDP. This was aggravated by an increasingly negative attitude of the BDP-government towards traditional leaders. Therefore, in prospect for the 1974 elections, the BDP readjusted its urban-rural-, i.e. center-periphery-, balance again in favor of the more rural areas. Due to the BDP's position of incumbency, it did this by the implementation of actual rural development policies rather than rhetorics (Charlton, 1993, 355f.). BDP ministers started to regularly travel the vast country in order to stop the defection of its rural basis. Additionally, to lure away the growing class of civil servants in Gaborone, which tended to vote for the commoner-representing part of the BNF in the 1969 elections, the BDP

increased their salaries (Picard, 1987, 161f.). Although the BDP preferred deeds rather than words in order to balance its peripheral background and basis with its increasingly centrist governing style, it nonetheless emphasized its will to build a broad coalition of urban and rural forces in formulating explicitly its ideology of "unity" and "harmony" of all Batswana citizens "irrespective of race, tribe or occupation" in advent of the 1974 elections. In rejecting Marxist ideology, Seretse Khama denied "that certain groups are faced with an inevitable and irreconcilable conflict of interest." Rather he beliefs that these conflicts "can be avoided if we [...] apply in practice our belief in *Kagisano* [i.e. unity and harmony]." (Khama cit. in Polhemus, 1983, 402f.)

The fact that the peripheral-traditional forces inside the centrist BNF were responsible for the electoral gains in the 1969 elections instead of the centrist-commoner founders of the party led to subsequent power struggles inside the party. Koma lost the presidency to Bathoen II and several progressive members left the party. Yet, Koma kept the vice-presidency and remained the rhetorically most outspoken BNF-leader and ensured that the party was not overtaken entirely by the traditional allies. In the party organ of the BNF, Koma ensured that the party remained true to its initial program and that the new traditional members would have to adapt to the progressive character of the party (Polhemus, 1983, 407f.). Koma's resilience to give in to the traditionalist drift in his party was supported by the fact that the BDP readjusted its electoral strategy after 1969 in favor of its previously defecting traditional and rural base, which in turn increased the BNF's urban and more progressive vote (Charlton, 1993, 355f.).

Generally, the re-balancing strategy of the BDP proved to be rather successful in the 1974 elections. The electoral support of the BDP was almost back to the level of the first pre-independence elections and both the BNF and the BPP lost one seat. Nonetheless, voter turnout in general decreased again and pointed to the fact that the problem of

Figure 14: *Party System Structuring in Botswana 1979 and 1984*



voter apathy and dissatisfied traditional chieftaincy in peripheral areas was not completely reversed (Picard, 1987, 162–164).

The 1979 elections were a repetition of the 1974 elections, both regarding its outcome as well as the electoral strategy of the BDP with the difference of a higher voter turnout as the government invested heavily in re-registration of voter and increased efforts in rural development again. Co-optation of further potentially BNF-inclined civil servants were continued as well. Meanwhile, the BNF could maintain its position as the most important opposition party and the BNF presidency went back to Koma and the progressive forces of the BNF in 1977. Hence, the center-side of the BNF was strengthened again. The fortunes of the BPP in turn started to vanish while the BIP lost its sole seat in the National Assembly (Picard, 1987, 164; Makgala, 2005, 306).

Khama's death in 1980 hurt the vote share of the BDP in the 1984 elections to some degree, but the party could hold its seat share and comfortable absolute majority in the National Assembly. The 1984 elections also resulted in the consolidation of the BNF's position as Botswana's most important opposition party and its standing as a viable alternative for urban voters. Due to the vanishing of the BPP and the BIP, the BNF reached the highest vote and seat share since its foundation and Koma, for the first time, became a member of parliament by winning a Gaborone constituency (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 14) (Picard, 1987, 168–172).

Increasing centralization by the BDP whose core consisted of member of tribes that belonged to the 80 percent Batswana majority led to the impression on the side of the biggest minority group, the Bakalanga, of cultural suppression (Du Toit, 1995, 128f.). Both the BPP and later the BNF tried to invest in this potential ethnopolitical-cleavage as it coincided with urban Francistown constituencies, who sympathized with the more progressive opposition parties, anyway. However, the BDP made sure that ethnic grievances of minority groups were attenuated by the same development projects and material benefits it employed to win back its own rural basis. Accordingly, the Bakalanga never displayed a significant opposition vote outside the immediate Francistown area and politics in Botswana remained ethnically cross-cutting (Selolwane, 2002, 78f.).

In sum, although an urban and commoner-based intelligentsia was underdeveloped in the Bechuanaland Protectorate itself, several Batswana commoners, who received their higher education in South Africa, initiated the birth of the Botswana party system with the foundation of the BPP upon return to their country of origin. This forced the peripheral-traditional and more conservative forces in Bechuanaland to form their own party and the territorial cleavage came into being. The non-enfranchisement of Batswana miners in South Africa, lack of urbanization and general low modernization level in Botswana at the time of first pre-independence elections ensured an overwhelming electoral victory of the peripheral-side of the territorial cleavage embodied in the future dominant BDP. In the following, the BNF, an heir to one faction of the BPP, realized the importance to ally itself with peripheral and traditional forces and forged an uneasy coalition of its urban basis of commoners and a faction of traditional leaders who were disgruntled by the increasing centralizing tendencies of the BDP. Both the centralizing tendencies on the side of the BDP and the peripheral alliance strategy on the side of the BNF blurred the collective identity element among the party elite, and to some degree, the socio-structural

foundation element on both sides of the territorial cleavage. Nonetheless, both the BDP and the BNF managed to hold together their organizational integrity and structured the Botswana party system during the entire pre-third wave phase and beyond. And after the first post-independence elections, they readjusted their platform and policies to some degree again to bring it back in correspondence with their initial collective identity and socio-structural foundation. Summa summarum, it is safe to consider the establishment of the territorial cleavage and its concomitant structuring of the Botswana party system as "more than medium" (according to the criteria formulated in section 4).

Lesotho

Likewise to Botswana, Britain had no inherent interest in the colonization of *Basutoland* (*Lesotho* after independence). The establishment of the *Basutoland Protectorate* in 1884, after annexation as a British Territory in 1868 and intermediary administration by the Cape Colony, was rather strategically motivated. Chief Moshoeshoe, the founder of the Basotho nation, his territory and people were under constant threat from the migrating Boers and the newly established and adjacent Orange Free State.[66] Moshoeshoe asked for British protection and the British in turn saw their interests in danger if the Boers would incorporate the Basotho territory and subsequently could push down to the sea and the territory of the cape colony (Spence, 1968, 10f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 283–285; Eldredge, 2007, 25).

As in Botswana, the British administration wanted to keep the costs of the new protectorate as low as possible. Accordingly, 'dual' rule was implemented in Basutoland, i.e. protection from outside threats by the British, and internal rule by the Basotho chiefs (Spence, 1968, 14f.). Likewise to other African colonies, Basotho chiefs were empowered by British rule insofar as their autocratic powers transformed from being flexible custom-

[66]The people of Lesotho, pronounced *Lesutu*, are called Basotho, *Basutu*. The singular is Mosotho, *Mosutu*, and the language is Sesotho, *Sesutu* (cf. Rosenber, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 12f.).

ary law to codified law. At the same time, the chiefs were now responsible to the colonial administration instead of to their own people, which decreased their traditional legitimacy. I. e. traditional rulers were not "chiefs by the people" anymore but "chief[s] by jurisdiction over an area" (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 35).

In the 1930s, the British intended to "modernize" the system of rule in Basutoland, and reduced the number of chiefs drastically. While the modernization of the traditional system decreased the number of subordinate chiefs, it emphasized the role of senior chiefs and the paramount chief itself. This shift of power from subordinate chiefs to senior chiefs, which was initiated by the colonial administration in 1938, led to a new alliance of the previously disunited commoners and subordinate chiefs.

By the 1930s, a small but growing number of entrepreneurial, relatively wealthy, educated and mostly protestant Basotho commoners became politically more active, because they felt actively neglected and sabotaged by the British. Josiel Lefela, a teacher, was the most prominent of them (Epprecht, 1995, 36, 42f.; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 37f.). He formed the *Commoner's League*, which was both anti-colonial, critical of the current role of the chiefs and had links to South Africa's Communist Party. He had the backing of an increasing number of migrant Basotho workers in South African mines. Lefela initially intended to establish a Council of Commons alongside the existing National Council, which was preserved for chiefs and their nominees. However, the majority of the National Council was against it (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 38; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 147f.).

Due to the concurrence of actual degradation of subordinate chiefs and perceived degradation of commoners after the reform of 1938, these two unlike groups were suddenly united against the British administration (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 39). As we will see further below, the antagonism of the uneasy alliance of subordinate chiefs and commoners on the one hand and senior chiefs on the other hand basically represents two sides of a center-

periphery cleavage with the special circumstance of a sub-cleavage inside the prospective center between the paramount chief and the senior chiefs on the one side and the commoners on the other side. These special circumstances gave birth to three political parties in advent of first pre-independence election in 1960 as we will see further below.

Coates (1966, 113) points to the effect the experience of Basotho soldiers in the Second World War had on their level of political awareness and increased the general demand in Basutoland for more indigenous legislative powers. At the same time, the changing circumstances after the Second World War and the definitive certainty that incorporation of Basutoland in apartheid South Africa was not an option anymore prepared the ground for the British administration to support steps in direction of more self-governance (Spence, 1968, 29). In 1955, the National Council, which was so far only advisory, asked for legislative powers. The British government agreed to discuss the demand and in 1960 the new constitution came into being: The National Council transformed into a Legislative Council with legislative powers over internal matters. Most importantly, the new constitution introduced the electoral principle and demanded that half of the 80 Legislative Council members are elected by local District Councils acting as electoral colleges. The District Councils in turn are elected by universal adult male franchise. The remainder remained reserved for senior chiefs and nominees of the paramount chief (Coates, 1966, 113; Spence, 1968, 32f.). On the one hand the new constitution fulfilled an important demand of the commoners by the introduction of the electoral principle and the possibility for commoners to be eligible. On the other hand, the senior chiefs and the paramount chief retained their decisive position by holding half of the seats based on non-democratic basis. Accordingly, the fundamental friction between senior chiefs on the one hand, and commoners and subordinate chiefs on the other hand, remained salient (cf. Spence, 1968, 33).

Amidst the changing environment after the Second World War and demands for reform of the National Council, Ntsu Mokhehle founded the first nationalist party, the *Basutoland African Congress* (BAC), renamed *Basutoland Congress Party* (BCP) in 1958 in preparation for the first pre-independence elections (Spence, 1968, 32; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxviii). Mokhehle was a pupil of Lefela, the founder of the Commoner's League, and shared Lefela's and the commoners' outspoken anti-colonial rhetoric. Mokhehle received his university education at Fort Hare College in South Africa together with future anti-apartheid leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. He became politically active in the ANC, and ideologically, followed the pan-Africanist ideas of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (Epprecht, 1995, 43; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 23f., 151, 265). Although Mokhehle himself was a son of a subordinate headman, he did not obtain a place in the traditional system of rule. After having received his Master of Science in Fort Hare, he became a teacher in Basutoland, the only job open for academic Basuto under British administration (Khaketla, 1972, 34–36). Accordingly, Ntsu Mokhehle despite his quite excellent education did not play any role in the administrative system of the British protectorate. As its forerunner, the Commoner's League, the BAC/BCP drew its support from the commoners, i.e. Basotho civil servants, protestant teachers, traders, entrepreneurs and laborers who also felt neglected by the British administrative system (Epprecht, 1995, 43).

Despite the commoners non-incorporation into the British system of indirect rule and administration, the BAC/BCP's rhetorical stance vis-à-vis the incorporated system of chieftaincy was initially relatively soft. It rather reflected the complexly layered system of traditional and indirect rule in Basutoland, where subordinate chiefs proliferated excessively and a paramount chief existed, in opposition to the Bechuanaland protectorate where no paramount chief existed and chieftainship played a less significant role in the formation of the nation (Halpern, 1965, 261). Accordingly, in opposition to the BPP in Botswana,

the BAC/BCP initially did not question the idea of formal incorporation of traditional rulers in an upper house, and underlined the fundamental importance of the traditional element for Basutoland. Clearly, the BAC/BCP's general soft stance on the topic was rather strategically motivated, as later developments and testimonies after the first pre-independence elections show (Spence, 1968, 30f.; Khaketla, 1972, 49f., 56). Mokhehle and the BAC/BCP were wise to go soft on the topic, because it could have repelled the following of the future electorate, which still held chieftainship in high esteem due to its historic role in the formation of the Basotho nation (cf. Spence, 1968, 31; Coplan, 1997). After all, the chieftainship's strategic interaction with the British enabled the construction of the Basuto identity vis-à-vis the all-encompassing threat of incorporation into apartheid South Africa (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997).

Although the BAC/BCP initially went soft on the chief subject, it was clear that it did envision a rather ceremonial role for the paramount chief, and no substantial role for subordinate chiefs (Eldredge, 2007, 216). In reaction to this and fear of the alleged communist influences in the BAC/BCP, Chief Samuel Seepheephe Matete formed the *Marema-Tlou Party* (MTP) in 1957 and Chief Leabua Jonathan established the *Basutoland National Party* (BNP) in 1958 (Spence, 1968, 36–38; Eldredge, 2007, 216). Matete acted as a chief and had an influential role in the National Council. He was the main advisor of the Regent Paramount Chieftainess Mantsebo. In 1956 however, Matete challenged her rule by preparing the succession to her throne and concomitant modernization of the paramountcy by intending to install her Oxford-educated stepson Bereng Seeiso as the new regent in a centralized and monarchical future independent Lesotho (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 216, 233f.). Hence, Matete mainly formed the MTP to strengthen the royal center to the disadvantage of peripheral subordinate chiefs and radical commoners who also intended to form the future center in the new nation. Accordingly, the MTP had the support of the senior chiefs, who hoped to profit from an emphasis on the paramountcy,

which could tip the balance of power in their favor and against subordinate chiefs and commoners (Spence, 1968, 37; Weisfelder, 1977, 175). Likewise to Matete, also Leabua Jonathan, the founder of the BNP, was a chief and an advisor of the Regent Paramount Chieftainess Mantsebo. He was a member of the National Council, and in opposition to Matete, he became a Roman Catholic like the acting Regent Mantsebo and supported a prolongation of her regency in opposition to Matete's plans to install her stepson Bereng Seeiso (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 126f., 235). As a lesser chief with weak links to the senior chiefs, Jonathan approved of Regent Mantsebo's traditional interpretation of the paramountcy. Her regency was based on more cooperative relationships to subordinate chiefs and was against the new alliance of Matete and her stepson Seeiso Bereng who intended to modernize and centralize the paramountcy by putting more emphasis on it and the senior chiefs (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 216). The influential Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho in turn feared the alleged communism of Ntsu Moekhehle and his BAC/BCP who tried to incorporate lesser chiefs and commoners. The Church supported Jonathan to found a more conservative party, which would ally itself with the lesser chiefs like himself and who were skeptical of the progressive rhetoric of the BAC/BCP and Mokhehle, anyway. (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 126; Khaketla, 1972, 18).

In sum, the proliferation of lesser chiefs and the significance of the paramount chief in Basutoland led to a more complex center-periphery cleavage in Lesotho than in Botswana. Both commoners and royalists hoped to become the new center through modernization, centralization and nationalization. Subordinate chiefs who had a position of considerable influence during the early decades of British administration and secured the penetration of the periphery came under pressure because of the modernization attempts of both the British administration itself and royalist like Matete who wanted to strengthen centralization by putting emphasis on the paramountcy and senior chiefs and decrease the number

Figure 15: *Embryonic party system structuring in Lesotho 1960*



of lesser chiefs. Because the British administration initially was more favorable towards modernization and centralization through the paramountcy and senior chiefs instead of commoners, subordinate chiefs had no other option than to turn towards the BAC/BCP due to the common enemy of centralization through royalism. This alliance was paradoxical as interests on the center-periphery cleavage between commoners and lesser chiefs were contradictory and mainly motivated because of the lack of political organization on the side of the subordinate chiefs. Hence, although the formation of the BNP came late, it stepped in the middle ground between the Matete's MTP and Mokhehle's BAC/BCP and easily captured the support of subordinate chiefs (cf. Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 40). The center-periphery cleavage between commoners and royalists manifested in the BCP and the MTP on the one hand and subordinate chiefs manifested in the BNP on the other hand was reinforced by a religious divide regarding the fact that most commoners belonged to protestant churches in Basutoland while most subordinate chiefs belonged to the Roman Catholic Church (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 15) (Epprecht, 1995, 42f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 352–356).

However, with the BNP being operational only in 1959, there was too little time to properly prepare the new party for the first pre-independence elections in 1960 (Spence, 1968, 37; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127). Accordingly, Mokhele's BCP (former BAC) used its advantage in terms of publicity and organization and won

the majority of District Council seats and concomitant National Council seats. The MTP came second and Leabua Jonathan and his BNP experienced a devastating defeat. Yet, BCP's gains in 1960 were not representative of later elections because women, who were in the majority in the country due to massive migration of men to South African mines, were not yet enfranchised while migrant men in turn could cast their vote in South Africa, which was not the case in later elections. Accordingly, the BCP made most of its gains in Basotho towns and among Basotho miners in South Africa, which proved to be a majority of the enfranchised population only in the 1960 elections. Because women remained in Basutoland, they were more in contact with the chiefs than their migrant men, and accordingly would have been most likely less willing to vote for Mokhehles's BCP, which was considered to be the most anti-chief party of the three parties despite its cautious rhetoric in this regard (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127; Epprecht, 1995). Because both the MTP and the BNP were identified with the traditional element but the MTP was more known among the population in 1960 than the BNP, the MTP was more successful in obtaining the rural vote. Jonathan and his BNP had too little time to bring the message across that their profile differed decisively from the MTP regarding the support for lesser chiefs (Spence, 1968, 37).

MTP's vision of a strong paramountcy invested in the person of Bereng Seeiso, the stepson of acting Regent Mantsebo, came only half true: Named Moshoeshoe II, Bereng Seeiso was installed as the Paramount Chief in March 1960. Yet, the 1959 constitution curtailed the executive powers of the paramountcy instead of expanding it (Weisfelder, 1977, 175f.).

After the first pre-independence elections in 1960, steps towards independence intensified. In 1964, the British accepted a new constitution that envisioned independence one year after the second pre-independence elections scheduled for 1965. The new independence

constitution followed the general line of the 1959 constitution and installed the Paramount Chief Moshoeshoe II as Head of State and King of future independent Lesotho with rather ceremonial powers similar to the British constitutional monarchy. The legislative consisted of the Senate, 22 principal chiefs and 11 member appointed by the King, and the National Assembly, 60 members elected through single member constituencies by universal suffrage. The Prime Minister in turn was designated to be responsible to the National Assembly. The second pre-independence elections under the new constitution were scheduled for 1965 (Coates, 1966, 113; Spence, 1968, 41–43).

Ironically, after the 1960 elections, the two stronger parties BCP and MTP, which represented the commoner and royalist version, respectively, of the center-side of the territorial cleavage, experienced ideological and internal turmoils while the so far unsuccessful BNP, which represented the periphery side, remained intact and enlarged its organization.

With the prospect for independence there, Mokhehle and the BCP's strings with South Africa's ANC proved to be dangerous for future relationships with the powerful apartheid neighbor and could delay independence after all (Spence, 1968, 38–40). And Mokhehle feared that the alleged communism of the ANC would be incompatible with BCP's nationalism. Consequently, Mokhehle and the BCP attacked ANC members in both Basutoland and in the party itself and turned to the pan-Africanist South African anti-apartheid movement PAC, which lacked any communist influence. Mokhehle and the BCP's rhetorical stance regarding subordinate chiefs turned from strategic approval towards open hostility after the electoral success in 1960 and was now more in accordance with the socio-structural foundation of the party (Spence, 1968, 38f. 46, 50; Khaketla, 1972, 56). However, Mokhehle's more aggressive rhetoric and his increasingly authoritarian behavior inside the BCP party organization led to the split of the deputy leader of the party, Bennett Makalo Khaketla, his followers, and twelve BCP parliamentarians until 1964. Khaketla formed the *Basutoland Freedom Party* (BFP) in 1961 and in 1962 merged with Matete's MTP to found

the *Marematlou Freedom Party* (MFP). Although the merger brought together two strains of the center-side of the territorial cleavage, the alliance was rather "curious" as it brought together senior chiefs and royalist who hoped for a central role for the paramountcy in the future independent nation on the one hand and radical ex-BCP commoners who rather favored a constitutional monarchy with a strong and democratically elected parliament, on the other hand. Therefore, the uniting element between the two groups was rather the mutual fear of an increasingly authoritarian Mokhehle (Spence, 1968, 38f., Weisfelder, 1977, 177f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 222f.).

In the advent of the 1965 elections, the BCP experienced further difficulties. The BCP was against extension of suffrage to Basotho women. It feared that most women would vote for the BNP. This in turn could have hurt BCP's chances for another electoral success because women have the majority of votes in the country due to labour-migration of most Basotho men to South African mines. Basically, the fear that the women's vote would go to the BNP was justified because most women lived in more rural areas and were in closer contact and under protection of lesser chiefs due to the absence of their migrant men. And the BNP was the party of the lesser chiefs. As women indeed received suffrage by the 1964 constitution, the BCP's fear became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now the BNP could profitably claim that the BCP was against women's interests in general because of the BCP's previous campaign against women's suffrage. Additionally, because most of the lesser chiefs as well as the BNP and Jonathan itself were members of the Roman Catholic Church itself, Mokhehle and the BCP intensified rhetorical attacks against the Roman Catholic Church in Basutoland. Many poor catholic women in rural areas did not approve of these attacks because they profited from support by the Roman Catholic Church (Epprecht, 1995, 37, 50–52). As previously noted, a further disadvantage to the BCP in the 1965 elections was the agreement that ex-patriate Basotho, mostly men that

were not attached to the traditional ways of life in rural areas anymore, were not able to cast their vote outside the borders of Basutoland anymore (Spence, 1968, 43).

In general, Jonathan and his BNP proved to be much more coherent in their ideological and organizational development between the first pre-independence elections in 1960 and second pre-independence elections in 1965 than their competitors. Indirectly, the BNP profited from the BCP's (and to some degree also the MFP's) attack on the Roman Catholic Church. Quite often, the Roman Catholic Church was the only functioning institution in rural and mountainous areas besides the chieftainship. It materially benefitted many women who were left alone by their migrant men. The BCP's attacks mobilized nunneries and catholic women against it and they became members of the BNP themselves or organized further support for the BNP (Epprecht, 1995, 53f.). Furthermore, in opposition to the BCP, The BNP did not ally itself neither with the ANC nor the PAC. Rather, it advocated for pragmatic relationships with South Africa and Jonathan even welcomed electoral support from South Africa. This also increased women's support for the BNP because they feared that the more aggressive stance of the BCP towards South Africa could harm economic relations with South Africa, on which they were indirectly dependent due to their migrant men (Spence, 1968, 46–48; Southall, 1994, 110; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 40; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 127f.).

The turmoils, splits and switches in ideological standings on the divided center-side of the territorial cleavage together with the extension of the suffrage to women and new non-suffrage to migrant Basotho men in South Africa explains the surprising electoral victory of the peripheral-side party, BNP, in the 1965 elections to the disadvantage of the center-side parties, BCP and MFP. The BNP gained a slim absolute majority of 35 seats in the National Assembly, the BCP 21 seats and the MFP four seats. BNP's leader Jonathan became the first Prime Minister on July 7, 1965 (Spence, 1968, 43; Nunley, 2009). In accordance with the socio-structural foundation and rhetorics of the BCP and the BNP,

the BCP gained most of its votes among wage earners in the lowlands and towns while the BNP gained most of its votes among peasants and women in more rural and mountainous districts (Spence, 1968, 46; Epprecht, 1995, 54).

After the 1965 elections and in preparation for independence in 1966, royalists of the MFP tried to strengthen the King's powers by blocking the vote for the necessary independence resolution in the Senate after the BNP majority in the lower house already approved of it. Furthermore, the MFP accused the new BNP government to collaborate with South Africa. In connection with that, and rather opportunistically, the BCP allied itself with the King and the royalists of the MFP despite its previous rhetorical attacks on both the chieftainship in general and the paramountcy itself during the past 1965 election campaign. Furthermore, the BCP explicitly attenuated its rhetorical platform regarding lesser chiefs. This contradicted its own socio-structural foundation of mostly protestant commoners and was rather strategically motivated to profit from the BNP government's neglect of the development of the more mountainous and rural areas, which brought the BNP to power in 1965, after all. The BCP also objected to the BNP government's friendly relationships with South Africa despite the BCP and Mokhehle's previous strategic switch during the past 1965 election campaign from alliance with the ANC to alliance with the PAC in order to allow future coexistence with South Africa. Finally, disagreements between the King and the BNP government over his role and lack of executive power in newly independent Lesotho cumulated in a violent protest meeting two months after independence. This led to house arrest for the King and concomitant disruption of the BNP with a fraction of the subordinate chiefs who supported the King, as well as to the enforced end of the King's political agitation for more executive powers. Additionally, the leaders of the BCP and the MFP were temporarily arrested (Spence, 1968, 48–53; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 128; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 289, 387).

In the following, the elections results of the first post-independence elections in 1970 showed that by the immobilization of the King, the royalist center-side of the territorial cleavage, embodied in the MFP, lost its appeal, and the split of votes among the center-side of the territorial cleavage lost its relevance to the advantage of the BCP. At the same time, the BNP was not able to significantly increase its vote share vis-à-vis the 1965 elections, which led to the electoral victory and absolute majority of the BCP (Weisfelder, 1977, 180f.; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130; Nunley, 2009). Apart from the new insignificance of the MFP and the poor government performance of the BNP in its mountainous and rural strongholds, the surprising victory of the BCP can be explained by the attenuation of its rhetorics regarding chieftainship in general and relations to South Africa. Furthermore, many traditional voters did not approve of Jonathan and the BNP's conflict with the King and punished the BNP for that to the advantage of the BCP (cf. Weisfelder, 1977, 180; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130; Southall, 1994, 110).

The electoral victory of the Mokhehle's BCP in 1970 led to Lesotho's second critical juncture of the abolishment of the electoral regime because Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan of the BNP reconsidered his decision to hand over power. Jonathan announced the suspension of the constitution three days after the 1970 elections, and declared emergency powers until the establishment of the new constitution. The coup was supported by the British-led paramilitary *Police Mobile Unit* (PMU), which was well stocked with rural BNP supporters. Leaders of the BCP were temporarily jailed and the King put under house arrest (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 130f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 17, 360).

In sum, the high significance and symbolic relevance of the Basotho chieftainship system in general and its two-layered nature of subordinate chiefs on the one hand and a paramountcy and senior chiefs on the other hand led to a salient, but rhetorically less pro-

nounced or, at times, even inconsistent center-periphery cleavage in comparison to other African colonies. Every Basotho party that tried to conquer the position of power in pre- and post-independence elections did not dare to be too critical of the chieftainship in general and of lesser chiefs in special. Even the party of the commoner center-side of the territorial cleavage, the BCP, was rhetorically only explicitly congruent to its socio-structural foundation of protestant commoners and a following of more urban and less traditional voters while it had the absolute majority in the National Council between 1960 and 1965. The BNP, in turn, only dared to be most rhetorically explicit about its anti-paramountcy standing after capturing power in 1965. In both cases, too much criticism of either the traditional-peripheral side, subordinate chiefs, and the traditional-centrist side, the paramountcy, proved to lead to the defeat of the party that held the majority in subsequent elections. Additionally, the BCP also lacked a coherent rhetoric regarding its stance vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa. Before the 1960 elections, the BCP was rhetorically aggressive regarding South Africa, between 1960 and 1965 it attenuated its rhetoric only to be very critical again between 1965 and 1970 of the BNP government's collaboration with South Africa. After 1965, the BCP also started to capitalize on the BNP's initial following, which was related to the socio-structural origins of its leadership, i.e. Roman Catholicism and subordinate chieftaincy. The BCP started to win the support of a fraction of disgruntled Roman Catholic subordinate chiefs and mountainous constituencies despite the BCP's socio-structural origins of its leadership of Protestant commoners. Hence, on the one hand, the center-periphery cleavage that formed in advent of the first pre-independence elections in 1960, established itself during the 1960s due to organizational and leadership continuity in both the BCP and the BNP, which had two different socio-structural foundations and were supplemented by the religious cleavage between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Yet, the ideological rhetoric and therefore the element of collective identity was rather inconsistent over time, at least in the BCP so far, due to the delicate relation with apartheid

Figure 16: *Party system structuring in Lesotho 1965 and 1970*



South Africa, which put pressure on every Basotho government during the apartheid area, and the significance of chieftaincy for the Basotho nation. Due to its rhetorical inconsistency, the BCP managed to lure away some portions of the Roman Catholic constituencies and subordinate chiefs from more mountainous and rural areas in 1970, which actually did not match the BCP's socio-structural leadership profile.

The MTP/MFP in turn, which represented the royalist center, did not manage to establish itself and achieve ongoing saliency of this sub-cleavage of the territorial cleavage after its initial success in the 1960 elections, because the party first blurred its socio-structural foundation and concomitant ideological profile by adopting disgruntled ex-BCP members, and second because it lost its battle for enhanced executive powers for the king (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 16).

Ghana

The Gold Coast was considered to be the British "model colony" in sub-Saharan Africa (Awoonor, 1990, 133; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011). It was established in 1874 to organize the coastal areas under British protection. Initially separate administrative units, the Ashanti and the Northern Territories were added in 1900 to the Gold Coast colony as well (Apter, 1963, 119; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 78). Local revenues were considered too low to allow an administrative system of direct rule. The British regarded traditional rule as

deeply entrenched in the regions of the Gold Coast and rather pragmatically installed the system of indirect rule. Despite its pragmatic motivation, indirect rule led to a non-neutral emphasis on inherited rule of mostly uneducated and illiterate chiefs over an educated and mostly urban and coastal African professional elite that hoped for meritocratic elements of indirect rule, i.e. the so called *intelligentsia* (Awoonor, 1990, 135; Rathbone, 2000, 10f.). As in other African colonies, traditional leaders became agents of British rule (Apter, 1963, 122). While some of their powers increased due to that, their traditional legitimacy vis-à-vis their subjects decreased (Rathbone, 2000, 13).

After the First World War, the British intensified administration of the colony through indirect rule. The coastal and cosmopolitan African elite realized that no position of power was envisioned for them in the British administration. Anti-colonial and anti-chief resentments, as well as radical nationalism started to thrive among them (Rathbone, 2000, 14).

Finally, after the Second World War, anti-colonial and radical nationalist feelings also intensified among the returning African ex-serviceman who fought on the side of the British and realized that they fought for a free Europe while remaining under colonial rule themselves (Awoonor, 1990, 133f.). These feelings were supported by the general mood of the Post-World War order, which put pressure on the colonial powers to give up their colonies (Boahen, 1975, 149–154). Due to the growing discontent in general in combination with the older grievances of the Ghanaian intelligentsia, a new constitution, the Burns Constitution, was drawn up in 1946 by the British, which provided for an African majority in the advisory body for the British Governor, the Legislative Council. Although this was considered a revolutionary step in British African colonial rule in general, only five of the total of eighteen Ghanaian seats were envisioned for direct election by the people while the remainder was reserved for traditional chiefs (Boahen, 1975, 157f.; Awoonor, 1990,135; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 159).

In reaction to this, the disgruntled Ghanaian intelligentsia, which consisted mainly of educated man, merchants and businessmen, as well as lawyers, founded the *United Gold Coast Convention* (UGCC) in 1947 (Awoonor, 1990, 135f.; Boahen, 1975, 157–160). The word 'party' was explicitly avoided in the name. Nonetheless, the grouping was clearly political as the members agreed that the UGCC should ensure that the "government [...] pass into the hands of the people *and their chiefs* [my emphasis] in the shortest possible time". In its opposition to the Burns Constitution, the UGCC considered the "position [of the chiefs] on the Legislative Council [...] [as] anomalous" (cit. in Boahen, 1975, 158; Austin, 1964, 52f.). The two statements may seem contradictory, but can be explained by the conflicting background of the UGCC leadership. Hence, despite its opposition to the Burns Constitution, the UGCC could not be considered a radical anti-chief party both in its rhetoric as well as regarding the socio-structural foundation of its leadership. Key members like the Vice-Chairman, Joseph Boakye Danquah, Ofori Atta or Akufo Addo were familiarly related to the most influential chief, Nana Sir Ofori Atta I. Hence, they were ambivalent in their stance on chieftaincy. Accordingly, the UGCC drew its support not only from professional classes and businessmen, but also from traditional rulers (Boahen, 1975, 160; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 192f.; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).

As General Secretary, the UGCC leadership appointed Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah received higher education in the United States and Great Britain and lived abroad for twelve years. He returned to Ghana to assume his new position. In opposition to most of the rest of the UGCC leadership, Nkrumah had no family ties to traditional leaders and was of humble origin (Boahen, 1975. 160f.; Rathbone, 2000, 21; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 186f.). The charismatic Nkrumah soon assembled his own following behind him. In opposition to the relatively moderate and traditional following of the UGCC leadership, he assembled more radical elements of the society, teachers, clerks, women, petty traders, and unemployed semi-educated youths who had no housing in the city, the so called 'veranda boys', all of

them sharing a commoner background (Austin, 1964, 55; Boahen, 1975, 170; Rathbone, 2000, 24; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).

Nkrumah's extended studies abroad brought him in contact with Marxist, communist and radical black writers. Later he described himself as a Marxian socialist. He became an advocator of Pan-Africanism and played an influential role in the pan-African Congress of 1945 (Apter, 1963, 201; Boahen, 1975, 162). This stood in sharp contrast to the more conservative and territorialist, rather than internationalist UGCC leadership (Austin, 1964, 54). Nkrumah also lacked compromising relationships with traditional leaders, in opposition to most of the other leaders in the UGCC. Hence, he had no restraints in radical repudiation of colonialism and indirect rule (Boahen, 1975, 162; Rathbone, 2000, 21). In sum, a potential, future fissure both in terms of the different socio-structural foundation as well as regarding the element of collective identity between the radical nationalist forces assembled around Nkrumah and the conservative nationalist forces assembled around Danquah, was in place right from the beginning of the UGCC.

A combination of grievances by Ghanaian merchants over imported goods from Europe and grievances by Ghanaian World War Two ex-serviceman over their after-service conditions led to a protest march in Accra upon which two ex-servicemen were shot dead by colonial law-enforcement officers. This triggered riots in Accra, which subsequently spread to other towns of the Gold Coast. Six leaders of the UGCC, among them Danquah and Nkrumah, were arrested by the British authorities and released after eight weeks. These events both made the colonial administration realize the insufficiency of the Burns Constitution to meet nationalist demands and increased the popularity of the UGCC in general and Nkrumah in special among the masses (Austin, 1964, 76–81; Boahen, 1975, 162f.; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, xlvif.). The British Government installed an all-Ghanaian committee to draft a new constitution. The committee was mostly composed of chiefs and the more conservative and bourgeoise elite of the UGCC, which were familiarly related to influential

chiefs, amongst them Danquah. Remarkably, Nkrumah, which lacked relations to chiefs, was not nominated for the committee. This increased the fissure between Nkrumah and his followers and the more traditional and conservative forces of the UGCC (Austin, 1964, 80f.; Boahen, 1975, 163–165).

Freed of the time-consuming committee work, Nkrumah increased his involvement with radical youth groups who opposed chiefly influence in the making of the new constitution, and he also increased the fierceness of his rhetoric. He started to issue a daily news-sheet, which was radically anti-colonial, against the Committee for the new constitution and even the UGCC itself (Austin, 1964, 81). Nkrumah summoned a Youth Congress, which released a statement that demanded "a consitutition that would give [...] [the] country [...] FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW [sic]" (cit. in Austin, 1964, 82). This stood clearly in contrast to the UGCC's initial policy of incremental autonomy, manifested further above in the words of "[self-]government [...] in the shortest time possible" (Boahen, 1975, 158; Boafo-Arthur, 2003, 212). Tensions between Nkrumah and the UGCC leadership augmented until Nkrumah made his final break and formed the *Convention People's Party* (CPP). Nkrumah became chairman, K. A. Gbedemah vice-chairman and Kojo Botsio secretary, both of them commoners as Nkrumah himself. Most commoners and young men started to ally themselves with the CPP instead of the UGCC (Austin, 1964, 85ff.; Boahen, 1975, 167). Inevitably, the newly-founded CPP repeated the previous rejection of the Committee for the new constitution and its bias towards chieftaincy, which the CPP regarded as a repetition of the concept of indirect rule. The UGCC, in turn, strengthened its alliance with the chiefs. The CPP had the support of the commoner majority of the population who did not profit from the spoils of the system of indirect rule through chiefs, and hoped to gain from immediate independence. Due to the CPP's superior organizational capacity the party managed to efficiently mobilize this latent majority and won the first pre-independence elections in 1951 in overwhelming fashion by gaining 34 of the 38

directly elected Legislative Assembly seats. The UGCC, in turn, only won two seats in the Assembly. Acknowledging the overwhelming support for the CPP, the British governor asked Nkrumah to form a government (Apter, 1963, 201; Boahen, 1975, 170–172; Awoonor, 1990, 148f.; Rathbone, 2000, 22-28; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, xlviif.; Nunley, 2009).

Hence, in Ghana, as in other African colonies that followed its pioneering decolonization path, political cleavages among the indigenous elite in advent of first pre-independence elections resulted from the decentralizing and pragmatic logic of the British colonial administration. What was later officially declared by the British as the policy of "indirect rule" was basically nothing more than the efficient usage of existing peripheral structures of traditional rule in order to save the costly deployment of countless district officers to the periphery of the colonies. Emphasis on traditional leaders led to the disgruntlement of two different socio-structural groups in the Gold Coast that hoped to gain from increasing centralization through nationalization and formed different collective identities: A merchant, lawyer, urban and well-educated class, which could refer to its royal ties, and hoped to claim the future center through step-by-step take-over from the British colonial power and accommodation of some sort for allied chiefs and traditional elements in the future, more centralized nation. On the other side, we find a coalition of more radical elements, petty traders, teachers, clerks and jobless youth in urban centers, which were hold together by the charismatic personality of Nkrumah, and their mutual commoner status, i.e. no links whatsoever to traditional leaders, and therefore did not profit from the British administrative system of indirect rule and had no access to the concomitant clientelistic spoils and pork (cf. Rathbone, 2000, 23f.). Accordingly, this group demanded immediate independence with no concessions at all towards traditional rulers. The split of the UGCC into the conservative UGCC assembled around Danquah on the one side and the radical CPP assembled around Nkrumah gave this two already existing groups the final organizational

Figure 17: *Embryonic Party system structuring in Ghana 1951*



counterpart. The new-old UGCC represented a moderate center-periphery alliance, while the CPP represented the radical center-side of the territorial conflict (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 17).

Despite the overwhelming CPP victory in the first pre-independence elections, Joseph B. Danquah and Kofi A. Busia, an independent, ensured that opposition to the CPP remained alive inside the assembly. Danquah won one of the two seats for the UGCC in the 1951 elections. Kofi A. Busia, a member of the royal family of Wenchi, who was of Akan background like Danquah and an university faculty, inherited the Wenchi seat of a deceased independent assemblyman (Austin, 1964, 180; Awoonor, 1990, 150, 155; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 68f., 91). Because the intelligentsia around Danquah and Busia considered the name of the UGCC to be tainted with the devastating electoral defeat of 1951, it agreed on the formation of a new party and leadership under the name of *Ghana Congress Party* (GCP) and the person of Busia in 1952. The new party explicitly referred to the tradition of the UGCC by allying itself with the chiefs and stressing its moderate nationalism in opposition to the radicalism of the CPP. The new-old party struggled somewhat to hold its socio-structural foundation and collective identity together because it became an attraction point for dissident ex-CPP members who felt omitted in the distribution of positions in the CPP government and selections for constituency-candidacy for the upcoming 1954

elections. Yet, Busia managed to keep them in line by emphasizing the GCP's moderateness and explicitly rejecting to copy the CPP's rhetoric of immediate self-governance for the Gold Coast (Austin, 1964, 181). Rather, Busia and the GCP started to invest in rhetoric that accused the CPP government of dictatorial and corrupt behavior and portrayed itself as the defender of democracy (Austin, 1964, 226; Awoonor, 1990, 160).

The 1951 victory of the radical nationalist CPP stirred up concerns among peripheral regions in the Gold Coast and the GCP tried to capitalize on that by emphasizing its own peripheral aspects due to both its position as the center of opposition and its alliance with chiefs who tried to retain their peripheral power in the colony. Accordingly, the GCP started to incorporate Ashanti grievances over seat allocation in the Ashanti region in advent of 1954 elections and allied itself with three regionalist parties (Austin, 1964, 177–180, 187; Awoonor, 1990, 155; Rathbone, 2000, 64f.): (1) The Northern region of the Gold Coast distrusted the CPP that it would respect its peripheral interests in a future, centralized nation (Austin, 1964, 180, 184f.; Awoonor, 1990, 157). In order to defend Northern interests against Accra-based Southern dominance, mostly Northern, chiefly figures founded the *Northern People's Party* (NPP) in 1954. The NPP's main aim was to stop CPP dominance and too rapid self-government, which would leave the peripheral interests of the Northern region to the alleged arbitrariness of the radical, centralizing nationalists. (2) The traditionalist *Muslim Association Party* (MAP), which defended immigrant and Muslim trader's interests and feared rough treatment by the centralist-nationalist CPP. And (3), the *Togoland Congress* (TC), which opposed the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast and sought unification with its French counterpart on the Eastern side of the Gold Coast territory (Austin, 1964, 184–191, 228–234; Rathbone, 2000, 65).

The CPP, in turn, continued its radical nationalist rhetoric after its first electoral victory and repeated its demand for "SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW". Amongst others, the CPP intended to establish a democratic and socialist society and supported Pan-Africanism

Figure 18: *Party system structuring in Ghana 1954, 1956 and 1960*



(Austin, 1964, 162). In its manifesto for the 1954 elections, the CPP again stressed its support for the common people in opposition to the aristocrats (Rathbone, 2000, 66), and the CPP refused to establish a chiefly, second chamber (Austin, 1964, 260).

The election results of 1954 on the one hand both confirmed the CPP's dominance as it won 71 of 104 Legislative Assembly seats and the GCP's weakness in terms of organization and appeal to the common voter as only Busia managed to win a seat for the party while no one else, most notably Danquah, captured a seat. Nonetheless, local and peripheral forces that were allied with the GCP made substantial gains in comparison with 1951 because of the Northern NPP, which won 12 seats from scratch, in addition to the two seats for the Eastern TC and one seat for the muslim MAC. And 16 independents, which stood in opposition to the CPP as well, won seats in the Assembly (Austin, 1964, 242–245; Awoonor, 1990, 160). Obviously, the nationalist appeal of the CPP came under increasing stress from the peripheral, regional and local side in comparison to the 1951 election (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 18).

Ashanti grievances accelerated after the 1954 elections because of a CPP bill that fixed cocoa prices on a low level for four years. The Ashanti region with its regional capital Kumasi grew half of the cocoa in the Gold Coast, and therefore was hurt the most by this policy. Together with the already existing inadequacy of Ashanti representation in the Assembly in general and the fact that the chiefly element was almost inexistent in the Assembly since the 1954 elections, despite its symbolic importance for Ashanti unity, grievances led to the final outburst of Ashanti political agitation (Austin, 1964, 252, 255f., 258; Boahen, 1975, 183f.; Awoonor, 1990, 161; Rathbone, 2000, 68). In September 1954, the Ashanti-based *National Liberation Movement* (NLM) was founded. Ashanti chiefs strongly supported the new party as they lost the most due to the radical nationalism and centralism of the CPP government (Austin, 1964, 250, 264; Boahen, 1975, 183; Awoonor, 1990, 161; Rathbone, 2000, 71). After all, Ashanti chiefs used to have considerable power and received generous British subsidies due to the British administration through indirect rule. The objects and aims of the NLM corresponded with its socio-structural foundation, and it stressed the importance of the traditional rulers, demanded abolishment of traces of communism in the Gold Coast, and most importantly, a federal constitution for the future, independent, nation that would give peripheral regions a voice in the legislation and government of the country (Austin, 1964, 259–262, 279f., 332; Awoonor, 1990, 163). The unsuccessful GCP representatives of the intelligentsia-chief alliance, Busia and Danquah, of Akan origin themselves, abandoned their GCP "shell" and supported the new, powerful movement as well because it represented similar socio-structural elements as the GCP, and the UGCC before it, and stood for the same anti-radicalism as well as the chiefly-peripheral alliance, but proved to be more successful in mobilizing larger segments of the population through its more tribalist approach than the GCP and the UGCC before it. Busia captured a leading position in the new party and was envisioned as the leader of a future NLM government (Austin, 1964, 267, 269, 342; Apter, 1966, 277).

The British administration, in turn, feared violent outbursts in the Ashanti region if it would grant the promised independence to the CPP government. Hence, it decided on another, final election before independence, which was intended to serve as a plebiscite on the federation versus centralization question by the victory of either the peripheral forces of the NLM or the centralizing forces of the CPP (Awoonor, 1990, 165f.).

In advent of the upcoming, extraordinary 1956 elections and in reaction to the increased peripheral threat from the Ashanti and other peripheral forces, which have already been relatively successful in the 1954 elections, the CPP introduced a motion against religion-based parties such as the muslim MAP (Austin, 1964, 282). Nkrumah himself intensified rhetoric against the agitation of peripheral parties, which he denounced as "tribal feudalism". He asked voters to repeat their 1954 vote and vote for "INDEPENDENCE NOW" (cit. in Austin, 1964, 330). And as in the elections before, the CPP prominently pointed out that it would be the party of the common people (Austin, 1964, 334) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 18).

The 1956 elections produced the results the British government hoped for, i.e. a clear majority for one of the two sides; either the centralist side, the CPP, or the federalist side, the combined opposition vote: The CPP confirmed its 1954 victory by winning a clear absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly (71 seats of 104 as in 1954). Although the NLM won 12 seats from scratch, it did not suffice to increase the combined opposition vote. The British conditions for granting independence were met. Danquah again did not manage to capture a seat while Busia secured his Wenchi seat (Austin, 1964, 353f.; Awoonor, 1990, 169; Rathbone, 2000, 96).

In the following, the new Assembly accepted Nkrumah's motion to ask the British government for independence. The opposition boycotted the motion. Nonetheless, the British granted independence for March 6, 1957. Ghana became the first independent nation south of the Sahara (Austin, 1964, 357f.; Awoonor, 1990, 170). What was perhaps helpful against

potential secessionism of the defeated peripheral regions in the new, centralized nation, was the fact that neither the CPP nor the opposition parties were uniformly supported in their own strongholds. There was a considerable CPP-vote in the Ashanti region, Togoland and the Northern regions, and a considerable opposition-vote in the South (Austin, 1964, 367). And Nkrumah himself belonged to a minority ethnic group, the Nzema. Accordingly, he preferred anti-tribalistic and unifying mobilization strategies (cf. Dickovick, 2008).

After independence, the CPP and Nkrumah intensified the consolidation of their centralized power by increasingly suppressing peripheral interests in a non-democratic manner. Muslim leaders were deported, and parties with a regional, tribal or religious basis forbidden. The central government downgraded Ashanti-chiefdoms, installed pro-CPP chiefs to the disadvantage of anti-CPP chiefs, and abolished the regional assemblies. Nkrumah increased his attacks on the Legon university, which he considered to support opposition leaders like Busia, who was a Legon faculty himself (Austin, 1964, 365, 377, 380; Awoonor, 1990, 190; Rathbone, 2000, 103). Individual members of the opposition came under increasing threat through the Deportation Act, the Emergency Powers Act, and the Preventive Detention Act, and several members of the opposition were detained.

Confronted with the increasingly authoritarian power of the CPP, the opposition decided to combine its force by the inauguration of a new party with the combined executive from the mainly Ashanti NLM, the Northern NPP, the Muslim MAP, the Togoland TC, and the recently dissident Ga community in Accra. In a rally presided by Busia, the *United Party* (UP) was founded in November 1957 (Austin, 1964, 380f., 384; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 248). The new party, UP, adopted the NLM symbol, a cocoa tree, in order to be recognized as the follower organization of the NLM. However, under the increasingly undemocratic environment, the UP had a difficult standing right from the outset. Several members crossed the floor to the CPP and Busia went into exile in 1959 (Austin, 1964, 384–387; Apter, 1966, 279; Awoonor, 1990, 193).

In 1960, Nkrumah and the CPP intended to centralize power even more by drafting a new, republican constitution, with a presidential system, which would give Nkrumah vast executive powers. The UP ported Danquah, the old antagonist of Nkrumah, as its candidate for the parallel 1960 plebiscite and presidential election although it – quite paradoxically – at the same time recommended to vote "NO" on the new, republican constitution and the introduction of a presidential system (Austin, 1964, 386f.; Awoonor, 1990, 194f.).

Having already achieved the previous main goals, self-governance, centralism and anti-tribalism, the CPP mainly offered more national welfare in its 1960 campaign program. Under the impression of the increasing authoritarian behavior of the CPP, the UP issued pamphlets that mainly pointed out to the dictatorial and communist outlook of the CPP, and portrayed itself as the democratic alternative (Austin, 1964, 387–389). As the only alternative to the centralist CPP, the UP could count on the support of peripheral regions, and Danquah kept up his existing alliance with influential chiefs who opposed the increasing centralism of the CPP government (Rathbone, 2000, 122) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 18).

Danquah and the UP did not stand a chance against the organizational machinery of the CPP and its incumbency advantage. The presidential republic with Nkrumah as its first president, securing almost 90 percent of the vote, became reality. Both Austin (1964, 390–394) and Awoonor (1990, 195) present plausible evidence for electoral fraud in contested regions in the 1960 elections. However, most likely, Nkrumah would have won anyway, albeit not to that degree (Austin, 1964, 394f.).

While the 1960 election was of a multiparty character in principle and the opposition still able to stand for election, the opposition media mostly unrestricted and the UP able to rally in most areas of the country, developments after Nkrumah's electoral victory in 1960 led to the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the minimally competitive

multiparty electoral regime. Cocoa prices fell in 1961 and economic difficulties troubled the young nation. The CPP government introduced a new system of purchase tax, prices rose and workers' incomes dropped. Strikes flared up. In the following, Danquah and other opposition leaders were arrested for alleged participation in the strikes (Austin, 1964, 389–401, 407; Apter, 1966, 292; Awoonor, 1990, 195). Danquah was released later only to be arrested again. After surviving assassination attempts and increasing disintegration in the CPP itself, Nkrumah announced a referendum that would install the CPP as the sole legal party in Ghana. The 1964 plebiscite was rampant with fraud and produced 99 percent approval rate (Austin, 1964, 413f.; Awoonor, 1990, 196, 202). The first minimally competitive electoral regime in Ghana came to its end.

In sum, while the radical center-side of the territorial conflict, embodied in the CPP, remained relatively stable after its victory in the first pre-independence elections, the moderate center-periphery alliance, embodied in the UGCC, changed its organizational 'shell' and party name, UGCC to GCP to NLM to UP, in the following pre- and post-independence elections before the second critical juncture of the abolishment of the electoral regime (see party system structuring map in figure 18). This changes were mostly owed to the poor organizational capacity and the electoral inefficacy of the moderate center-peripheral alliance than to a substantial change of the structural core and its element of collective identity. Hence, both in this regard and in terms of leadership continuity, embodied in Danquah and Busia, also the moderate center-peripheral alliance side of the territorial cleavage remained stable over the years 1951 until after the 1960 elections. Yet, the longer this side had to succumb to the radical centrist-side of the CPP, the more it adjusted its inner balance towards the peripheral aspect, embodied in chiefs and the alliances with the Ashanti region grievances, and peripheral-regional and -tribalistic parties to the detriment of its own center-aspiring ambition, embodied in the intelligentsia

and the leadership of Danquah and Busia. The increasing authoritarianism of the CPP and Nkrumah increased the collective identity element and concomitant rhetoric of the moderate center-periphery alliance to represent the democracy-defending side on a latent democracy-authoritarianism cleavage, albeit it is at least questionable – apart from the lack of a genuine socio-structural foundation in this regard – how enduring this cleavage would have been, had the UGCC/GCP/NLM/UP-side captured power in the years 1951 until after 1960. Last but not least, potential ethnopolitical cleavages were clearly cross-cut by the CPP's multi-ethnic and centralizing approach with a leader of a minority ethnic group. On the moderate center-periphery alliance side, in turn, grievances were rather regional than ethnical and encompassed several ethnic groups with common peripheral interests. Apart from that, both sides had significant vote shares in each others regional strongholds. Hence, the initial cleavage between a radical commoner and centralist side on the one hand and a moderate center-peripheral intelligentsia-chief alliance side on the other hand remained salient and cross-cut other potential cleavages.

Mali

The French Sudan (official name for the territory between 1920 and independence; thereafter Mali) was established around 1880 as its administration became increasingly autonomous from the French Governor in Senegal, i.e. French military officers started to report directly to Paris instead of to the Governor in Senegal (Imperato and Imperato, 2008, xxviii, 124). At the outset, French colonial rule in West Africa followed a quite different rationale than the British policy of indirect rule. The French "assimilation policy" intended to assimilate colonized Africans until they became true Frenchmen themselves. The policy was based on the assumption that all men are potentially equal and French culture would be the highest developmental state a culture could reach. While being racist regarding the fact that African cultures are considered to be inferior to French culture,

the policy was regarded by many educated Africans in French colonies as a chance to be integrated in the French colonial political system by meritocratic means (Foltz, 1965, 10f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 23f.). However, as much as the policy of assimilation was relatively feasible in Senegalese coastal areas where Africans had been in contact with the French since decades, it proved to be unpractical the more the French conquered the vast interiors of West Africa like the French Sudan with a population of several millions in a relatively short amount of time (Foltz, 1965, 11; Imperato, 1989, 47). Accordingly, just before World War I, the concept of "association" was introduced, which allowed for more gradual evolution of African cultures towards the French ideal. The concept of association allowed methods of administrative rule that would have been considered unacceptable in France but were more pragmatic for the administration of the vast interior of West Africa. Amongst others, the concept of association allowed to deny the local population elections and the usage of indigenous structures of authority for the French administration of the periphery of the French Sudan. Hence, the actual French mode of rule in French Sudan resembled more the British system of indirect rule than the French ideal of meritocratically selected African Frenchmen that basically would rule themselves (Foltz, 1965, 11; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 24f.). Accordingly, the administrative structures in French Sudan that came below the *cercles* and their subdivisions, the *cantons*, were ruled by local chiefs. Although usually of noble background, the chiefs were in most instances imposed by the French on largely arbitrarily drawn administrative divisions, and not necessarily congruent with the "real" chief of the local people. This decreased the imposed chiefs legitimacy vis-à-vis the local population. Additionally, as mere agents of French colonial rule, they were often obliged to carry out unpopular duties like collecting taxes and administering the foreign French judicial code (Foltz, 1965, 12f.).

Hence, on the one hand the French colonial administrative system destroyed the original indigenous system of rule to a large degree. On the other hand, the system produced some

sort of class consciousness on the side of the local "chefferie" and aristocracy because it united them in their common task of securing control of the periphery for the French and brought them the peripheral power and spoils that derived from that service. This class consciousness, in turn, effectively cross-cut potential ethnic or religious cleavages in French Sudan (cf. Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 257; Foltz, 1965, 15; Bebler, 1973, 107).

Before World War II, a relatively small group of educated African elites started to organize itself in voluntary associations in Bamako, the capital of the French Sudan. Most of them received their higher education in *Ecole William Ponty* in Dakar, a higher school for the training of teachers, clerks and civil servants. These officially non-political associations served as networks to discuss politics and were multiethnic in character. While the Vichy regime during World War II interrupted these activities, the international anticolonialist tenor after the war and the return of 7000 West African soldiers, engaged in France, strengthened political agitation and revived the thriving of voluntary associations in French Sudan (Foltz, 1965, 21f.; Imperato, 1989, 51f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, xxxi, 101). In the following, *Free France* under General Charles de Gaulle committed itself in the Brazzaville Conference to colonial reforms without touching the topic of independence itself. Amongst others, the conference called for a federal structure between France and its African colonies. This led to the French Fourth Republic's constitution introducing territorial assemblies in the French West African colonies and one to three directly elected deputies per territory to the French National Assembly itself. The executive powers remained in the hand of the French administrations though (Foltz, 1965, 21f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, xxxii).

The first elections for the Assembly of the French Fourth Republic triggered party formation in French Sudan. Three French Sudan graduates from the Ecole William Ponty ran for the position. They all turned out to be the central figures in French Sudan politics of the coming years up to independence. Among them was Fily Dabo Sissoko. He was of

noble descent and an important canton chief. In the elections, he was the French colonial administration's favorite due to his conservative views. He considered himself to be a traditionalist amd a frenchman, and did not want to be associated with communism (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 271f., 275f.; Foltz, 1965, 120; Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 272f.). After Fily Dabo Sissoko won the election in 1945, his supporters formed the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais* (PPS). The party drew its support from cantonal chiefs and traditional segments of the society who were oriented toward the French, and mostly profited from the French rule through association in the periphery of French Sudan. Accordingly, the rather conservative party aimed for gradual, rather than immediate autonomy of the territory, and in cooperation with France (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 280–284; Foltz, 1965, 58; Imperato, 1989, 53; Vengroff, 1993, 548; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 239f.). Hence, in his campaign rhetoric, Fily Dabo Sissoko emphasized the "prestige of chiefs", which needed the be reinforced (cit. in Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 283). Foltz (1965, 49f.) considers the PPS a "patron party" in opposition to mass parties. The party had rather a regional than territory-wide appeal, which was owed to the natural narrowness of any patronage network that is based only on a few traditional leaders (see also Vengroff, 1993, 548).

The second Ponty graduate who stood for the French Assembly elections in 1945, Mamadou Konaté, became the early antagonist of Fily Dabo Sissoko. Like Fily Dabo Sissoko, he came from Bafoulabe in the south-west of French Sudan. Unlike Sissoko however, Konaté was of commoner background, and not part of the French system of rule in French Sudan (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 272). Together with Modibo Keita, the third man standing for these elections, Konaté founded the *Union Soudanaise* (US) after Fily Dabo Sissoko's electoral victory. Eventually, the US affiliated itself with the Rassemblement Démocratique African (RDA), an interterritorial and anti-colonial party led by the Ivorian Felix Houphouet-Boigny that served as a meeting ground for West African political parties,

and became the US-RDA. In opposition to Sissoko and the PPS, the US was strongly anti-colonialist and aimed for a radical break with France (Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 255, 330). Initially, the US drew its support mostly from urban dwellers (Foltz, 1965, 121; Imperato, 1989, 58). By 1953, Konaté intensified efforts to establish the party also in more rural areas, which turned it into an effective mass party. Both the urban and rural followers of the US had a socio-structural background of being part of the non-privileged strata in the traditional society in common. Hence, they had more to gain from radical political change and immediate independence than the following and leadership of the PPS, which was affiliated with the traditional segments of the society (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 257; Foltz, 1965, 50f., 57, 121; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 186).

Modibo Keita, the third man in the 1945 elections, was initially backed by the French Communists and the West African radical and Marxist *Groupes d'Etudes Communistes* (GEC). After having founded the US with Konaté, he accepted to take the second place in the party because he realized Konaté's appeal to enfranchised voters. Modibo Keita was born in Bamako, became a schoolteacher after graduation from William Ponty, and – like Konaté – lacked connections to the French administration through traditional chieftaincy (Hodgkin and Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 264; Imperato, 1989, 52f., 58; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 169f.). Besides the general support of urban dwellers, the US and Konaté and Modibo Keita enjoyed the backing of the influential town groups of traders, which were discriminated by the aristocracy because of their lower caste affiliation. Through the traders, the US had access to a vast communication network, which touched distant marketplaces, and the vast number of artisans in rural areas, which were susceptible to the US' anti-traditional rhetoric of equality (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 287f.; Foltz, 1965, 121). The US explicitly opposed the French system of indirect rule and was against the involvement of chiefs in modern political parties (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 289).

With the introduction of the *loi cadre* by the French in 1956, which strongly increased the powers of the territorial assemblies and granted universal suffrage in the French territories of West Africa, fortunes shifted from the PPS and Fily Dabo Sissoko, which won all the elections since 1945 for the French National Assembly and the Territorial Assembly with restricted suffrage, to the US of Konaté and Modibo Keita (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 284; Imperato, 1989, 53; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 195). With the introduction of universal suffrage in French Sudan, the mass-party character and the anti-chief rhetoric of the US trumped the narrow and mostly chiefly patron-based support structure of the PPS because the legitimacy of the chiefly system was already eroded to a stronger degree among the newly enfranchised masses in the French Sudan in comparison with Ghana, Lesotho or Botswana due to the more invasive transformation of the traditional system by the French colonial administration. The PPS hastily tried to reduce chiefly influence in the party but it was already too late and the US-RDA won the first pre-independence elections with universal suffrage in 1957. The party gained an overwhelming absolute majority in the Territorial Assembly with 64 out of 70 seats while the PPS only captured the remainder of six seats. Both Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, another influential figure and canton chief in the PPS leadership, lost in their home constituencies. Modibo Keita, who took over the US party leadership after Konaté died in 1956, rose to power (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 276, 279–281, 284, 294; Foltz, 1965, 12f.; Imperato, 1989, 54f.; Nunley, 2009).

After the PPS' defeat, Fily Dabo Sissoko first tried to recapture electoral success by strategically changing the party's name into *Parti du Regroupement Soudanais* (PRS). However, by March 1959, because of a disadvantageous altering of the electoral law by the US majority, Sissoko and his party decided to rather opportunistically merge with the US-RDA, which rendered the second pre-independence elections in French Sudan basically meaningless due to the lack of other, alternative parties to the US in the new Territorial

Figure 19: *Embryonic Party system structuring in Mali 1957*



Assembly. Months later, the other former PPS strong men, Hamadoun Dicko, crossed lines to the US-RDA as well. The US-RDA became the sole political party in French Sudan, which set the stage for future developments (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 298; Foltz, 1965, 113f.; Imperato, 1989, 54; Nunley, 2009).

In sum, despite the somewhat different design of French administrative rule in French Sudan (later Mali), rule through association with chiefs in the periphery of the vast territory provoked the same territorial political cleavage in advent of the first pre-independence elections as in British colonies. The peripheral side of the cleavage was represented by the leadership of canton chiefs, embodied in the PPS, which had the support of the aristocracy and its immediate patronage network. In line with its socio-structural foundation, the PPS only supported gradual ascent to independence, and in close association and cooperation with the French. The PPS' outlook was largely conservative and anti-communist. The center side, in turn, materialized in the US-RDA, a mass party with a commoner leadership and following, initially rooted among urban dwellers, later spread to the rural areas through a network of traders and artisans. The party was progressively nationalist and egalitarian as it aimed for a radical break with the colonial power and the abolishment of chiefly powers in French Sudan politics. After Mamadou Konaté's death, the party had a fervent Marxist, the former number two Modibo Keita, as its new leader (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 19).

However, the rather opportunistic merger with the center-side party by the leaders of the peripheral side of the territorial cleavage after their devastating defeat in the first pre-independence elections with universal suffrage in 1957 led to the early demise of the territorial cleavage in Mali. Hence, at least the organizational element of the peripheral side ceased to exist. The early demise of the territorial cleavage was owed to the fact that on the one hand, the mass-appeal of the peripheral side of the cleavage was rather weak because the collective identity component, the attachment to traditional and chiefly rule, was already eroded due to the highly disruptive way the French used the chiefly system for their objectives. On the other hand, the leaders and followers of the center side were less extreme in their repudiation of the traditional elements in the French Sudan society than their peers in other African colonies. They were less radically assimilationist-minded and hence less repugnant towards their traditional past than their colleagues from the coastal territories like Senegal, Guinea or Ivory Coast, which were for a more extended period in contact with French policy of assimilation. Finally, the outlook on a future independent federation with Senegal suppressed the salience of the internal Sudanese territorial cleavage to some degree (cf. Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 299; Foltz, 1965, 112–118).

Regarding potential ethnopolitical cleavages in French Sudan, the ethnopolitical support pattern adhered to the territorial logic: Ethno-regional groups like the Bambara and the Fulani that welcomed French colonization and secured subsequent inclusion in the French system of rule through association with chiefs supported Fily Dabo Sissoko's PPS. The Diawara, the Malinke or the Songhai, in turn, supported the US because of various reasons that were rooted in their less favorable treatment by the French conquest and administration of the colony (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 280–282). The party leaderships, in turn, were largely non-ethnically based. Leaders like Modibo Keita came from minority ethnic groups. And general inter-ethnical cooperation among the leadership derived from the mutual experience in the Ecole William Ponty and needed to be maintained anyway

upon return to the ethnical melting-pot of Bamako where the first political groupings and parties were founded. No ethnical group in French Sudan was big enough to allow sustainable exclusionist behavior in social and political relationships. Ancient trade routes and the common denominator of Islam helped to strengthen inter-ethnic alliances (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 280; Imperato, 1989, 52; Dickovick, 2008, 1126f).

After the uprising in Algeria, and with General de Gaulle back to power in France, West African territories could chose between total integration into France, autonomy within the French Community or immediate independence. All but Guinea, which chose immediate independence, opted for political autonomy, which was what the French government had hoped for. The US in the French Sudan did not dare to support the immediate independence option – despite its previous radicalism in the question of independence – because it feared that it would lose the northern regions of the French Sudan if it did not follow the course that was envisioned by De Gaulle. In the following, the old French West African Federation dissolved and only the French Sudan and Senegal decided to form a new independent federation within the French Community, the Mali Federation, which became independent from France on June 20, 1960. Presidential elections were set for August, but soon differences between the Senegalese side, which opted for a less centralized federation, and the Sudanese side, which pressed for a unitary state with centralized power in the hands of one powerful president broke out openly and led to the dissolution of the Mali federation and the subsequent proclamation of the Republic of Mali (Foltz, 1965, 129, 168–184; Imperato, 1989, 54–57; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, xxxiif.).

As the president of the newly independent Mali and with no opposition in the assembly, Modibo Keita intended to realize his Marxist-socialist visions and implemented a highly centralized form of government. He associated Mali with communist and socialist governments around the world. In 1961, the US government crushed the remaining powers of the

traditional system by eliminating the canton chiefs from the system of local government altogether. Only the chiefly powers of the Tuareg nomads in the northern Mali were left intact due to the special position they have already enjoyed under French rule (Schachter Morgenthau, 1964, 289; Foltz, 1965, 129; Imperato, 1989, 58–60).

The already economically weak position of newly independent Mali deteriorated further because of the tensions between Senegal and Mali that led to the interim closing of the Bamako-Dakar railway and economic isolation of Mali. Modibo Keita announced an austerity program and pullout of the West African Monetary Union. Mali issued its own currency in July 1962, the *Mali-Franc*, which was deemed necessary for the implementation of a non-capitalist development plan and the final break with the colonial power (Meyer, 1980, 4f.; Imperato, 1989, 60). Merchants and traders started to riot in Bamako because their regional trade was destroyed by the introduction of the nonconvertible currency. Modibo Keita used the riots as a pretext to get rid of his last potential challengers, and charged Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, the former strongmen of the PPS, and their associates with treason. After a death sentence for Sissoko that was changed into a life sentence and hard labor, Sissoko and his associates were transferred to Kidal in the northeast where a Tuareg rebellion took place. Later it was announced that they had been killed by Tuareg in an ambush. However, it was widely believed that they were executed by the government itself. With the effective elimination of the last potential opposition figures by the Keita government there was no doubt anymore that the abolishment of the minimally competitive electoral regime became a certainty. Subsequently, Modibo Keita was reelected as president by the National Assembly. In the 1964 National Assembly elections, the US-RDA was already the sole legal party (Bebler, 1973, 82; Imperato, 1989, 60f.).

Hence, while Modibo Keita and the US-RDA remained faithful to their centrist, anti-chief and Marxist-socialist program after independence, they also effectively eliminated

the last traces of the peripheral side of the territorial cleavage by the final elimination of its former leaders.

First Comparison

The analysis of the first two process stations, "birth" and "establishment", in the four cases reveal a striking similarity in cleavage-formation of embryonic African party systems at the time of independence. Both former English and French colonies in both West Africa, Ghana and Mali, and Southern Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, experienced the formation of a political center-periphery cleavage in the advent of the first indigenous pre-independence elections.

The end of the Second World War and the return of African soldiers who fought for Britain and France and a free Europe fueled indigenous aspirations for independence. The new Post-World War II order forced the colonial powers to prepare their colonies for self-governance and led to the installation of pre-independence elections in British and French African colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. Higher education for a narrow African elite in the United States, Europe, South Africa, or colonial Senegal on the one hand, and British indirect rule and the French concept of "association" on the other hand juxtaposed two sets of indigenous elites structured according to a center-periphery cleavage: on the one side a mostly commoner-based and educated urban elite that did not profit from the spoils of indirect rule and had more to win from immediate independence and a modern system of self-rule, on the other side a mostly traditional and rural aristocratic elite that secured the penetration of the periphery for the colonial administration and preferred an incremental and pacted transition to independence that preserved its privileges. The antagonistic indigenous preferences in the context of decolonization and nationalization led to the formation of two opposed collective identities among the indigenous elite, one progressive and anti-traditionalist, and one moderate or conservative and traditionalist.

The opposed interests of the two sides resulted in the organizational form of competing parties for the first pre-independence elections.

Despite the absence of a functional cleavage due to the lack of an effective industrialization in the four cases, the two territorial sides mimicked the dominant Western European left-right party system structure by either investing in communist, marxist or socialist rhetoric and trying to attract support from the Eastern Bloc or investing in capitalist rhetoric and trying to win the support of the Western Bloc in general, and the former colonial power in special. As expected, in each of the four analyzed cases, the progressive elite who opted for a radical break with the former colonial power invested in left-leaning rhetoric and was sympathetic to the Eastern Bloc whereas a conservative, moderate and traditional elite who opted for pacted transition invested in capitalist rhetoric and tried to ensure the continued support of the former colonial power and other Western countries.

While the similarities in cleavage formation are striking, the four analyzed cases differ regarding the exact composition and the strength of the two sides of the center-periphery cleavage. These differences can be attributed to differences in development and the extensiveness of colonial involvement, the strength and variety of the traditional systems of rule, and the ethno-regional structure of the four cases.

In comparison with Lesotho, Ghana and Mali, the center-side was almost inexistent in advent of the first pre-independence elections in Botswana. Nonetheless, the birth of the party system was initiated by a narrow politicized elite of Batswana commoners upon their return from studies and work in South Africa. Yet, lack of urbanization, a very low development level, and a strong traditional and moderate or conservative elite backed by the British colonial administration led to an overwhelming victory of the peripheral side in the first pre-independence elections in Botswana. The moderate-peripheral side managed to perpetuate the imbalance of strength to its advantage and remained victorious until the beginning of the third wave without having to resort to coercive means of power. And

because the state and security forces were underdeveloped and had to be constructed from scratch by the governing BDP itself (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2010, 255), its incumbency was never challenged by the barrel of the gun. Ironically, the relatively strong imbalance of power between the peripheral and the center side most likely secured the survival of the territorial cleavage in Botswana until the beginning of the third wave.

After the first pre-independence elections, the context of underdevelopment forced each side of the territorial cleavage in Botswana to adapt to the realities on the ground. Confronted with the task of state-building and development, the governing embodiment of the peripheral side, the BDP, became de facto a centralizing force, which, in turn, disgruntled an important fraction of its allied chiefly powers. This provided the embodiment of the center-side, the BNF, to form an uneasy, but potentially electoral useful alliance with peripheral and traditional forces. However, in the long run, the two parties re-adjusted their socio-structural foundation and collective identity according to the original constellation. Moreover, the BNF profited from an increasing urbanization over time. Nonetheless, elections are still won in the more rural parts of Botswana, which secures the dominance of the BDP.

In Lesotho, the electoral balance between center and periphery was much more even than in Botswana. The party of the progressive commoner center, the BCP, and the party of the traditional-conservative periphery, the BNP, alternated in holding power between 1960 and 1970. In opposition to Botswana, Ghana and Mali, Lesotho has a paramount chief. This led to the formation of an additional party, the royalist MTP/MFP, which claimed the center of the territorial cleavage, too. However, the MTP/MFP never obtained the electoral significance of the BCP. The main antagonism between the BCP, center, and the BNP, periphery, was additionally strengthened due to a salient religious cleavage between protestants and catholics that formed alongside the dominant cleavage between the commoner center, mostly protestant, and the traditional periphery, mostly catholic.

Furthermore, the difficult relationship with and geographic encapsulation within apartheid South Africa reinforced the cleavage between the two sides, although it was overshadowed by inconsistency, at least on the progressive side between 1960 and 1970, and later on both sides.

Notably, Lesotho's peripheral party, BNP, experienced the same dilemma as Botswana's peripheral BDP when it won power in 1965. Centralizing tendencies due to the construction of a modern state disgruntled its peripheral support-base and created incentives for the BCP to opportunistically attenuate its centrist rhetoric and attract peripheral forces. Generally, the cases of Botswana and Lesotho differ from Ghana and, most notably, Mali in view of the fact that chiefs and the traditional system of rule were less discredited by the general population due to the comparatively less disruptive way they were instrumentalized by the colonizers to secure colonial rule in the periphery. Moreover, chiefs played a pivotal role in the creation of pre-independence national feelings, most notably in Lesotho, triggered by the constant threat of the Boers (cf. Coplan and Quinlan, 1997).

Ghana was certainly the most modernized and economically most important colony of the four cases due to its access to the ocean and its resources. Accordingly, the stock of elites was larger than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, and indigenous pressures for independence were strong and materialized earlier. Accordingly, there existed not only a broader commoner-based and educated elite, but also a significant moderate and educated, center-aspiring elite with ties to the traditional and aristocratic periphery. Hence, we observe a territorial cleavage in Ghana between a progressive center-side on the one hand and a moderate-center and traditional-peripheral alliance on the other. In opposition to Lesotho and most notably Botswana, the progressive center remained victorious over four elections due to higher organizational power, stronger cohesiveness, and a larger electoral potential. However, the longer Nkrumah's CPP stayed in power, the more authoritarian it became. The moderate center-periphery alliance, in turn, had to emphasize its peripheral

identity and forge alliances with regional and tribalistic parties in order to remain a viable competitor. It also became associated with the economically important Ashanti region and vocalized Ashanti-grievances. Nonetheless, despite a stronger significance of ethno-regional identities than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, Ghana never went down the tribalistic path as other African countries did. The center-side was significantly ethnically cross-cutting in its mobilization and appeal, and both sides of the territorial cleavage obtained considerable vote-shares in each others' regional strongholds (cf. Elischer, 2013).

Although of less importance to the French than Ghana to the British, and also less developed, Mali was similar to Ghana in view of the fact that the progressive center-side was overwhelmingly victorious in the first national pre-independence elections. As in Ghana, the embodiment of the center-side, the US-RDA, was better organized than its peripheral equivalent, the PPS. However, the strength of the center-side in Mali can also be explained by the very weakness of the peripheral side. The traditional system of rule was more strongly discredited than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana due to the highly disruptive way the French had used and re-structured it for their own purposes. Despite of – or exactly because of – its weakness, after the electoral victory of the center, its leader Modibo Keita literally erased the last traces of the peripheral side. Only five years after the first pre-independence elections and two year after independence, the de-facto authoritarian one-party state became reality in Mali.

In both Mali and Ghana, authoritarian one-party states were installed by the victorious center-side parties, amongst others, because of increasing economic problems in both new-born nations and the concomitant fading of the honeymoon of independence. In Lesotho, in turn, the governing embodiment of the peripheral side, the BNP, allowed a third, free election in Lesotho despite increasing voter apathy among its rural voters due to a poor performance in government and severe conflict with the King. However, after losing the elections, the BNP, in collaboration with the security forces, refused to hand over power

and installed a de facto authoritarian one-party state. Only Botswana escaped the fate of authoritarianism due to the special constellation of a strong governing party that had nothing to fear from the polls and the concomitant absence of significant security forces that could have acted on their own or be instrumentalized by one of the two sides of the territorial cleavage.

Blurring and Suppression of the Center-Periphery Cleavage During the Authoritarian Phase in Lesotho and Mali

In opposition to Botswana and Ghana, both Lesotho and Mali did not experience any further elections until the advent of the third wave. Nonetheless, the following analysis reveals differences between the two countries as it shows that Lesotho's authoritarian phase was much shorter than Mali's authoritarian phase. Amongst others, this allowed the survival of both the de facto authoritarian BNP, the embodiment of the peripheral side of the territorial cleavage, and the illegally ousted embodiment of the center side, the BCP, until the advent of the third wave.

Apart from enduring a much longer phase of authoritarianism, Mali soon experienced another regime change due to the military coup against Modibo Keita's authoritarian one-party regime in 1968 by a junta that had neither ties to the ousted authoritarian center-side nor the short-lived peripheral side of the territorial cleavage in Mali. The following two sections analyze to what degree the territorial cleavage was suppressed and blurred during the two and three authoritarian decades in Lesotho and Mali, respectively.

Lesotho

Having lost popular legitimacy in their rule due to their annulation of the 1970 election results and the declaration of emergency powers, the BNP and Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan now relied heavily on the security forces, the *Police Mobile Unit* (PMU), in

order to stay in power. While the detention of main opposition leaders like the election's winner, BCP's Ntsu Mokhehle, ensured the stability of Jonathan's unconstitutional rule to some degree, the PMU crushed potential opposition outbreaks ruthlessly with the help of weapon deliveries from South Africa. The apartheid neighbor endorsed Jonathan's coup because Pretoria was most suspicious of Mokhehle and the BCP who initially had ties with the ANC, and later the PAC. (Spence, 1968, 47f.; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 131; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 360f.).

Britain, in turn, decided to withhold much needed aid in consequence of the coup. To prove Britain the legitimacy of their rule, Jonathan and the BNP started reconciliation talks with the opposition parties, BCP and MFP. The opposition leaders agreed to the annulation of the 1970 election results because they hoped to be released from detention and become part of an all-party transitional government. The mere announcement of Jonathan to install such an all-party arrangement convinced the British to restore aid. As soon as the British lifted their ban, the BNP and Jonathan decided to abort the all-party plans and the BNP remained in government alone. As a consequence, important BCP elements around Mokhehle refused to participate in the interim National Assembly, which became a rubber stamp for the government. The BCP leadership around Mokhehle started to intensify forms of violent opposition. In 1974, police stations were attacked by BCP supporters who tried to obtain weapons for an uprising. The attacks failed, and were followed by brutal counter-attacks of the government, upon which Mokhehle and most of the BCP leadership went into exile in Botswana and Zambia. In the following, the civil service was purged of opposition elements and filled with BNP supporters. The pro-BCP trade union came under increasing pressure whereas compliant voluntary associations received substantial patronage. A faction of the BCP, in turn, agreed to participate in the interim National Assembly and was later co-opted into Jonathan's government, which enhanced the government's legitimacy and at the same time led to increasing disintegration and confusion

among the BCP supporters because Mokhehle did not approve of the alignment of parts of the BCP with Jonathan's government (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 131–137; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 361).

To enhance the legitimacy of their unconstitutional grip to power and consolidate the de facto one-party rule, Jonathan and the BNP pragmatically adjusted their ideological identity in several ways. The BNP started to abort its collaborative stance towards South Africa and increasingly attacked the apartheid system. This strategy both undercut the BCP's previous anti-apartheid appeal and secured prestige and assistance from the international community, which became increasingly anti-apartheid in these years. In complete opposition to its previous beliefs, the BNP even started to offer ANC refugees sanctuary and forged diplomatic ties with the Communist bloc. Especially the latter move was badly received by the Roman catholic hierarchy in Lesotho and disrupted their previously close alliance with the BNP and Jonathan. In another deviation from its previous identity, the BNP also started to attenuate its strong opposition vis-à-vis the King after he was sent to exile during the coup. Hence, soon the King was allowed to return home as a constitutional monarch in order to increase the legitimacy of the illegal BNP regime. The very core of the BNP identity, the defense of lower chiefs' interests, already decreased during its legitimate rule between 1965 and 1970 because of the BNP's weak performance in rural areas at that time. Now, this dealignment found its continuation by the BNP regime's rule through increasingly centralizing state structures of urban bureaucrats and the collaboration with senior chiefs, which both did not reverse the trend, of course (Khaketla, 1972, 297; Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 137–139, 146f.; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 41; Southall and Fox, 1999, 673; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 18f., 129–131).

Meanwhile, the part of the BCP that refused co-optation by the BNP and went into exile after the failed uprising in 1974 factionalized further over the best strategy how to return to power. A sub-faction around Mokhehle decided to intensify armed struggle against

Jonathan's regime and founded the military arm of the BCP, the *Lesotho Liberation Army* (LLA). The LLA invested in guerrilla war-tactics, which resulted in regular bombings and other violent destabilization attacks in Lesotho between 1979 and 1986. The LLA recruited combatants among Basotho miners in South Africa and turned to its old South African ally, the Pan-African Congress of South Africa. After 1981, Mokhehle became persona non grata in Botswana and Zambia due to the insurgency. It is widely alleged that after that expulsion, the LLA was forced to rely on tacit support from apartheid South Africa, Mokhehle's once outspoken enemy. Pretoria's rationale for this was twofold: First, it was directed against Jonathan's ANC support, and second, it followed South Africa's general applied strategy to destabilize its southern African neighbors in order to avert alternative power bases in the region (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 139–141; Southall, 1994, 111; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 41f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 28f., 177f.).

The increasing destabilization of the BNP regime through the actions of the LLA and South Africa led to general popular frustration in Lesotho and tensions inside the BNP. Additional pressures from aid donors prompted Jonathan to restore legitimate rule through elections in 1985. However, opposition parties boycotted the 1985 election and nullified its legitimacy completely. Senior officers of the *Lesotho Paramilitary Force* (LPF), formerly PMU, became increasingly frustrated over Jonathan's ANC support, which they considered to be the cause for a South African economic embargo and Pretoria's alleged support of the insurgent LLA. In January 1986, allegedly backed by South Africa, the officers staged a successful military coup and Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya became the chairman of the new Military Council, which was installed as new governing body of Lesotho. Like Jonathan, Lekhanya was a Roman catholic and installed by Jonathan himself as Mayor-General of the PMU in 1974. In the following, Jonathan was put under house arrest, and most BNP ministers dismissed while some remained in place, under the direction of the Military Council. Mokhehle and other BCP leaders were allowed to return from their exile,

in turn, which effectively ended the conflict with the LLA. Relations with South Africa were restored as well and let Lesotho gain in temporary stability. Reductions in donor funding for the military, however, led to tensions between senior and junior officers and the subsequent enforced deposition of Lekhanya in 1991. Subsequent pressures by South Africa, after the end of apartheid, and international donors prompted the military regime to set up a new constitution and first multiparty elections in 1993; elections, which marked the beginning of the third wave in Lesotho after 23 years of unconstitutional rule (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985, 141–143; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 42f.; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 19, 130f., 155–157, 251–254, 361f.).

I consider the territorial cleavage of Lesotho to be rather "medium established" instead of "more than medium established" despite the survival of both the BNP and the BCP as organizational units until the advent of the third wave: First, there was no multiparty disruption of the authoritarian BNP rule between the coup in 1970 and the founding third wave elections in 1993. Consequently, the two sides of the territorial cleavage could not and did not have to reinvigorate and routinize their political rhetoric and organizational coherence. Second, the inconsistency in terms of the ideological identity of the two sides of the territorial cleavage, which was already present during the electoral phase between 1960 and 1970 (see above), found its continuation during the years of the authoritarian BNP single-party rule. Most notably, the BNP's collective identity and structural foundation of representing the lesser chiefs became more and more tainted. Policies that were not in the interest of lesser chiefs, the increasingly centralizing governing style after 1965 as well as the collaboration with the King and senior chiefs after 1970 proved otherwise and largely hurt its popularity among the rural, Roman catholic population. Analogously, the BNP's dramatic policy switches from fervent anti-communism to diplomatic ties with the Communist Bloc after 1970 strongly blurred its previously rather consistent conservative

identity and alienated the Roman catholic church from the party. In the same line, the switch from a party that collaborates with apartheid South Africa to one that strongly provokes its neighbor with anti-apartheid rhetoric and the harboring of ANC-activists in Lesotho did not help to clear the image of a rather opportunistic party of skilled power brokers than an ideologically coherent party. The lack of multiparty elections for a time-span of 23 years allowed this opportunistic behavior, but damaged the identity of the party for third wave party competition to effectively rely on. And finally and most importantly, the military coup of 1986 only secured the survival of the most opportunistic figures inside the BNP leadership while more militant figures were effectively expelled. Longterm leader Jonathan, the most prominent figure of the party, died of natural causes in 1987, one year after his deposition (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 130f.).

The BCP, in turn, was already ideologically inconsistent in advent of the second and third elections of the pre-authoritarian phase. It switched its ideological positions, which were initially rather congruent to its socio-structural basis, each time in advent of the second and third election before the coup of 1970 (see above). After the co-optation of parts of the BCP by the BNP in the aftermath of the coup and the concomitant deprivation of political participation and even physical presence in Lesotho for the BCP-core around Mokhehle, the BCP could not cultivate its ideological identity anymore until 1986. The BCP's military arm, the LLA, even had to opportunistically ally itself with the BCP's once most outspoken enemy, apartheid South Africa, in order to remain a threat to Jonathan and the BNP.

Hence, even though both political-organizational counterparts of the center-side and the peripheral-side of the territorial cleavage survived until the advent of third wave – in opposition to Mali, as we will see below – their ideological identity and organizational cohesion was strongly blurred after 23 years of authoritarianism, and rather resembled two competing groups of power mongers than parties with different ideological identities and

socio-structural foundations.

Mali

After the successful elimination of every potential locus of political opposition in the country and the incorporation of most voluntary organizations into its party structures, the US-RDA gained a great and coherent political monopoly in Mali (Bebler, 1973, 103f.; Imperato, 1989, 59f.). The party determined its *option socialiste* and introduced several measures that should lead to a socialist economic structure and accumulate enough capital for the industrialization and modernization of Mali. State-owned companies were founded and agriculture reorganized with the intention of collectivization. Foreign trade became a state monopoly (Meyer, 1980, 5f.; Bebler, 1973, 83). However, the socialist option proved to yield poor results because it was based on a faulty assessment of the financial and human resources of the country and did not take into account Mali's unfavorable geographic conditions of its landlocked position, a vast hinterland and endless, ungovernable borders. Farmer productivity decreased and the previously positive balance of trade changed to a negative one. Corruption, black markets and smuggling started to thrive in this context. Political dissatisfaction rose among peasants, merchants and the urban population, of which most belonged to the initial following of Modibo Keita and the US-RDA (Bebler, 1973, 83; Meyer, 1980, 6f.; Imperato, 1989, 61). Economic and financial difficulties reached a stage where the Keita government had to swallow its pride and enter monetary negotiations with France in 1967, where the devaluation of the Mali Franc and the concomitant blocking of government expenditures and government salaries were agreed upon in exchange for French aid. The subsequent dramatic drop in purchasing power now even led to conflicts between the US-RDA leadership and state employees as well as party members itself. Factions cracked up inside the leadership between moderates who welcomed the reapprochement towards France and radical Marxist who regarded the agreements as

violations of party principles. As Modibo Keita came under increasing pressure of the latter, he started a Malian "cultural revolution", got rid of the centrists and moderates inside the party leadership, and strengthened the US-RDA's para-military People's Militia to purge the party and the population from dissent and potential opposition. Strains between the militia and the army during 1968 led to fears on the side of the army officers that Modibo Keita and the radicals would arrest them and replace the army by the militia. Sensing the great discontent of the public with the Keita regime, Yoro Diakité, an army captain, and Lt. Moussa Traoré, a military instructor, decided to carry out a coup d'état. After returning from a meeting in Mopti, Modibo Keita was arrested and the newly formed *Comité Militaire de Liberation Nationale* (CMLN) announced the fall of the Keita regime with Moussa Traore new chief of state and president of the CMLN (Bebler, 1973, 84–88; Meyer, 1980, 7–9; Imperato, 1989, 61–63).

The new military regime, the CMLN, embarked on a political vacuum in Mali (cf. Bebler, 1973, 105f.). Modibo Keita effectively destroyed the only opposition that was based on an already modestly salient political cleavage through the co-optation and subsequent elimination of Fily Dabo Sissoko and the PPS. The composition of the CMLN leadership was based on personal relationships in the military rather than a common socio-structural or ethnopolitical background besides shared service in the army (Bebler, 1973, 90; Imperato, 1989, 64; Dickovick, 2008, 1126f.). Accordingly, the junta had no actual coherent political platform after capturing power besides the goal of economic recovery. It did neither reject the socialist options nor did it dismantle the state-run economy because this would have hurt the many urban dwellers employed in it. And the junta also reaffirmed Keita's agreements with France. Internal and external trade was liberalized to please traders and merchants whereas the dismantling of the collectivized agriculture was intended to secure the support of the rural population. The junta dissolved the People's Militia and restored individual liberties to some degree. Regarding foreign policy, Mali remained aligned to the

Eastern Bloc, although relations to the West improved (Bebler, 1973, 92f.; Meyer, 1980, 13; Imperato, 1989, 64f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 54f.).

Initial promises to return to civilian rule quickly were abolished during 1969 because of sharp disagreements on this issue inside the CMLN. Subsequently, frictions inside the junta intensified between the more senior members around Diakité who favored closer relations with the West and more junior members around Traoré who wanted to uphold relations with the Eastern Bloc. After accusations of plotting a coup, Diakité was sentenced to life imprisonment. Shortly thereafter he died in prison (Bebler, 1973, 101f.; Meyer, 1980, 14–16; Imperato, 1989, 65; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 55).

By June 1974, the Malian population accepted a new constitution, which was drawn up by the CMLN. The constitution arranged for a one party state, universal suffrage, a president and a national assembly. US-RDA members with important positions in the ancien regime were barred from party membership and both government and national assembly participation for a period of ten years. The CLMN was provided with the task of interim government for a five-year span until 1979. The new constitution did not arrange for a radical break with the pragmatic governing style of the military regime. Rather it provided the CLMN leadership the opportunity to get rid of the uniforms and transform the military regime towards constitutionally legitimate civilian rule (Meyer, 1980, 19–21; Imperato, 1989, 67f.; Nunley, 2009).

Despite some considerable amount of internal resistance, the foundation of the new single political party, the *Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien* (UDPM), was announced in September 1976. President Moussa Traoré became the head of the new party and CMLN members spread throughout the country to establish the party at the grassroots. Likewise to the US-RDA, the UDPM incorporated most of the voluntary organizations in the country to avoid the potential formation of organized dissent from the outset. While a faction of hawks inside the CLMN was purged from the leadership, Traoré made it clear that the

military would remain involved in politics. After the new party was firmly established throughout the country, former US-RDA leaders were released from prison. The timing of this gesture of reconciliation ensured the former elites' effective exclusion in the new regime. In the general elections of 1979, Moussa Traoré ran unopposed and was elected by over 99 percent of the votes. UDPM candidates for the National Assembly were elected unopposed as well. Later assembly elections became party-internally contested in order to give the regime a democratic touch and channel public grievances and protest-voting from the top leadership of the UDPM to the rank and file, and by that also effectively suppressed potential future power bases among the rank and file of the party. In its programmatic outlook, the UDPM intended to remain unaligned to neither socialism nor capitalism. Nonetheless, rather in coherence with the previous Keita regime and the military regime, it aimed for the construction of an independent, state-directed economy and it did not dare to retain Keita's socialism by reducing parastatals, which provided employment for the politicized contemporary and future urban elite, students and teachers. As soon as the UDPM regime started to cut the flow of students to the civil service in 1980, opposition of the students to the new regime started to grow (Meyer, 1980, 22–35; Imperato, 1989, 68–71; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 324–326; Nunley, 2009).

During the 1980s, increasing donor dependence led to pressures for privatization and cutbacks in the civil service. While on the one hand this rather pragmatic change of policy ensured the continuation of aid flows, it was a risky move because it threatened the availability of job-opportunities for the higher educated youth in the bureaucracy. Additionally, recurring delays in the payment of teachers led to strikes organized by the teachers' union. However, the different protest groups did not manage to forge mass-based protest, which would have included other segments of the society or even inside the civil service itself. The protesting groups had a relatively narrow common socio-structural basis, and lacked an element of collective identity or even ideological content despite the common

denominator of general discontent with the current performance of the Traoré regime. The new groups also lacked an organized historic opposition core they could have attached themselves to because of the early elimination of the peripheral-conservative opposition by Modibo Keita around independence, and the subsequent effective exclusion of elements of the Keita regime by the Traoré regime (Imperato, 1989, 72–77; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 297).

Still, the growing discontent in combination with the changing international environment and the example of prodemocracy movements elsewhere in Africa led to demands for multiparty democracy in 1989. In disrespect of the signs of the time, Moussa Traoré refused to give up single-party democracy. Yet, his governing style of constantly reshuffling his own cabinet and the military leadership, which allowed him to avoid independent power bases inside the UDPM and the military, now proved to backfire (Imperato, 1989, 78; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 327f.). Violent protests by the pro-democracy movement, students and unions led to the disintegration of disgruntled parts inside the UDPM leadership and a subsequent successful military coup on March 26, 1991. The coup was led by Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré (known as "ATT"). ATT and 24 other military officers arrested Moussa Traoré and dissolved the UDPM. They formed the *Conseil de Réconciliation Nationale* (CRN). Prodemocracy groups threatened the CRN that they would resume violent protests if the CRN would not make way for a democratic and civilian government and likewise, Western donors warned that they would suspend aid. A transitional government was installed and a new, democratic constitution approved, which led to the founding elections in February and April 1992. The third wave of democratization arrived in Mali (Imperato, 1989, 78; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 71, 296–298; 327f.).

Hence, we can see that the authoritarian interregnum did not change the general pattern that was already put in place shortly after the first pre-independence elections in 1957:

Mali is a clear case where the establishment of a potentially salient territorial cleavage failed completely.

The legitimacy of traditional chiefs was weaker in advance of the first pre-independence elections than in Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana because of the even more intrusive way the French administration in the French Sudan transformed chiefly institutions to suit their system of indirect rule. Additionally, the lack of an established bourgeoise intelligentsia as in Ghana precluded the establishment of a moderate center-periphery coalition in Mali (cf. Bebler, 1973, 105f.). Accordingly, the initial electoral gains of the peripheral-side in Mali, embodied in the person of Fily Dabo Sissoko and the PPS, were rather owed to the exclusive suffrage than to the viability of the party itself. The first pre-independence elections with universal suffrage demonstrated the predominance of the center-side of the territorial cleavage, embodied in Modibo Keita and the US-RDA. The party was predominant both in the broadness of its socio-structural base, the formation of a collective identity and coherent ideology, as well as the organizational penetration of the country. After that, Modibo Keita and the US-RDA, effectively destroyed the already weak peripheral opposition by the deliberate altering of the electoral rules, the co-optation of the PPS and its leadership, until its final physical elimination. Consequently, the military regime of Moussa Traoré, which replaced the US-RDA one-party regime, embarked on a political vacuum and could not ally itself with an organized opposition. As it lacked any socio-structural foundation or collective identity itself, it rather continued the platform and organizational shell of the US-RDA in a more moderate and pragmatic fashion, which it transformed later into civilian-military rule under Moussa Trouré's newly established one-party vehicle, the UDPM.

Hence, there was no chance that any traces of the already weak peripheral side could survive the almost three decades of authoritarian rule that were to follow until the beginning of the third wave in Mali. Yet, the 23 years of Moussa Traoré's regime also left no legacy of the center side of the territorial cleavage for third wave parties to effectively

rely on. The reasons for this are fourfold: First, almost 6 years of unopposed dominance of the center-side of the cleavage and another 23 years of unopposed pragmatic continuation through moderated replication of its platform and organizational structure by Moussa Traoré's military junta led to the blurring of its own contours. Second, Moussa Traoré made sure that former strong men of the US-RDA had no chance of re-entering Malian politics. Third, Moussa Traoré was rather a pragmatic power broker than a fervent ideologist as Modibo Keita. Hence, he had no problems to revert Keita's legacy of socialism as soon as changes of the domestic and international economic environment during the 1980s rendered it necessary. Lastly, while Moussa Traoré's skilled balancing of internal competition in the CMLN/UDPM secured his own political survival for 23 years, it also ensured that he left no political heirs and political legacies for the parties of the third wave to rely on. Hence, the political vacuum Mali embarked on in 1991 was total. The forces that had to build up a new party system in 1991 were several weakly structured voluntary associations and ad-hoc groupings, which had as their only political common denominator the dissatisfaction with the Traoré regime and the introduction of multiparty democracy but lacked a broad socio-structural foundation, coherent collective identity or organizational form.

Renaissances of Pre-Third Wave Party Competition and Authoritarian Backlashes in Ghana

One year after the fraudulent 1964 plebiscite, which installed Kwame Nkrumah's *Convention People's Party* (CPP) as the sole legal party, the long-time important opposition figure Joseph Boakye Danquah died in prison (Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 91). With Danquah dead, Kofi A. Busia in exile, and most former UP leaders in jail, the CPP was not only legally but also practically the sole political party in the country. Lacking any oppositional threat, factionalism inside the CPP started to thrive during the first half of the 1960s.

As Nkrumah started to implement his socialist and pan-africanist ideas into practice this stirred up resistance among more moderate elements of the party, most notably Minister of Finance, Komla Gbedemah, one of the founding members of the CPP. Ruling increasingly authoritarian and mostly by decree, Nkrumah sacked Gbedemah, who subsequently went into exile. The fate of Gbedemah was exemplary of Nkrumah's move to exchange older elements of the CPP leadership with younger personell who would not question his actions (Austin, 1964, 402–408; Boahen, 1975, 206–210 ; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 128f.).

In 1963, Nkrumah drew up a seven year development plan, which was supposed to realize quick industrialization and agricultural revolution by means of active state control. The government started to rigidly control imports and distribution of goods in the country. While these developments yielded some noteworthy results as the completion of the Volta Dam, it generally proved to have disastrous consequences for the country's economy overall. By the end of 1964, the country experienced shortage in basic commodities and the overhasty industrialization failed leading to virtual state bankruptcy. In sum, Nkrumah's concrete socialist policies and authoritarian rule not only led to increasing factionalism inside his leadership, but to wide unpopularity of his rule and disillusionment among most Ghanaians (Boahen, 1975, 210–219).

Most dangerous to Nkrumah's regime, however, was the growing discontent among the police and the armed forces. Nkrumah started to expand the presidential guard to the detriment of the regular security forces, which considered themselves increasingly ill-equipped and feared to be eventually completely replaced by the presidential guard. The announced dismissal of two of the most senior officers and Nkrumah's intention to send Ghanaian troops into the settler oligarchy of Rhodesia triggered Major Afrifa and General Kotoka's decision to stage a coup. The timing for a coup was good, not only because of Nkrumah's increasing domestic isolation, but also because he became increasingly unpopular among newly independent African governments, and both Britain and the United

States. The former did not appreciate the ruthless and increasingly egomaniac way he tried to achieve African unity. The latter were alienated because of his increasingly unbalanced pro-communist foreign policy. Major Afrifa and General Kotoka declared the successful coup on February 24, 1966 while Nkrumah was out of the country. The government was dissolved, the CPP declared illegal and all political prisoners released. The *National Liberation Council* (NLC), mostly staffed with personnel from the police and the army, was established as interim governing body of Ghana. The NLC made great efforts in promoting national reconciliation, restoring the Ghanaian economy according to IMF standards and reinvigorate diplomatic relations with the West. Yet, counter-coup threats and increasing unpopularity of the introduced austerity measures convinced the NLC to not hold on to political power and to prepare the draft of a new constitution and return to civilian rule. The general ban of political parties was lifted and elections scheduled for August 29, 1969 (Bebler, 1973, 33–43; Boahen, 1975, 219–235).

Clearly, sympathies of the NLC relied with the conservative tradition of the Danquah-Busia opposition, which was embodied in the *United Party* (UP) before the CPP was made sole legal party in 1964. After the NLC's coup in 1966, Kofi A. Busia was allowed to return from his exile and made national chairman of the newly inaugurated Center for Civil Education, which intended to re-strengthen popular morale through traditional christian values. He was an important member of the Constituent Assembly, which prepared the new constitution and made sure that de-stooled chiefs were reinstalled and advisory and consultative powers of chiefs extended in a new national House of Chiefs. During that time, he prepared the foundation of a new party, the *Progress Party* (PP). The party was mostly organized by previous members of the UP. The PP rallied on the fact that its leader Busia was all along a fervent opponent of Nkrumah, i.e. the candidate who would be the most credible conversion of the disasters of the last years of Nkrumah's rule, and on the greater experience and higher eduction and status of the PP's candidates in opposition to the

Figure 20: *Party system structuring in Ghana 1969*



other parties. The PP candidate field clearly echoed the Danquah-Busia party tradition, the UGCC, GCP, NLM and UP, before the first abolishment of multiparty competition in 1964 (Bebler, 1973, 40–43, 105; Boahen, 1975, 230, 235–238; Jones, 1976, 288; Awoonor, 1990, 213–215, 218; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 68f., 212; cf. Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011).

Although a political decree forbid pro-Nkrumahist parties, and any associated symbols or names, former CPP ministers, most notably Gbedemah, founded new political parties that were regarded as heirs of the CPP legacy. Gbedemah's *National Alliance of Liberals* (NAL) was the most important and best organized among them. The opponent PP's rhetoric made sure that Gbedemah and the NAL would be identified with the tyranny of the last years of Nkrumah's rule. Radical former CPP supporters, in turn, abstained from voting because the NAL and Gbedemah were associated with the moderate wing of the CPP. And the NAL was also certainly hurt by the fact that it was not allowed to make use of any CPP symbols. These factors contributed to the defeat of the NAL with 29 seats in the National Assembly of the Second Republic vis-à-vis 105 seats for the winning PP. Busia, as the leader of the PP, became Prime Minister (Bebler, 1973, 52f.; Boahen, 1975, 235–238, Awoonor, 1990, 219f.; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 20).

Likewise to the 1954, the 1956, and also the 1960 elections, the Danquah-Busia tradition embodied in the PP, was most successful among the regions who considered themselves to belong to the peripheral regions of Ghana, most notably the Akan regions, among

them Ashanti, and the northern regions. In opposition to previous elections, however, the CPP and Nkrumah-heir, the NAL, did not manage to effectively cross-cut ethnic cleavages anymore and was most successful in the Volta region, where the Ewe are predominant, the ethnic group to which Gbedemah belonged. Hence, for the first time in Ghana's electoral history, the two sides of the territorial cleavage could each be associated with one big ethnic group. Interestingly, during Nkrumah's CPP regime, Ewe and Akan were rather allied with each other in peripheral opposition to the CPP, which was echoed in the ethnic background of the two 1966 military coup plotters Afrifa, who was from an Ashanti region, and Kotoka, an Ewe. However, the 1967 death of Kotoka in an attempted counter-coup by Akan junior officers, and the subsequent castling of the NLC military leadership in favor of Afrifa brought the two ethnic groups in opposition to each other. Nonetheless, neither the PP nor the NAL could rely solely on either Akan or Ewe support, because the northern regions and the Ga-dominated Greater Accra regions were still necessary to win the elections (Bebler, 1973, 54f.; Boahen, 1975, 238–240, Awoonor, 1990, 219f.; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 107f.).

After the elections the junta stepped down. The National Assembly and the House of Chiefs voted Edward Akufo-Addo for president with ceremonial functions. The person of Akufo-Addo was also exemplary of the new order. He was of Akan and royal background, a member of the conservative intelligentsia that founded the *United Gold Coast Convention* (UGCC) and an anti-Nkrumah candidate in the 1951, 1954 and 1956 elections. Ethnic representation in Busia's cabinet was exclusionist insofar as none of the 19 ministers was of Ewe origin. A majority of senior Ewe officers and Ewe public servants were dismissed from the army and the civil service. Northerners and Ga were represented besides the Akan majority, though (Bebler, 1973, 55; Awoonor, 1990, 220; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 32; Osei, 2012, 108).

Under Busia's democratic regime, Ghana's massive economic problems continued. They eventually triggered the second military coup, on January 13, 1972, led by Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, while Busia was in London for medical treatment. The new military body that would rule the country was named *National Redemption Council* (NRC) (later *Supreme Military Council*, SMC). Despite Acheampong's Ashanti background, the new ruling body initially reversed most of Busia's capitalist policies and adopted some flavor of Nkrumahist rhetoric and policy. Amongst others, the NRC unilaterally repudiated international debts, reactivated state farms, a nation-wide food production program, and strengthened ties with the Eastern Bloc. They rehabilitated Nkrumah to some degree by repatriating Nkrumah's body after he died in Romania from cancer. Nonetheless, Acheampong was neither too accommodating to the Busia-Danquah nor the Nkrumah political camp, and propagated no-party government in 1977 (Bebler, 1973, 55–63; Jones, 1976, 289f.; Awoonor, 1990, 224–231; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011).

Soon however, economic problems and rampant corruption flared up again, and Acheampong's governing style became increasingly dictatorial. Accordingly, in 1978, a palace coup was staged, and General Fred Akuffo became the new Head of State. General public pressure and looming threats from junior officers who felt neglected by their corrupt seniors in the NRC/SMC forced Akuffo to legalize political parties, return to civilian rule and general elections for June 18, 1979. Yet, in full preparation of the elections for the Third Republic, junior officers around Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, who formed the *Armed Forces Revolutionary Council* (AFRC) disposed General Akuffo, anyway, in an alleged effort to clean the military of the corrupt leaders of the 1966 and 1972 military regimes. The "housecleaning" was brutal indeed, as the AFRC executed many former military leaders, among them Akuffo himself and Acheampong of the SMC, as well as the 1966 coup leader Afrifa who formed the NLC. Despite general popular consent with the punishment of the old guards, Rawlings and the AFRC knew that it was difficult to have civilian support for

another military regime, and they did not suspend the planned elections and the return to civilian rule (Jeffries, 1980, 397f.; Awoonor, 1990, 229–239, Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 18, 24, 32; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 109).

The constitution for the third republic resembled the U.S. constitution as it envisioned an executive president, an elected parliament and an advisory council of state. Some restrictions on the formation of political parties remained in place. Amongst others, no party was allowed to use symbols and names of parties that competed in former Ghanaian elections, i.e. most notably the CPP and the last embodiment of the Danquah-Busia party tradition, the PP. Nonetheless, the two parties that stood out in the elections both rather explicitly referred to their historic legacy of belonging to one of the two sides of the historical, territorial cleavage (Awoonor, 1990, 239–241; Jeffries, 1980, 398; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 187f.).

The Nkrumahist *People's National Party* (PNP) ported Hilla Limann, a rather unknown politician, former member of the CPP and nephew of Imoru Egala. Egala was the former foreign minister in the Nkrumah government and barred to stand for presidency as the PNP candidate because he was found guilty of using his office for private gain during the Nkrumah area. Egala held the CPP network together since the 1966 coup and made it available to the organization of the PNP and the presidential bid of his nephew Limann. The PNP explicitly referred to its Nkrumahist heritage, was clearly leftist and socialist in its outlook, and inherited the CPP-image of being in touch with ordinary people (Awoonor, 1990, 240–241; Jeffries, 1980, 399, 408; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 160, 187f.; cf. Osei, 2012, 109).

The Danquah-Busia conservative party tradition was embodied in the *Popular Front Party* (PFP) and the presidential candidacy of Victor Owusu. As a successful lawyer, one of the founders of Busia's Progress Party and minister in the Busia government he was the logical choice. Of Ashanti origin himself and being one of the most outspoken agitators

Figure 21: *Party system structuring in Ghana 1979*



of the Ewe-exclusionist policies of the former Busia government, it was difficult for the PFP *not* to be associated with the Ashanti-Akan bias of the former PP. The PFP mainly portrayed itself as democracy-promoting force and pro-Western, which it claimed would bring Ghana much needed Western assistance and revive the economy (Awoonor, 1990, 240; Jeffries, 1980, 399, 409f.; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 204f.; Osei, 2012, 109) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 21).

The elections resulted in a narrow absolute majority for the Nkrumahist PNP, 71 of 140 National Assembly seats, and only 42 seats for the conservative PFP, most of them in the Ashanti region. Amongst others, the conservative PFP did not win a single seat in the Ewe-dominated Volta region. Clearly, the PFP was hurt by the anti-Ewe image of its presidential candidate Owusu and the PFP leadership's general reluctance to ally itself with Ewe-elements who did not want to associate itself with Limann's PNP. With Limann having a northerner background, the PNP, in turn, proved to be a truly national party as it won seats in every single region, even Ashanti, and managed to cross-cut ethnopolitical cleavages. It rather followed the cross-cutting appeal of Nkrumah's CPP than the rather tribalist elections result of its immediate forerunner in the 1969 elections, the NAL (see above) (Jeffries, 1980, 399f, 401–405, 410f.; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 160).

On September 24, 1979, Rawlings handed over power to Limann and ordered his men to return to the barracks. The Limann government did neither manage to stop the eco-

nomic downward spiral that plagued Ghana since almost two decades nor did it combat rampant corruption inside the government. Accordingly, Rawlings staged his second coup on December 31, 1981. He suspended the constitution, banned political parties and declared a revolution of the people and the common man and a war against the abuses of authority. Rawlings' newly found *Provisional National Defense Council* (PNDC) took over government with Rawlings as chairman. Similar to the CPP and Nkrumah, Rawlings and the PNDC tried to anchor their movement in grass-roots structures and established the *People's Defense Committees* (PDCs) and *Workers' Defense Committees* (WDCs). Like its forerunner AFRC, the PNDC was mainly constituted of junior military officers. Yet, the PNDC did also include civilians and had the support of socialist elements in the society, workers and the youth. Effectively not aligned with any of the two party traditions, the PNDC became a new force in Ghana politics. Nonetheless, the organizational style, charisma of Rawlings and initial revolutionary rhetoric of the PNDC was certainly more in tune with the progressive Nkrumahist tradition than the conservative Danquah-Busia tradition. This Nkrumahist flavor foreshadowed the effective co-optation of Nkrumahist rhetoric to the disadvantage of the 'real' Nkrumahists and CPP-heirs in the advent of the founding third wave elections in 1992 (see further below). Until then, and rather ironically however, the devastating economic situation of Ghana forced Rawlings and the PNDC to soon turn for help to the IMF and the Worldbank in opposition to the intended potentially helpful alliance with the Eastern Bloc. In return for economic bailout, the PNDC government had to initiate painful economic reforms that stood in opposition to the PNDC's rather socialist outlook (Awoonor, 1990, 242–250; Jonah, 1998; Fleischhacker, 2010, 106–108; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 124; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011; Osei, 2012, 109f.).

The austerity measures hurt the rather urban following of the PNDC and strained the initial alliance. In reaction to that, the PNDC tried to widen its support basis among rural groups, which benefitted to some degree from the implemented structural adjustment

measures. By the end of the 1980s, the authoritarianism of the PNDC eventually led to an unusual pro-democracy alliance of both protagonists from the Danquah-Busia tradition and the Nkrumahist tradition as well as trade unions and the Ghanaian student union. These pressures together with the changing international and regional environment let the Rawlings government realize that political liberalization was inevitable. In an attempt to control change from above, Rawlings set up a National Commission for Democracy, which envisioned the re-introduction of multiparty democracy. The ban on parties was lifted and general elections scheduled for November and December 1992, i.e. the founding elections of the third wave in Ghana (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 334–337; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 138; Daddieh and Bob-Miliar, 2011, Osei, 2012, 110f.).

In sum, I can safely conclude that Ghana's territorial cleavage was more than medium established by the beginning of the third wave. There are several reasons for that. First, Ghana experienced three pre-independence elections. This routinized electoral competition among the political elites and the voters and helped to establish the territorial cleavage before the country even became independent. Second, Nkrumah and the CPP's fully authoritarian regime only lasted for two years, between 1964 and 1966, which was to short a time to eradicate the conservative Danquah-Busia center-periphery alliance. Third, the first military coup, which ousted Nkrumah and the CPP in 1966, was associated with Busia's conservative opposition and quickly re-introduced civilian rule and multiparty elections, which allowed another electoral competition between the two sides of the territorial cleavage, the conservative center-periphery alliance side and the progressive center side, associated with Nkrumah's heritage. Both the 1966 coup and the 1969 election for the first time brought the Danquah-Busia side of the territorial cleavage into power and strengthened the relevance of this side for the future of political competition in Ghana. Forth, the second military coup in 1972 brought military forces into power that loosely followed

the progressive policies of Nkrumah and rehabilitated his political heritage to some degree after the disastrous last year of Nkrumah's rule. And, like their 1966 military antecessors, their reign was anyway rather too brief to effectively eradicate the heritage of both sides of the cleavage. Fifth, the enforced return to civilian rule in 1979 again brought parties in opposition to each other which both capitalized on one of the two sides of the historic territorial cleavage. Finally, although the authoritarian Rawlings decade, which started with the military coup on 1981, brought a third force into the game, which was not associated with either of the two traditions, it neither destroyed the heritage nor completely eliminated the heirs of the two traditions. Rather Rawlings and the PNDC co-opted, to some degree the rhetoric, and the leftist and progressive heritage of Nkrumahist parties.

Hence, no authoritarian force in Ghana managed to be in power long enough to disrupt the historic territorial cleavage and its organizational expressions long enough to effectively eradicate its appeal and organizational network for future parties to rely on. The two pre-third wave elections after the second critical juncture and the heritage of rhetoric and policies, on which the three different military regimes relied themselves on, allowed the survival of the rhetorical and organizational legacy of the territorial cleavage to make it a viable basis for third wave parties to rely on (see below).

Regarding ethnopolitical cleavages between the second critical juncture and the beginning of the third wave, the Akan bias, which strengthened the peripheral forces inside the conservative Danquah-Busia tradition, intensified after the Nkrumah era. The strong pro-Akan and anti-Ewe bias of the Busia government of 1969 on the one hand strengthened the viability of the Danquah-Busia tradition, but on the other hand made it strongly unpopular among the initially allied Ewe and foreclosed the potential of future cross-cutting alliances. The Nkrumahist party tradition, by contrast, only had an ethnopolitical bias in the 1969 elections as it almost exclusively relied on Ewe support, but managed later to

reinvigorate the ethnopolitically cross-cutting heritage of the Nkrumah years (cf. figures 20 and 21).

Degree of Center-Periphery Cleavage Structuring in Third Wave Party Competition

Botswana

The electoral cycle was never interrupted in Botswana since the first pre-independence election in 1965. Nonetheless, Botswana's elections since 1989 take place in an international context that promotes democracy more credibly than before, i.e. the authoritarian option would become much more difficult to obtain in case the dominant BDP would lose an election one day.

In general, the Botswana party competition pattern during third wave elections continues the developments that cumulated in the last pre-third wave elections of 1984. The dominant BDP continues to embody the legacy of the conservative peripheral side of the territorial cleavage, although it is at times a hard task for the governing party to balance that image with its position as a longtime incumbent of a relatively strongly centralized government. The BNF, in turn, consolidated its position as the runner-up opposition party. The party is an offspring of the progressive center side of the territorial cleavage, but opportunistically allied itself with alienated peripheral forces between 1969 and 1984.

In the 1984 elections, the BNF finally managed to become more successful in urban areas and and started to liberate itself from its paradoxical electoral dependence on traditional chiefs that were alienated from the dominant BDP. This opportunistic alliance with peripheral forces stood in contrast to the BNF's ideological identity and original socio-structural foundation as the party of the progressive center of the territorial cleavage (Charlton, 1993, 334f.; Wiseman, 1998, 258). In the 1989 elections, the BNF continued its urbanization trend and reached a vote share of almost 27 percent. This was the highest

vote share an opposition party ever reached in Botswana's political history at that time. And it led to the weakest result for the BDP since its foundation, although the BDP still retained a comfortable absolute majority. Furthermore, the BNF contested almost every constituency, hence it achieved a national stature, which was so far unprecedented for opposition parties in Botswana. The BNF reinvigorated its egalitarian rhetoric and promised to deliver more social justice than the BDP. The party strengthened its urban support basis, and won two Gaborone seats. In sum, the party gained in ideological and socio-structural cohesiveness as well as in vote share. And although the result did not look good on the seat share side due the defections from the traditional elements of the BNF in advent of the 1989 elections, the party nonetheless managed to hold a considerable vote share in these districts. Obviously, the accumulated symbolic and ideological capital since 1969, made the party immune to large defections on the supporter side despite defections of their leaders, even in its more rural strongholds. In sum, while the seat share of the runner-up in Botswana, was below the average of other African dominant party systems at the beginning of the third wave, the actual vote share was was almost double the average. Hence, while the combination of first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies with a dominant party of nation-wide and cross-regional appeal resulted in an overall low seat share for the BNF, the vote share of 1989 indicated potential for future elections (Charlton, 1993, 346f., 350f.; Nunley, 2009).

Finalizing the trend of previous elections, by 1994, the runner-up BNF became dominant in the urban and semi-urban areas. The increasing urbanization of Botswana was adjusted by the reconfiguration of the urban constituency size, and amongst others, led to unprecedented seat gains for the BNF. The elections resulted in 13 seats for the BNF and 27 for the BDP. For the first time, not only the vote share, but also the seat share of the runner up in Botswana was double the average of other African dominant party systems. The socio-structural core of the growing BNF support came from the urban working class,

which grew heavily in recent years before the 1994 elections, and was dissatisfied with its relative poverty in relation to the urban elite. Further support came from the urban unemployed, mostly labour migrants from rural areas. Hence, because the BNF amended its progressive-centrist identity with socialism between its foundation and the beginning of the 1990s and afterwards with social democracy, it could reap the "delayed" growth of the corresponding socio-structural groups (Wiseman, 1998, 256–258; Emminghaus, 2003, 146; Morton, Ramsey and Mgadla, 2008, 181, 247).

Although the BNF's chances for defeating the BDP and ending the dominant party system looked as good as never before in the 1999 elections, the BNF started to disintegrate in advent of the elections. After BDP president Masire retired in 1998, fellow Bangwato tribesmen of the BNF-leader, Koma, regained the leadership of the dominant BDP. This fueled old allegations among the BNF leadership that Koma secretly intends to be co-opted by the BDP due to his tribal linkages. The history of opportunistic inclusion of disgruntled chiefs by Koma into the BNF between 1969 and 1984, which blurred the original collective identity and socio-structural foundation of the BNF, started to backfire on the cohesiveness of the party. It supported the allegations that Koma is a disguised tribalist in the clothes of a progressive centralist and social democrat. In April 1998, after failed attempts to dispose Koma from the BNF leadership, members of the BNF central committee broke away and founded a new party, the *Botswana Congress Party* (BCP). Five BNF members of parliament defected to the BCP. In advent of the elections, the BCP tried to ideologically position itself in the center between the left, BNF, and the right, BDP. Nonetheless, it basically tried to mobilize the same voter segments as the BNF, i.e. the poor and unemployed. In rural areas, it tried to mobilize the non-Tswana speaking minorities. In this last respect, it proved to be a viable alternative to the BNF, which had a rather diffuse profile regarding the rights of non-Tswana minorities. In sum, the birth of the BCP prohibited a BNF triumph in 1999 and helped the BDP to regain

Figure 22: *Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in Botswana 1999 and 2004*



strength in comparison with the 1994 elections. While the vote share of the BNF and the BCP resulted in a combined, respectable, 37 percent, the seat share of the runner-up BNF dropped to the African dominant party system average of 15 percent while the BCP only managed to win one seat in parliament. After the defeat, some BCP members returned to the BNF. Hence, the BNF managed to retain its position as the runner-up in Botswana's dominant party system, albeit on a much lower level than in 1994. The BDP's dominant position, in turn, was back into more safe waters again (Wiseman, 1998, 258–260; Emminghaus, 2003, 146f., 152f.; Makgala, 2005, 305–314; Morton, Ramsey and Mgadla, 2008, 77f.; Nunley, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 257f.).

Factionalism and allegations of co-optation by the BDP continued in the BNF after the 1999 elections and led to the suspension of Koma and the old, socialist guards of the party. The reformers inside the BNF took over, managed to keep the party together and emphasized the more recent social democratic identity of the party. The party's position as the runner-up in Botswana's dominant party system, its ideological identity, symbolic capital, and support pattern was too well established as to be hurt too much by the loss of its long-time leader, and experience another electoral depression after 1999. It regained in strength, an increased its seat share from 15 to 21 percent in 2004 (Makgala, 2005,

316–322; Nunley, 2009, Fleischhacker, 2010, 205f) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 22).

In sum, although Botswana never experienced any disruption of its multiparty electoral regime after independence, conducted five sufficiently fair pre-third wave elections, and has one of the oldest runner-up parties in African dominant party systems, the runner-up opposition party, BNF, only managed to remain partially cohesive after impressive electoral gains in 1994. Problems of internal cohesiveness were largely owed to the blurring of its identity and socio-structural foundation due to the pre-third wave alliance of Koma with disgruntled traditional chiefs, which defected from the BDP. Together with allegations of potential co-optation of Koma by the BDP, the history of Koma's proven opportunistic tribalism gave the younger reformers inside the party arguments to revolt against Koma and the old guards. This resulted in the break-away of members, the formation of the BCP, and electoral backslide in 1999. Nonetheless, the 2004 elections, after the break-away of Koma from the party, demonstrated the organizational persistence of the BNF as the long-time runner-up in Botswana's dominant party system.

Lesotho

The founding third wave elections in Lesotho in 1993 demonstrated the survival and viability of both the BNP and the BCP as political parties and organizational units, which each embodied one side of the historic territorial cleavage. This can be ascribed to the unusual character of the authoritarian regime in Lesotho. Until the advent of the third wave, neither party was ever constitutionally forbidden, nor was a *de jure* single party state ever established. Accordingly, both parties competed in the first multiparty elections and were either associated again with pro-chieftaincy, as in the case of the BNP, or anti-chieftaincy, as in the case of the BCP. The BCP adjusted its ideological profile to the new world order, and strongly attenuated its radicalism of old times in favor of more neoliberal

rhetoric. The party mostly rallied on its historic role in achieving independence, the fact that its electoral victory of 1970 was stolen by the authoritarian BNP and by the charisma of the BCP's long-time leader, Ntsu Mokhehle (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 29f.).

Although the BNP was still generally identified as the lesser chiefs' party after 1993, its policies, increasingly centralizing governing style after 1965 as well as the collaboration with the King and senior chiefs after the 1970 coup proved otherwise and largely hurt its popularity among the rural, Roman catholic population. Furthermore, in opposition to the BCP, the BNP lacked leadership continuation. The more militant figures of the BNP were expelled from the party in the 1986 military coup. And longterm BNP-leader Jonathan died of natural causes in 1987. Rather ironically, the leader of the same coup, Justin Lekhanya, became the new BNP-deputy under the newly reconstituted party in 1991. The selection of the new BNP leader was problematic as well. Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana was a highly controversial figure among BNP members because of allegations of corruption while being minister in Jonathan's government and political opportunism during the 1986 coup. This factors together with the authoritarian history of the party proved to be a heavy burden for the founding elections (interviews with political experts and chiefs in Lesotho, 2010; Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 19f., 130f., 371f.; Southall, 1994, 113).

Not very surprisingly, the BCP scored a big win and won almost 75 percent of the vote in opposition to 22 percent for the BNP. The BNP lost almost half of its vote share in comparison with the 1965 and 1970 elections. The blurring of its identity during its authoritarian rule and the leadership discontinuation obviously hurt the party. While the vote share of the runner-up BNP was still above the average of runner-up parties in other African dominant party systems, the party did not manage to win a single seat in parliament due to the majoritarian FPTP electoral system and unfavorable spreading of

its voters (Southall, 1994, 115; Nunley, 2009). Soon after the 1993 elections, the BCP government around its prime minister Mokhehle was deposed by an opportunistic alliance of the BNP, the military and King Letsie III. The King issued a decree to dissolve the BCP government, reinstate his father, Moeshoeshoe II, and install an interim government under BNP-associated elements, among them the new BNP-leader Sekhonyana. Hence, the first electoral cycle of the third wave was already disrupted. Only combined international pressure from the governments of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa managed to force Letsie III to reinstall the BCP government (Coplan and Quinlan, 1997, 43–45; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 20).

After re-installation of the BCP, the growing age of Mokhehle fueled looming factionalism in the BCP. When Mokhehle's former colleagues threatened to oust Mokhehle from the party leadership, Mokhehle founded the *Lesotho Congress for Democracy* (LCD) and took away the majority of BCP parliamentarians as well as the party colors from the old BCP. The LCD co-opted the collective identity and organizational structure of the BCP as well, and practically left behind the old party as an empty shell. Still having the absolute majority in parliament, Mokhehle remained prime minister and his cabinet stayed intact. In advent of the 1998 elections, Mokhehle's health deteriorated and Pakalitha Mosisili became the new party leader (Southall and Fox, 1999, 675f., 692; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 30f., 164–166).

Meanwhile, the BNP associated itself with BCP-leftovers that inhabited the old BCP-shell as well as with the old, royalist MFP in order to protest the apparent change of party membership by the prime minister and most of the former BCP parliamentarians and party members. The opportunistic go-together with the BNP's erstwhile ideological antagonists did not help to restore the BNP's damaged identity and organizational cohesiveness, which was also tainted by its opportunistic alliance with Letsie III in the events around the short-lived coup after the 1993 elections. Under these confusing circumstances, the voters opted

for the incumbent party LCD, the party that was effectively the same old/new BCP with just another name, but the most close ties to the legacy of the charismatic Mokhehle, and the legacy of the old BCP. While the LCD lost some of its vote share in comparison with the vote share it attained as the old BCP in 1993, the opposition parties did not coordinate their electoral bid. The BNP experienced another electoral disaster, and won only one seat in parliament despite a vote share of 24 percent. The BCP-remainder only managed to obtain 10 percent of the votes and no seat in parliament. The elections were considered sufficiently free, and it was rather the majoritarian FPTP electoral system in combination with the unfavorable scattering of the opposition vote, which accounted for the weak opposition result. Nonetheless, the BNP leader Sekhonyana claimed electoral fraud and the opposition started to demonstrate in Maseru while BNP-associated junior ranks of the *Lesotho Defense Forces* (LDF) started a mutiny against their senior officers because they believed them to have sold out to the LCD. Lesotho became ungovernable again, and the new LCD prime minister, Mosisili, had to ask the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) for help. South African and Botswanan troops ended the mutiny and the LCD remained in power. However, the more inclusive mixed member proportional was installed for the next elections (Southall and Fox, 1999; Elklit, 2002; Southall, 2003; Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, xxxii, 20, 31, 96, 165f., 364f.; Nunley, 2009).

In 1999, the very man that staged the military coup against the BNP and Jonathan in 1986, Lekhanya, succeeded Sekhonyana as BNP leader. This alienated many old guards of the BNP, which already found it difficult to come to terms with Sekhonyana as their leader. They stopped to support the BNP, and the party deteriorated further regarding party cohesiveness. Lekhanya exchanged important party figures, and inserted fellow military colleagues into the party. Although the party did not disintegrate fully, it certainly did not became a stronger competitor for the governing LCD by that. Accordingly, the vote

Figure 23: *Blurring and fractionalization of the historic territorial cleavage during the third wave in Lesotho in 1998 and 2002*



share of the runner-up BNP did not improve in the 2002 elections. However, the party won 21 seats of the one third of the 120 parliamentary seats that was allocated through proportional representation. Hence, the BNP reached a seat share of 17.5 percent vis-à-vis the comfortable 64 percent of the dominant LCD. This was slightly above the runner-up seat share in other African dominant party systems (Rosenberg, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 20f., 157f.; Southall, 2003, 284, 288–290). (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 23).

After the 2002 elections, Lekhanya intensified his authoritarian leadership style in the BNP, and the party started to become a one-man show that increasingly lacked ties to the traditional BNP-heritage. Attempts to revitalize the party's image by some BNP members were prevented. Additionally, a split inside the dominant LCD in 2006 gave birth to a new party, the *All Basotho Convention* (ABC), which became a serious rival both for the LCD and the runner-up BNP. The charismatic minister Tom Thabane resigned from the LCD government, and founded the new party. He managed to convince 17 LCD parliamentarians and one independent to cross the floor to the ABC and forced the LCD prime minister to dissolve the parliament and call for early elections. As an important minister under

Figure 24: *Blurring and fractionalization of the historic territorial cleavage during the third wave in Lesotho in 2007*



Jonathan's authoritarian BNP government, civil secretary to the Military Council after the coup in 1986, political advisor to Mokhehle, and minister under Mosisili, he was a man of both party traditions and was part of every government since 1970. Accordingly, he managed to attract support from both sides of the historical cleavage. In the subsequent early 2007 elections, the entry of the ABC hurt the disintegrating BNP more than it hurt the LCD, which still had the advantage of incumbency to counter the electoral attack. The BNP's vote share dropped from 22 percent in 2002 to less than 7 percent in 2007 while the ABC became the new runner-up opposition party in Lesotho's dominant party system. With only three seats in parliament and further factionalization problems after 2007, the BNP ceased to play a significant role in Lesotho politics (Rosenber, Weisfelder and Frisbie-Fulton, 2004, 387f.; interviews with political experts and former BNP militants in Lesotho, 2010) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 24).

In sum, although the organizational embodiments of the two sides of the historic territorial cleavage were present in Lesotho's first third wave election, the two parties were not able to alter the trend of increasingly blurred ideological identities and patterns of disintegration that were already present during the pre-third wave phase. The BCP/LCD side, which embodied the original progressive-centrist side of the territorial cleavage, had the advantage to compete the founding third wave elections under its long-time, charis-

matic leader, Mokhehle, and to be untainted by the corruption of the authoritarian BNP government in the pre-third wave phase. In addition to its damaged identity after 23 year of authoritarianism, the BNP also lacked charismatic leadership after the death of Jonathan and lost the founding third wave elections to the BCP. Clearly, in a context of general organizational disintegration and damaged collective identities, the opposition party is henceforth in a weaker position than the incumbent party, which has access to patronage in order to hold the party together. Hence, the BNP started its slow decline after its electoral defeat in 1993, while the BCP/LCD managed to hold its absolute majority together after its electoral triumph despite significant turmoils in advent of the subsequent 1998 and 2007 elections, which both signified looming cohesiveness problems as well.

Ghana

The first presidential elections of the third wave in Ghana were scheduled for November 3, 1992, the parliamentary elections for December 29, 1992 (subsequent third wave elections in Ghana were held simultaneously). As in the 1979 elections, political parties were not allowed to use names and symbols of parties that contested previous Ghanaian elections. Nonetheless, as soon as the ban on political parties was lifted in the advent of the founding elections, the unusual anti-Rawlings and pro-democracy alliance between the two dominant party traditions came to its end and parties were formed again according to the structuring logic of the historic territorial cleavage. While the Danquah-Busia side managed to hold its tradition together in one cohesive political party organization, and formed the *New Patriotic Party* (NPP), the Nkrumahist tradition splintered into different party offshoots, the *National Convention Party* (NCP), the *People's Heritage Party* (PHP), the *National Independence Party* (NIP) and *People's National Convention* (PNC). Rawlings' PNDC and the associated grass-roots committees transformed into a third force, the *National Democratic Congress* (NDC), which co-opted Nkrumahist elements and supporters (Jeffries

and Thomas, 1993, 338, 343; Nugent, 1995, 222–226; Jonah, 1998, 95; Boafo-Arthur, 2003, 219; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 300; Osei, 2012, 111).

The Danquah-Busiaist's cohesion was stronger because it could rely on an ideologic identity, which was still relevant after the end of the Cold War and more real than ever, i.e. the promotion of Western liberal capitalism and the party's pro-democracy stance since the last years of the Nkrumah-era. The cohesion of the NPP's leadership was strong and rather immune to defections because of the mutual experience of political persecution during the Rawlings era. The NPP explicitly referred to its Danquah-Busia heritage and drew most of its leadership and support from Akan regions, former PP and PFP supporters, as well as business people. In an effort to mitigate its Akan bias, the party decided on Albert Adu Boahen, a retired university professor, to be the presidential candidate. Boahen had family roots in both the Ashanti and the Eastern region. He was a prominent figure in the pro-democracy movement against the PNDC and Rawlings and therefore a natural choice for the founding third wave elections. (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 346; Nugent, 1995, 223f.; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107; Owusu-Ansah, 2005, 184; Ayee, 2008, 192).

The heirs of the Nkrumahist tradition were less cohesive and were handicapped both by a somewhat outdated collective identity after the end of the Cold War, a generational conflict between the old guards and the younger elements inside the tradition and the fact that Rawlings and the PNDC successfully co-opted some of the Nkrumahists' programmatic heritage and a fraction of Nkrumahists itself during their 11 years of authoritarian rule. Younger elements of the Nkrumahist opposition to Rawlings transformed the Nkrumahist tradition into the *People's Heritage Party* (PHP). The old guards of the CPP and the Nkrumahist embodiments of the 1969 and 1979 elections, the NAL and the PNP, however, soon formed the *National Independence Party* (NIP). Yet, the former president of the third republic (1979–1981), Limann did not accept that he was not envisioned to be the presidential candidate for the NIP. Consequently, he defected from the NIP and formed

the third Nkrumahist party, the *People's National Convention* (PNC), which guaranteed his nomination, of course. The fourth Nkrumahist party that was formed in advent of 1992 election, the *National Convention Party* (NCP), was the very embodiment of the blurring between the Nkrumahist parties and the PNDC. Some members of the NCP were close to the PNDC and regarded Rawlings as a modern version of Nkrumah himself. (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 343–345; Nugent, 1995, 220–229; Fleischhacker, 2010, 107f.)

The PNDC and the party to which it transformed after the lift of the political party ban, the *National Democratic Congress* (NDC), had an inherent advantage as it controlled the transition agenda. Amongst others, it used the intermediary period between the initiation of the transition process until the final lift of the ban on political activity and the formation of political parties, which was relatively closely scheduled in advent of the elections, to already covertly campaign and use government resources under the pretext of conducting normal government business. In advent of the 1992 elections, Rawlings made great efforts to co-opt the Nkrumah heritage for himself and his new party, the NDC. Amongst others, he inaugurated an Nkrumah mausoleum, and he convinced the Nkrumahist NCP, alongside the grassroots supporter party of Rawlings, EGLE (*Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere*), to form an electoral alliance with the NDC and support Rawlings' presidential bid. The NDC also adopted some of the Nkrumahist rhetoric and chants in rallies. Rawlings toured the more rural parts of the country and denounced the intellectualism of most notably the NPP, but also parts of the Nkrumahist heirs that did not ally themselves with the NDC. In rather populist manner, Rawlings claimed that he would rule in the interest of the common man (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 340, 347, 358; Nugent, 1995, 218, 229–232; Elischer, 2013, 176) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 25).

The presidential elections of 1992 resulted in a clear victory for Rawlings with 58 percent of the votes. The overall result pattern did not deviate from the 1969 and 1979

Figure 25: *Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in Ghana 1992*



elections as it displayed an opposition support of 30 percent for the candidate who came second in place, this time Boahen of the Danquah-Busiaist NPP. His runner-up vote share is almost double the average of other founding third wave elections in African dominant party systems and most certainly can be attributed to the historic support pattern and the organizational cohesiveness of the Danquah-Busiaist tradition. Boahen was most successful in the Ashanti region as well as among the urban middle-class, a pattern similar to the Danquah-Busiaist NLM in the 1956 elections. The Nkrumahist parties, however, were devastatingly defeated. The three Nkrumahist presidential candidates of the PNC, NIP and PHP only reached a combined 11 percent of the total vote. The regional voting pattern showed that they even lost in regions, which used to be Nkrumahist strongholds in the 1969 and 1979 elections, most notably the Volta region. Rather Rawlings' disaggregated results resembled the ethno-regionally cross-cutting appeal of previous Nkrumahist parties like the PNP of 1979 and the CPP itself during the 1950s. Rawlings reached 50 percent or more in all regions besides the Ashanti region and gained 93 percent support in the Volta region. Rawlings was most successful among rural voters and the urban poor. Quite clearly, the NDC's co-optation of the Nkrumahist heritage and some of the Nkrumahist elites and supporters worked in favor of Rawlings and the NDC in the context of factionalizing Nkrumahist heirs (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, 355–358; Nugent, 1995, 232–234; Nunley, 2009).

The opposition parties claimed fraud and boycotted the subsequent 1992 parliamentary elections. It is difficult to verify their allegation. Certainly, the presidential elections were not fair due to the skewed playing field in advent of the elections, but the polling day itself was rather free. Occasional electoral fraud did happen in some polling stations, but international observers did not witness systematic fraud and accepted the results. In general, the literature on Ghana's 1992 elections is undecided about the decisiveness of electoral fraud for the final results (cf. Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, Nugent, 1995, 234–242;

Levitsky and Way, 2010, 302). Whatever the case may be, the parliamentary elections were only contested by Rawlings' NDC and its allied parties, the Nkrumahist NCP and the EGLE-party. With 189 seats for the NDC, eight seats for the NCP, one seat for the EGLE, and two independents, the parliament lacked any parliamentary opposition party for the next four years and became practically a "rubber stamp" legislature (Nugent, 1995, 248f.; Nunley, 2009).

In an attempt to increase the international legitimacy of Ghana's young electoral democracy, the NDC government invested in the independence and capacity of the electoral commission and the courts after 1992. Nonetheless, the playing field remained skewed to some degree in favor of the the governing NDC in advent of the 1996 elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 303f.). The Nkrumahist parties – as a lesson of the 1992 disaster – tried to unite their forces and the NIP and the PHP merged to become the PCP (*People's Convention Party*). However, they did not manage to convince the Nkrumahist PNC of Limann of the necessity of unity. The new Nkrumahist PCP even supported the NPP's renewed presidential bid in acknowledgment of the Danquah-Busiaist NPP's contemporary superior opposition strength. The NPP was confident that it could win this time against Rawlings and the NDC. The NPP explicitly drew its confidence from the fact that the Danquah-Busia tradition managed to produce an electoral victory in 1969 and accomplished respectful runner-up results in the 1979 and the 1992 elections. This confidence together with the organizational and ideological cohesiveness of the Danquah-Busia tradition held both the party leadership and the rank and file together for another round of elections and provided immunity against major defections and factionalizations after 1992. The NDC, in turn, increasingly capitalized on the charisma of Rawlings himself and the visibility of modernization projects and rural development throughout the country. The NDC tried to create the same atmosphere of departure as the CPP did under the charis-

Figure 26: *Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in Ghana 1996*



matic Nkrumah in the early 1960s (Nugent, 1999, 291–304; Osei, 2012, 112f.) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 26).

The results of the 1996 presidential results practically echoed the 1992 results. Rawlings won by 57 percent of the vote. The NPP came second again, but its candidate, John Kufuor, managed to increase the vote share to 40 percent. In parliament, the NDC obtained 133 seats and the NPP 60 seats of the 200. This time, the opposition accepted the results. In the subsequent 2000 elections, Rawlings was barred by the constitution to stand for elections a third time, and his less-charismatic hand-picked successor, John Evans Atta Mills, had a much harder task to compete against John Kufuor of the NPP. In most narrow fashion, the NPP and John Kufuor won both the the presidential and parliamentary election, and effectively ended the dominant party system of Ghana. The party system materialized to become the two-party system it already resembled during the 1990s, and the 1969 and 1979 elections. Through the person of Atta Mills, Rawlings remained the NDC strong man and managed to keep the party together despite the defeat in the 2000 elections (cf. Nugent, 1999, 305–316). The 2004 and 2008 elections consolidated the Ghanaian two-

Figure 27: *Legacy of historic territorial cleavage in third wave party system structuring in Ghana 2000, 2004 and 2008*



party system, embodied in the NPP and the NDC. The NDC effectively established itself as the third force in the political history of Ghana, thanks to the successful co-optation of the Nkrumahist' legacy, and the disintegration of the actual Nkrumahist heirs (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 27).

In sum, the "more than medium establishment" of the historic territorial cleavage in Ghana between independence and the advent of the third wave provided rich symbolic and ideological capital, on which the runner-up opposition party, the Danquah-Busiaist NPP, could rely in the context of a dominant governing party. It ensured both a stable support basis and a cohesive party organization, which secured an over-average runner-up presidential election result despite the skewed playing field and alleged electoral fraud. The same factors prevented the disintegration of the opposition between the founding third wave elections and the second third wave elections, and led to an even more impressive runner-up result for the NPP. This cleared the way for turnover in the 2000 elections and the end of the Ghanaian dominant party system. At the same time, the NDC acquired enough symbolic and ideological capital itself due to the co-optation of some amount of

the Nkrumahist heritage and the charisma of Rawlings, whose historical stature echoed the one of Nkrumah. Hence, it managed to avoid disintegration after the loss of dominance, which eventually led to the second turnover through the ballot in Ghana's history in 2008 and the further institutionalization of Ghana's two-party system.

Mali

The founding third wave elections of Mali in 1992 marked the end of almost 30 years without minimally competitive multiparty-elections. The two parties that turned out to be the most successful in the 1992 parliamentary elections were two former allies and broad-based pro-democracy movements, which turned into political parties in advent of the elections. The ADEMA (*Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice*) gained a comfortable absolute majority with 65 percent seat share. The runner-up, the *Congrès National d'Initiative Démocratique* (CNID), only gained 7 percent seat share, which is well below the runner-up average in African dominant party systems (Vengroff, 1993, 544–549; Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 12f., 252; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 28).

The ADEMA was rather a broad-based coalition of clandestine political grouping during the Moussa Traoré regime than an established political party with historical roots. It cooperated with student groups and unions in the pro-democracy demonstrations against the Traoré regime. Its militants were teachers and health professionals. The party also included some reformists from Moussa Traoré's dissolved UDPM. The leader and founder of the ADEMA, Alpha Oumar Konaré, won the presidential elections for the party two months after the parliamentary elections. The former archeology professor was for a brief period minister of youth, arts and culture in Moussa Traoré's regime, but resigned soon after a dispute with Moussa Traoré. The success of the party was mostly owed to the superior communications network it could establish through its well-educated teacher and

Figure 28: *Third wave party system structuring in a political vacuum: Mali 1992*



health professionals that were deployed throughout the country. And the party rather profited from the charisma of its leader and the role that it played during the pro-democracy demonstrations. An established collective identity or identifiable socio-structural foundation was largely absent (Vengroff, 1993, 546; Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 12f., 180–183, van Vliet, 2013).

The runner-up in the 1992 elections, the CNID, had a more narrow support base, which largely consisted of urban students. The party lacked the ADEMA's country-wide network, and was only successful in cities and its leader Mountaga Tall's home area around Ségou. Mountaga Tall, a lawyer, was relatively young and lacked ties to any of the pre-third wave parties. After the elections, the party became a vocal opposition to the ADEMA-government. In advent of the 1997 elections, internal disputes over co-optation efforts by the ADEMA, led to the expulsion of 10 committee members of the CNID and the formation of a CNID-offshoot, the PARENA (*Parti Pour la Renaissance Nationale*). As the CNID lacked electoral success, and could neither rely on an element of collective cohesion nor a defining socio-structural foundation, it was not surprising the party could not prevent

Figure 29: *Third wave party system structuring in a political vacuum: Mali 1997*



factionalism. While the PARENA agreed to co-optation by the ADEMA government in advent of the 1997 elections, the CNID, together with other opposition parties, boycotted the second running of the 1997 presidential and parliamentary elections after irregularities that led to the annulation of the first running of the elections by the constitutional court. It is dubious whether these irregularities were systematically in favor of the governing ADEMA. Public opinion polls showed that the ADEMA was still very popular, anyway. Certainly, the boycott was contra-productive for the CNID and most of the opposition parties as it increased ADEMA's dominance. ADEMA won 87 percent of the seats in parliament and Konaré was easily reelected. The CNID-offspring, PARENA, became the runner-up party with only eight of the 147 seats in parliament (Vengroff, 1993, 547; Smith, 2001, 74f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 62f., 237, 239, 252; Nunley, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 298) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 29).

Interestingly, even the ADEMA's electoral success and de facto dominant position was not sufficient to secure the organizational cohesiveness in advent of the 2002 election. Because of the two-term limit, Konaré was barred from running for the presidency again.

Figure 30: *Third wave party system structuring in a political vacuum: Mali 2002*



This triggered a succession crisis, which led to the formation of the party, *Rassemblement Pour le Mali* (RPM) under the leadership of the ADEMA's ex-prime minister and party baron, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta ("IBK"). Together with IBK, 38 ADEMA parliamentarians defected to the new RPM, and supported IBK as presidential candidate. The former coup leader of 1991, Amadou Toumani Touré ("ATT"), entered the presidential race as well. He ran as an independent candidate with no intentions to form a political party. Factionalism inside the ADEMA was so deep that many remaining politicians inside the ADEMA, including Konaré, supported ATT instead of ADEMA's official candidate, Soumaïla Cissé. PARENA, the runner-up of the 1997 elections, which was in alliance with ADEMA, defected as well, and fielded its own presidential candidate for 2002. Under these adversary circumstances, ADEMA lost both the presidency to ATT and its absolute majority in parliament, i.e. the de facto dominant party system could not consolidate, and Mali became a multi-party system (Smith, 2001, 74; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 239, 256; Nunley, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 297–299) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 30).

Figure 31: *Third wave party system structuring in a political vacuum: Mali 2007*



After 2002, the volatility of the opposition party system of the 1990s spread out to the Malian party system as a whole. While the ADEMA remained the political party with the most seats in parliament, it did not manage to return to its absolute majority of the 1990s in the 2007 elections. Rather it factionalized further, and gave birth to another party, the *Union pour la République et la Démocratie* (URD). The RPM, in turn, did not manage to repeat its success of 2002. An impressive number of 15 parties gained seats in the 2007 elections (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 31).

As a president without a political party, ATT intended to minimize parliamentary dissent and followed ADEMA's co-optation tactics, which it applied in advent of the 1997 election. Accordingly, ATT included as many parties as possible in an oversized coalition government. In doing this, he effectively deprived Mali's parliament of an opposition. Despite 15 political parties in parliament and 5.32 "effective" political parties, the Malian electoral regime started to resemble a "no-party democracy". And even more than before, political parties in Mali resembled electoral clubs rather than distinct political entities (Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 330; Nunley, 2009; Fleischhacker, 2010, 127; Levitsky and Way, 2010, 299). It can be argued that the lack of institutionalized forums of opposition

in ATT's "consensus" democracy was one of the triggering factors for the military coup in March 2012 and the end of Mali's electoral democracy (cf. van Eerd, 2012).

It is important to note that the two historic parties of Mali's first pre-independence elections, the progressive-centralist US-RDA and the conservative-peripheral PPS/PSP reappeared in the first third wave elections of 1992. After the formation of political parties was legalized following the coup in 1991, old Marxist hard-liners and associates of Modibo Keita re-formed the former sole legal party, US-RDA. However, ideologic factionalism between the Marxist hard-liners and moderate reformers, which was already present during the last years of Modibo Keita's single-party regime, soon re-flared and weakened the party. Amongst others, the party contested the 1992 presidential elections with two candidates! This proved to be very disadvantageous for a party, whose grass-roots organization and support basis have been damaged, and its identity seriously blurred by 23 years of suppression under Moussa Traoré's military regime, anyway. In the parliamentary elections of 1992, the party did not manage to become the runner-up. After the elections, the more successful of the two US-RDA presidential candidates, Tiéoulé Mamadou Konaté, son of the co-founder of the historic US-RDA, Mamadou Konaté, formed his own party, the *Bloc pour la Démocratie et l'Intégration Africaine* (BDIA). Hence, the younger Konaté voluntarily forgone the possibility to further profit from the remainders of the historical capital of the US-RDA. Not very surprisingly, both the BDIA and the remains of the US-RDA became insignificant in the subsequent third wave elections (Vengroff, 1993, 546f. 554f.; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 331f.; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party system structuring maps in figures 28 and 29).

A historian, Sékéné Sissoko, tried to profit from the historical legacy of the old conservative-peripheral PPS/PSP, and re-founded the party after the coup in 1991. However, besides organizational and financial problems, the party lacked any real ties to the old PPS, which was first co-opted and the effectively destroyed already around independence by the

US-RDA and Modibo Keita. Accordingly, the party only won two parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections, and fell into oblivion afterwards (Vengroff, 1993, 548, 553; Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 240; Nunley, 2009) (cf. with party system structuring map in figure 28).

In sum, 29 years of authoritarianism, which totally destroyed the conservative-peripheral heritage of the territorial cleavage and seriously blurred and damaged the organizational and ideological capital of the progressive-centrist side for its heirs to successfully rely on, led to a de facto dominant party system in the 1990s, which was not confronted by a challenging opposition at all. Interestingly, the lack of any cohesiveness-promoting element as some sort of collective identity, distinct socio-structural foundation or symbolic-historical capital even proved to be a problem for the dominant governing party ADEMA. In the following of the succession crisis in advent of the 2002 elections, the party seriously factionalized, and lost both its absolute majority and the presidency. Most symptomatically, the new president, ATT, was an independent candidate, did not intend to found a political party, and rendered the meaning of the word "party" almost to insignificance by his consensus governing style, which virtually deprived the Malian state of any parliamentary opposition and rendered political parties to mere "electoral clubs".

Concluding Comparison

The comparative-historical analysis of four crucial cases confirmed the large-N results of the previous section of the book. If salient legacies of cleavages manage to survive until the advent of the third wave, they make opposition parties more cohesive and stabilize their support pattern despite the unfavorable circumstances of a dominant party system in the context of relatively young electoral regimes and relatively low modernization levels. Opposition parties in third wave dominant party systems that can rely on historic ideological and symbolic capital are comparatively more successful and stable than opposition

parties that have to compete with the dominant party from scratch. They profit from an established 'brand identity' that increases voters' trust in both programmatic mobilization strategies as well as clientelistic promises. On the one hand, voters become more receptive to programmatic offers, on the other hand, they are more likely to suspend demands for immediate disbursement of clientelistic promises.

While survival of the historic territorial cleavage in Mali was almost impossible due to 29 years without multiparty elections, and rather stable authoritarianism, and survival in Botswana was more easy, because the electoral cycle was never interrupted since the first pre-independence elections, a juxtaposition of the cases of Lesotho and Ghana teaches us additional lessons: It is rather the element of collective identity of the territorial cleavage, which has to survive over time for third wave party system structuring to viably rely on than the actual survival of the organizational shell and/or party name. In Ghana, the authoritarian phase was interrupted by two democratic interregnums, which forced politicians to reinvigorate the collective and symbolic identity related to the historic territorial cleavage and helped to sustain cleavage-based party system structuring. In Lesotho, in turn, no such democratic interregnum took place during the authoritarian phase and the lack of electoral competition for the hegemonic one-party as well as the opposition in exile/insurgent underground led to the fading of the respective collective and symbolic identity despite the survival of the organizational shell and party names of the two sides of the historic cleavage. Accordingly, the organizational embodiments lacked cohesiveness as soon as their party founders died; in opposition to Ghana where the two organizational embodiments of the historic cleavage remained cohesive despite frequent leadership rotations. Hence, although Lesotho started on a much more promising path after independence than Mali, and experienced three pre-third wave elections between 1960 and 1970, its uninterrupted authoritarian phase between 1970 and 1993 was nonetheless long enough to

destroy the legacy of the historic cleavage too much for third wave parties to effectively rely on.

As the first two third wave elections in Ghana have shown, legacies of historic cleavages provide opposition parties with non-material sources of cohesiveness in the difficult context of competition with a dominant party that has access to state resources and is – to some degree – able to skew the playing field in party competition in its favor. Moreover, legacies of historic cleavages ensure that a party as an organization "stands for something", socializes voters into the political system, and develops a life of its own as an organization that is independent from dominant party figures. In a similar vein, Botswana's long-time runner-up opposition party, BNF, survived as a viable organization despite losing eight elections in a row. It even maintained its runner-up position despite the defection of its charismatic long-time leader and other important figures from the party, as well as the subsequent formation of a splinter party.

Specificially, the analysis showed that non-material sources of cohesiveness ensure that elites do not defect from the opposition to the dominant party after electoral defeats, let themselves co-opt or regularly spark disintegrating factionalism in the party. Moreover, it ensures that parties 'stand for something', i.e., have a 'brand identity' and are a more trustworthy choice for voters despite the fact that opposition parties cannot prove their clientelistic or valence potential in advance of the elections, but instead have to rely on promises. If the historic cleavage still shapes the party system, voters are socialized into to these structures, which increases their loyalty to the party they have voted for, even if they belong to the looser side for several elections in a row. While this certainly allows opposition parties to compete more viably with the dominant party on the terrain of clientelism and valence issues, it also allows opposition parties to invest more effectively in conflictive position-taking programmatic mobilization. Position-taking voter mobilization, in turn, allows competition on an equal standing with the dominant party, and enhances

the programmatic responsiveness of the dominant party itself, as well as the party system overall.

While transition to a multiparty electoral regime in Lesotho at the beginning of the third wave was almost exclusively initiated by international pressure, pro-democracy protest movements in Mali and Ghana had their share in inducing democratic change. However, Malian protest groups did neither rely on a broad common socio-structural basis, nor did they develop an element of collective identity besides their common goal of ending Moussa Traoré's regime. In Ghana, in turn, pro-democracy protest formed alongside the temporary alliance of the heirs of the historic territorial cleavage. Yet, Ghanaian protest groups, apart from the historic party traditions, did not manage to form an original third and viable organization besides the Nkrumahist and Daquah-Busiaist heirs. They lacked an original collective identity apart form their broad demand for political liberalization. In this respect, the analysis demonstrates that the third wave cannot be regarded as a critical juncture that triggers new cleavage formation and sets party system developments in countries apart due to different strengths and constellations of protest movements. Instead, it is the complete lack (Mali) and the relative lack of viable legacies of cleavage-based party system structuring (Lesotho) vis-à-vis the survival of significant legacies of cleavages (Botswana and Ghana) that account for varieties in party system structuring and opposition party system competitiveness degrees during the third wave. This, in turn, can be explained by the common occurrence of the first critical juncture of first pre-independence elections in combination with variance regarding the occurrence, timing and character of the second critical juncture of installation of post-independence authoritarianism.

The analysis of the four cases shows that a salient legacy of cleavages is not only important for the cohesiveness of opposition parties, but also for the cohesiveness of the dominant party itself. The cases of Lesotho and most notably Mali show that if the dominant party is not confronted by a relatively strong opposition relying on historical

capital, it has not enough incentive to uphold its own cohesiveness despite its resource advantages in terms of "buying" internal consent. Especially in times of succession crises, which is exemplified by both Mali and Lesotho, a dominant party that lacks non-material sources of cohesiveness to keep succumbed succession-aspiring elites in line has serious difficulties to avoid disintegration. On the one hand, this finding is in line with studies that emphasize the importance of organizational power of the incumbent party in order to avoid electoral turnovers in hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). On the other hand, my analysis also contributes evidence to a recent study by LeBas (2011), which underlines the fact that the non-material cohesiveness of incumbent parties is partially endogenous to the existence of a strong and cohesive opposition challenging the incumbent party. Yet, in contrast to my main argument, LeBas relates the strength of its pivotal case, the main opposition party in Zimbabwe, *Movement of Democratic Change* (MDC), to the existence of pre-third wave corporatism and contingency in strategic choice, rather than to legacies of independence cleavages.

Levitsky and Way's (2010) theoretical framework cannot explain Ghana's democratization and the underutilization of authoritarian means of power in Botswana. In contrast to Levitsky and Way, my analysis shows that cohesive incumbent parties are not necessarily stumbling blocks for democratic consolidation and eventual future democratic turnovers, and that cohesive opposition parties matter in this process. In both Botswana and Ghana, incumbent (dominant) parties base their cohesiveness to a substantial degree on (co-opted, in the case of Ghana) legacies of cleavages. And in both cases, cohesiveness gave incumbent parties the self-confidence to underutilize authoritarian means of power and allowed them to induce improvements in terms of democratic party competition. Yet, a dominant governing party is more likely to reinvigorate available non-material sources of cohesion if it is forced by a cohesive opposition to do so.

Paradoxically, although incumbency change is per se more likely in cases like Mali in 2002 – and Lesotho in 2012 – where the dominant party is less cohesive due to the lack of salient legacies of cleavages and a weak opposition, the multiparty systems that were born out of these constellations proved to be volatile and un-structured, and did not lead to improvements in the fairness of party competition and full democratization so far, as in the case of Lesotho (cf. van Eerd, forthcoming), or even to regime breakdown, as in the case of the military coup in Mali in 2012. Hence, although incumbency change is more difficult in cases like Ghana, where the dominant party was cohesive, it leads to less volatile and more structured multi-party systems that give voters the necessary orientation and lead to democratic consolidation. Due to its (co-opted) historic source of non-material cohesiveness, the dominant party in Ghana did not disintegrate after losing elections, as in the cases of Senegal and Kenya, but ensured the continued responsiveness of the (new) governing party. Hence, although incumbency change seems more difficult in Botswana, if it happens, I would expect Botswana's party system rather to follow Ghana's path towards full democratic consolidation than Lesotho's volatile path or even Mali's path of regime-disintegration due to the legacies of cleavages that are present in Botswana's party system and a more cohesive opposition party.

In addition, the analysis shows that it does not matter whether the peripheral or the center-side of the territorial cleavage turned out to be the victorious side during the birth of the historic party system around independence. Opposition parties were stronger in the third wave dominant party systems of both Ghana, where the historic center-side was victorious, and in Botswana, where the historic peripheral side was victorious. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that historic peripheral parties in power have to find a way to deal with the inherent contradictions of building a modern, centralized state, and keep their winning coalition with representatives of the traditional system of rule and their rural clientele together; something that obviously worked better in the case of Botswana than in the case

of Lesotho. The peripheral side in Ghana, in turn, profited from an alliance with moderate, center-aspiring and educated elites, which ensured the viability of the Danquah-Busiaist party tradition in the long run.

Furthermore, it does not matter whether countries were underdeveloped at the time of independence, as in the case of Botswana, or comparatively developed, as in the case Ghana, to result in the survival of legacies of cleavages until the third wave and more competitive opposition parties. In the case of Botswana, underdevelopment presumably was even an advantage due the lack of security forces and means of coercive power, which decreased the appeal of authoritarian entrenchment and foreclosed the possibility of military coups during Botswana's first decade of independence.

Lastly, ethnic cleavages played a considerable role in Ghana while the makeup of the ethnic structure in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali rendered ethnopolitical mobilization a less useful tool for electoral competition. The analysis of Ghana shows that an ethnic cleavage between Ashanti and Ewe developed since the democratic interregnum of 1969 that aligned itself to the dominant territorial cleavage. The moderate center-periphery alliance of the territorial cleavage already used to have an increasing Ashanti-Akan bias since the second pre-independence election in 1954. While the progressive center-side managed to cross-cut ethnic cleavages during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, it failed to do so in the 1969 elections, which resulted in the most ethnically structured elections in Ghana's history. The center-side managed to regain its ethnically cross-cutting appeal in the next democratic interregnum of 1979, however, whereas the moderate center-periphery alliance won most of its votes in the Ashanti region. With the beginning of the third wave in Ghana, the moderate center-periphery alliance mitigated its Ashanti-bias, and managed to attract voters beyond its traditional voter base, which eventually led to its electoral victory in 2000. Hence, despite the more important role ethnicity played in the structuring of the party system of Ghana than in Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, ethnicity

became never as salient in structuring political conflict as in cases like Kenya, or worse, Rwanda and Burundi. Ghanaian elections never had the character of an ethnic census, as the two dominant party-traditions always won considerable vote shares in each others' ethno-regional strongholds.

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5 Party System Responsiveness in Four African Cases

In the following, I want to test whether the survival of the historic territorial cleavage and the consequential presence of a more competitive third wave opposition party (system) in the context of a dominant party system is actually conducive to a programmatically more responsive third wave party system overall. After all, section 2 presented evidence that the presence of a competitive opposition party (system) enhances the general quality of democracy in African dominant party systems. Note that I do not expect that third wave parties still explicitly formulate concrete policies associated with the historic territorial cleavage. Rather, I expect the survival of the historic structure to be conducive to the successful representation of *new* conflicts and issues.

In this section, I focus on a more specific measure of the quality of democracy in an electoral democracy than in section 2, where I relied on Freedom House's *Civil Liberties* index. I analyze the degree of *party system responsiveness*, i.e., the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic offers, and the congruence between partisan voters' policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences. I measure the responsiveness degree in the small-N case selection, which I defined in the previous section of the book (on p. 117), i.e. the dominant party systems of Botswana and Lesotho, as well as the former dominant party systems of Ghana and Mali. According to my historic comparative analysis of the survival of legacies of cleavages in section 4 of the book, as well as my theoretical model and the evidence presented in section 2, I expect to find higher party system responsiveness degrees in the contemporary party systems of Botswana and Ghana than the contemporary party systems of Lesotho and Mali (cf. with section 2. Figure 9 on p. 132 summarizes the expectations for the four selected cases). Both Botswana's contemporary and Ghana's former dominant party system feature a relatively strong and institutionalized opposition party (system), structured according to the historic territorial

cleavage, whereas in Lesotho and Mali, opposition parties were relatively weak and/or non-institutionalized during the third wave and their party systems not effectively structured according to the historic territorial cleavage. Consequently, the former party systems of Ghana and Mali transformed into non-dominant party systems that were competitive and institutionalized in Ghana and highly volatile in Mali.

It is important to compare Botswana and Lesotho with two cases of the group of contemporary non-dominant party systems, because non-dominant party systems are so far generally regarded as favorable for democratic consolidation in the literature. They set the benchmark against which any positive assessment of a dominant party system has to be tested. The two contemporary non-dominant party systems of Ghana and Mali are ideal cases to compare with Botswana and Lesotho because they used to be dominant party systems themselves during the first decade of the third wave (see case selection in section 4).

Operationalization, Data and Method for Party System Responsiveness Analysis

In the following, I discuss the details of the operationalization of party system responsiveness, which will be measured by the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic offers and the assessment of the degree of congruence between partisan voters and party representatives' issue positions. The data will be discussed ensuing.

Operationalization and Method

"Party system responsiveness" is an important yardstick to assess the quality of democracy in African electoral regimes, as argued in section 1 (cf. Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2004). I conceptualize party system responsiveness as the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' pro-

grammatic offers, as well as the congruence between partisan voters' policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). The measurement relies on self-collected elite survey data and Afrobarometer (2008) data in Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana and Mali.

Programmatic party system responsiveness will be operationalized by looking into the clarity and distinctiveness of parties' programmatic offers and preferences and the degree of congruence between voter's policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences: Do politicians as members of a political party have significantly distinct preferences over a set of relevant policy dimensions and issues in relation to politicians of other political parties? And do voters who intend to vote for the very same party have congruent preferences in relation to the politicians of that party? The analysis will show whether competing parties significantly diverge from each other regarding different policy preferences and offerings, and if this divergence corresponds with the diverging policy preferences of their respective partisan voters (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005).

In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of issues and dimensions, it is important to empirically determine the relevant dimensions of contemporary conflict in a country. Otherwise, distinctiveness and congruence among and between partisan representatives and their respective partisan voters could be a product of chance. Hence, it is important to assess the degree of congruence in policy dimensions, which actually set political parties apart, i.e. are relevant for political conflict in a country. In doing so, I focus on the "supply"-side of democratic politics rather than the initial preferences of the voters and the degree to which parties respond to their demands. If parties do not stand for something in the first place, it will be difficult for citizens to identify representatives that promote their policy preferences. This focus corresponds with the cleavage approach that has been developed in the previous two parts of the book. Cleavages at independence structure party systems and channel historic political conflict. If legacies of cleavage survive until

the third wave, it is very likely that present issues of conflict are channeled along the same historic cleavage lines, and new voter generations are socialized accordingly; regardless wether the initial issues of the historic cleavages are still salient (cf. Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bornschier, 2012a).

Hence, the first step of the analysis has to identify policy dimensions that set contemporary parties in the four cases apart. The second step analyzes whether the same dimensions also set the voters in the four countries apart. The final step assesses the actual degree of congruence between voters and their political representatives (cf. Bornschier, 2012a). For that matter, only congruence that is based on salient distinctness on both the elite and the voter side can be trusted. Because the analysis focuses on the "supply"-side of democratic politics, I value significant distinctness on the party representative's side higher than significant distinctness on the voter side.

The first step relies on discriminant analysis to determine which issues structure party membership on the party representatives' side. When results lack significance in general, the issue bundles are taken that yield the best results of all issues analyzed.[67] The second step uses analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess whether party membership significantly explains the most relevant issue bundle, i.e., parties are significantly set apart. Subsequent, the analysis investigates whether partisan voters are significantly set apart as well by the issues deemed relevant in the analysis of the party representatives' issue positions. The final step qualitatively assesses the match of congruence by visually comparing the mean positions of the partisan representatives of the same party and the mean positions of their respective partisan voters. Note, that the positions of the party representatives and partisan voters are not measured on the same scale. Hence, congruence can only be interpreted in relative terms (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005; Bornschier, 2012a).[68]

[67]Insignificance will most likely be the case in the discriminant analyses of the party representatives' positions and should not be taken at face value considering the low number of respondents in the dataset.

[68]The visualization method follows Bornschier (2010, 2012a).

Data

To measure the degree of partisan distinctiveness among political representatives and among the electorate, as well as the congruence between the two sets of respondents, the analysis relies on original elite survey data for the party representatives' side and Afrobarometer survey data for the partisan voters' side. The elite data is extracted from interviews with parliamentarians and other party representatives, which have been conducted by the author in Botswana and Lesotho in 2010, and in Ghana and Mali in 2012. Politicians from the three most relevant parties (two parties in the case of Ghana) – regarding seat and vote share in the last parliamentary elections – were asked to position themselves in their function as official representatives of their party on different policy issues.[69] In Botswana, Lesotho and Mali, three elite respondents have been selected for the two most relevant parties (BDP and BNF, LCD and ABC, as well as ADEMA and RPM) and two respondents for the third-most relevant party (BCP, BNP and URD), which results in eight respondents per country. In the case of Ghana, five respondents were selected for the opposition party, NPP, and three respondents for the governing party, NDC.[70] To account for the relatively small sample of party elites, the selection of respondents followed the general ambition to include a mixture of influential party cadre, ministers and important parliamentarians (some in double function) with rural and urban background per each party. The most proximal mass survey data available for all four countries, in turn, is Afrobarometer Round 4, which was conducted in 2008.

The questions in the survey of party representatives focus on four items related to the economic policy dimension and two questions that tackle non-economic issues. Table 10

[69] The issues asked correspond with Kitschelt (2009).

[70] Unfortunately, it proved to be very difficult to successfully agree on interview dates with more politicians from the NDC, and achieve a more balanced sample in Ghana.

Table 10: *Matched Policy Dimensions for Elite Level and Voter Level*

Policy dimension	*Elite level*	*Voter level*
Economic Issues:		
Economic Liberalism	Support for or opposition against state intervention in private economic activity. Self-placement on the left or right of the national political spectrum.	Support or opposition against economic recovery programs and privatization efforts. Support or opposition against increasing influence of international businesses and investors on government.
Welfare	Support for or opposition against extensive welfare state, for or against redistribution, public provisions like old-aged pension benefits or free primary school for everyone. Self-placement on the left or right of the national political spectrum.	*Lack of adequate matching questions in Afrobarometer: The voter level issues of the* Economic Liberalism dimension *above are used as proxies instead.*
Non-Economic Issues:		
Ethnic Tolerance	Support for or opposition against toleration and equality for minority ethnic groups and assimilation of minority ethnic groups to the majority ethnic group.	Emphasis on national versus ethnic identity. Support for or opposition against state interference into private and cultural issues.
Cultural Liberalism	Support for or opposition against full individual freedom from state interference into private issues like family, religion and traditional customs.	Support for or opposition against state interference into private and cultural issues. Support for traditional leaders and chiefs.

groups them with Afrobarometer questions that are most proximate.[71] I use principal component factor analysis to test whether the single items are indeed related to the same issue.

Analysis

The congruence analysis is based on the policy dimensions of table 10 that separate the parties' representatives in each of the four countries the most. First, the two dominant cases, Botswana and Lesotho, are presented; subsequent the two former dominant cases, Ghana and Mali.

The results of the canonical linear discriminant analysis in table 11 show that Botswana's partisan elites are most strongly divided on issues of economic liberalism, i.e., general left-right placement and privatization. The canonical structure coefficient of -0.49 for the issues of economic liberalism in opposition to the smaller structure coefficients of welfare, ethnic tolerance and cultural liberalism indicates that issues of economic liberalism are most constitutive in the discrimination of elite party membership in Botswana.[72] The overall canonical correlation of 0.94 is rather high (1.0 being the maximum), which means that the canonical variable is very close to the issue categories, whereof economic liberalism is the most constitutive, in turn (cf. Klecka, 1980, 36f.). Despite the high canonical correlation, the F-statistic in table 11 indicates insignificance of the canonical correlation. Yet, this should not be taken at face value due to the low number of elite respondents.

[71] The exact wording and scaling of the survey questions can be found in the appendix on p. 307 and 309, as well as in `http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-rounds-merged/item/750-merged-round-4-codebook`.

[72] As a rule of thumb, issue categories that load higher than |0.4| can be regarded as constitutive for discriminating elites' party membership. Accordingly, I reconstruct the voters' conflict dimension on basis of the very same issue category that has been deemed relevant by the canonical discriminant analysis on the partisan elites' level (cf. Bornschier, 2013).

Table 11: *Results of canonical linear discriminant analyses of party representatives' issue positions*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Ghana	Mali
	Eco. lib. divide	Welfare divide	Welfare/Eco.lib. divide	Welfare/Ethnicity divide
Economic issues				
Welfare	0.10	0.37	–	−0.36
Economic liberalism	−0.49	−0.04	–	−0.03
Welfare-Economic lib.	–	–	0.79	–
Non-economic issues				
Ethnic tolerance	0.14	–	0.46	0.37
Cultural liberalism	−0.12	−0.18	0.41	0.21
N	8	8	8	8
Canonical correlation	0.94	0.91	0.83	0.93
Eigenvalue	7.87	4.69	2.14	6.42
Proportion of variance of total model explained	0.94	.98	1.00	0.89
p-value of F-statistic	0.418	0.321	0.168	0.797

Loadings are canonical structure coefficients.

In sum, I consider the dimension of economic liberalism the most valid dimension to assess the significance of programmatic distinctiveness of partisan elites in Botswana and construct the respective dimension on the voter side in Botswana to assess the degree of programmatic congruence.

ANOVA confirms the results of the discriminant analysis above (analysis of variance not displayed in book): A model that explains party elites respondents' position on the economic liberalism dimension by party membership is indeed significant ($p < 0.1$ in figure 32). The standard deviations in figure 32 do not overlap: an additional indicator for the fact that Botswana's party representatives are indeed significantly divided on the economic liberalism dimension.

Figure 32: *Botswana – Party representatives and voters on the economic liberalism divide*



Hence, as theoretically expected and indicated by the results of the previous sections of the book, Botswana indeed features a programmatically structured party system. A long history of un-interrupted party competition structured according to a historic territorial cleavage led to a dominant party system with a comparatively strong and institutionalized opposition in the third wave and to opposition parties and a dominant party that are programmatically cohesive and distinct from each other. While the opposition parties BNF and BCP are left and center left on the economic liberalism dimension, the dominant

BDP is clearly right of the center.[73] The BDP's recent internal struggles and its catch-all character of a party in democratic dominance since more than 40 years is reflected by the relatively bigger standard deviation.

There is no significant divide on the economic liberalism dimension among Botswana's voters, however (see insignificance of ANOVA, as well as indistinguishable programmatic position means and overlapping standard deviations in figure 32).[74] Hence, we cannot analyze the degree of programmatic congruence between partisan elites and partisan voters in Botswana. In the context of a dominant party system, however, lack of congruence is not necessarily problematic for democratic responsiveness. Rather, it shows that programmatic party-voter linkage is not fixed in Botswana, and BDP-dominance therefore not for eternity. Due to the significantly diverging offers of the institutionalized opposition parties, BNF and BCP, vis-à-vis the dominant BDP, the BDP is forced to position itself programmatically and be responsive to the median voter.

In line with theoretical expectations, both the large and overlapping standard deviations in figure 33, as well as the insignificant ANOVA show that parties in the dominant party system of Lesotho, which lacks an institutionalized opposition, fail to be significantly divided even on their most relevant dimensions of contemporary conflict, the welfare dimension.[75]

Hence, the fact that the historic territorial cleavage lost its significance for third wave party system structuring in Lesotho to rely on despite the survival of the organizational

[73] All issues have been recoded so that lower values indicate economically more 'left' and culturally more liberal positions, and higher values the opposite.

[74] The economic liberalism dimension on the mass level is based on the issues of privatization and the support of international business in the national economy, q10 and q99b in Afrobarometer, R4 (see Afrobarometer survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix). The canonical structure coefficient of 0.73 for the issues of cultural liberalism in table 15 indicates that the cultural liberalism dimension would structure mass partisan membership better than the dimension of economic liberalism. Yet, neither the canonical correlation in table 15 nor ANOVA (not displayed in book) indicates statistical significance.

[75] The relatively small canonical structure coefficient of 0.37 for issues of welfare (based on the items of redistribution and extensive public spending) in table 11 is the most constitutive issue bundle in the discrimination of party representatives' party membership in Lesotho.

Figure 33: *Lesotho – Party representatives and voters on the welfare divide*



'shells' of the two sides of the historic cleavage until the beginning of the third wave is not only corroborated by the volatility of the opposition in Lesotho and the instability of the dominant party, but also by the fact that important contemporary representatives of the apparent heirs of the two historical sides, the LCD and the BNP, as well as the LCD-splinter, ABC, do not manage to cohesively identify the programmatic positions of their own parties.

As shown in figure 33, Basotho voters are also not significantly divided regarding the welfare dimension despite the issues of welfare being the most constitutive for discriminating partisan voters in Lesotho (see canonical structure coefficient of 0.83 in table 15 in the appendix). Hence, the coherent ordering between the partisan elites and voters in figure 33 should not be overestimated.[76]

In accordance with theoretical expectations, the championed two-party system of Ghana is significantly divided on both the party representatives and partisan voters' side (see figure 34). Note, that due to the large sample of 645 partisan voters in Ghana, ANOVA yields highly significant results for explaining voters' positioning on issues of welfare and economic liberalism by their partisanship despite an overlap of the standard deviations in figure 34 ($p < 0.001$). Nonetheless, the differences in mean programmatic positioning of NDC and NPP voters are considerably distinctive in comparison with voters in Botswana,

[76]The welfare dimension on the mass level in Lesotho is based on the issue of support for economic recovery programs, q10 and q11 in Afrobarometer, R4 (see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).

Lesotho and Mali in figures 32, 33 and 35. Both NDC voters and NDC party representatives take a consistently more left position on the combined dimension of welfare and economic liberalism than the voters and representatives of the main opposition party, NPP.[77] The large canonical structure coefficients of 0.79 on the representatives' side in table 11 and 0.98 on the voters' side in table 15 in the appendix for the combined dimension of welfare and economic liberalism indicate that economic issues are most constitutive in Ghana for discriminating both elites' and voters' party membership.

Figure 34: *Ghana – Party representatives and voters on the welfare/economic liberalism divide*



In sum, It is safe to say that Ghana confirms to the Anglo-Saxon ideal of two-partyism structured on the economic dimension. The survival of the historic divide between the centrist-progressive Nkrumahist party tradition and the centrist-peripheral moderate Danquah-Busiaist party tradition led to a dominant party system with a competitive opposition party, and finally, an institutionalized two-party system during the third wave in Ghana. The results of the distinctiveness and congruence analysis of the contemporary representatives of the two party traditions and their respective partisan voters shows that both the party representatives and partisan voters are programmatically cohesive and significantly

[77] In Ghana, the combined welfare and economic liberalism dimension of party representatives is based on the issues of redistribution, extensive public spending, general left-right placement and privatization (see survey questions on p. 307 in the appendix). On the mass level, the dimension relies on q10 and q11 (see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).

distinct among each other, in line with their party affiliation. Hence, the two parties successfully managed to align contemporary issues in accordance with the historical cleavage.

For Mali, the canonical discriminant analysis reveals that a combined dimension of issues of welfare and ethnicity is most constitutive in the discrimination of representatives' party membership. However, the two canonical structure coefficients are rather small (0.36 and 0.37 in table 11; based on issues of redistribution and ethnic tolerance).[78] Moreover, figure 35 shows that parties in the non-dominant, but also non-institutionalized party system of Mali fail to be significantly divided even on their most relevant dimensions of conflict: Whereas the former (almost-)dominant party, ADEMA, and the party URD are programmatically significantly distinct from each other, the standard deviations from the mean positions of the RPM and the ADEMA are relatively large and do overlap, which leads to an overall insignificant distinctiveness between the three parties, i.e., insignificant ANOVA (ANOVA-analysis not displayed in book). Furthermore, the significant programmatic distinctiveness between the ADEMA and URD is paradox as the two parties entered the 2007 elections as coalition partners (last elections at the point of interviews in February and March 2012). This points out to a deeply programmatically unstructured party system, which, in turn, is reflected by its rampant volatility since the beginning of the thrid wave. Figure 35 demonstrates that Malian voters are not significantly dived among each other, too.[79]

Hence, in accordance with the main argument of this book, the early abortion of party competition, only two years after Mali's independence in 1960, and the subsequent 29 years of authoritarianism, which effectively blurred the last traces of the historic territorial

[78] See survey questions on p. 307 in the appendix.

[79] The welfare/ethnicity dimension on the mass level in Mali could not be meaningfully combined due to canonical structure coefficients that have opposite signs (-0.59 vis-à-vis 0.44 in table 15 in the appendix). Accordingly, figure 35 shows only the welfare dimension on the mass level, based on q11 and q99b, because the partisan mass are more divided in this dimension than in the ethnicity dimension, based on q66, q67 and q83 (see survey questions on p. 309 in the appendix).

Figure 35: *Mali – Party representatives and voters on the welfare/ethnicity divide*



cleavage for parties of the third wave to effectively rely on, led to a volatile third wave party system that does not provide its electorate with programmatic structuring and orientation.

Conclusion

In sum, Ghana's institutionalized two party system is generally more responsive than Botswana's dominant party system, which features institutionalized opposition parties. And Botswana outperforms Lesotho's dominant party system, which features volatile opposition parties. The first fact is not really surprising, the second corresponds with the general argument of the book. Furthermore, Botswana's dominant party system also outperforms Mali's non-dominant multi-party system. This contradicts the research that has so far been done on African party systems and supports my argument that *not* dominance of one party and the concomitant lack of electoral turnover are the biggest problems for responsiveness in African electoral democracies, but instability and fragmentation of the general party system, or instability and fragmentation of the opposition in dominant party systems. This indicates that in the African context, where institutionalized two-party systems or institutionalized multi-party systems are rare, an institutionalized opposition party (even if too weak to take power) that confronts a dominant party can lead to programmatic party system responsiveness and democratic consolidation. Accordingly, Lesotho and Mali experienced major turmoils in their political systems in 2012 (cf. van Eerd, 2012; forth-

coming), while Botswana's dominant party, BDP, managed to stabilize itself again after the break-away of a splinter in 2010. Ghana in turn, managed the death of president Mills in a smooth, democratic and constitutional way without delay.

Moreover, during the 1990s, Ghana used to be a dominant party system with a strong and institutionalized opposition, i.e., it had the same party system configuration as contemporary Botswana. And, as in Botswana, Ghana's electoral regime already became more democratic during times of electoral one-party dominance. Hence, Ghana projects a potential positive journey from a dominant party system to an institutionalized and responsive two- or multi-party system for contemporary dominant party systems with relatively strong and institutionalized opposition parties, i.e., party systems like Botswana. In opposition to that, during the 1990s, Mali used to be a dominant party system with a weak and non-institutionalized opposition, and developed into a chaotic and unresponsive multi-party system during the 2000s, cumulating in break-down of democracy in 2012. This projects a less favorable journey for contemporary dominant party systems with weak or non-institutionalized opposition parties that transform into non-dominant party systems, as in the case of Lesotho.

6 General Conclusion

In this book I have argued that an institutionalized and relatively strong opposition in a dominant party system is more important for higher qualities of democracy and democratic consolidation than actual turnovers that end dominance in African electoral regimes. Overall, both the quantitative as well as the qualitative analysis of the book confirm this argument. Hence, dominant party systems – where one party gains the presidency and an absolute majority in parliament for several elections in a row – can reach relatively comprehensive civil liberties and lead to programmatically distinct parties despite lack of incumbency change. Yet, in order to fulfill their potential to lead to democratic consolidation, dominant parties need the electoral confrontation with an institutionalized and relatively strong opposition party. This gives them the incentive to be responsive to voter demands, uphold internal elite cohesiveness and underutilize their ability to skew the playing field in party competition.

Hence, it is important to differentiate between dominant party systems that are good for democratic consolidation due to the existence of a strong and institutionalized opposition and dominant party systems that are bad for democratic consolidation due to the absence of a strong and institutionalized opposition. The quantitative large-N section of the book shows that it is helpful to use an index that measures the competitiveness degree of the opposition in dominant party systems through the volatility of the opposition party system and the strength of the runner-up opposition party. More competitive opposition parties in dominant party systems of the third wave between 1990 and 2008 lead to more comprehensive civil liberties in contemporary African electoral regimes, regardless whether dominant party systems experienced turnover and became non-dominant party systems or whether they remained dominant party systems.

Furthermore, the last section of the book exemplifies that dominant or formerly dominant party systems with an institutionalized and relatively strong opposition lead to programmatically more structured party systems reflected in more significantly distinct programmatic party positions and more responsive parties. Moreover, turnover and the concomitant end of a dominant party system with *non*-institutionalized and relatively weak opposition parties – as in the case of Mali – does not lead to an institutionalized multi-party system, but instead to a volatile and fragmented party system that is not programmatically structured and not responsive to its voters. Hence, turnover and the end of a dominant party system does not automatically lead to democratic consolidation, as some accounts in the literature suggest. Rather, my analysis implies that turnover and the end of a dominant party system needs to be preceded by a dominant party system with an institutionalized and competitive opposition where improvements in the skewness of the playing field in party competition and the quality of democracy have already been initiated before actual turnover, which is exemplified by the case of Ghana. Hence, if incumbency change and the end of dominance would take place in Botswana, I would expect Botswana's electoral regime rather to follow Ghana's path to full democratization than Mali's path to low quality of democracy and eventual regime disintegration, because Botswana already features a relatively competitive opposition and a relatively high quality of democracy despite long-time dominance of the incumbent party.

Accordingly, the book makes an important contribution to our general understanding of the role of party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation in late third wave democratization processes. More precisely, it contributes to a more careful assessment of the role of dominant party systems for the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation. Likewise, the book provides further evidence that turnovers do not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation. Rather, regimes that experience electoral turnover are dependent on the same requirement of an institutionalized opposition party

as dominant party systems to help further consolidate democracy. Furthermore, the last section of the book shows – through the use of an original elite-survey dataset – that political mobilization in contemporary African electoral regimes is not exclusively of a clientelistic or charismatic nature. If contemporary and formerly dominant party systems feature competitive and institutionalized opposition parties, they are distinctively set apart on contemporary dimensions of programmatic conflict and responsive to the electorate.

In addition, both the results of the large-N as well as the comparative historic analysis of four crucial cases show that opposition parties in the difficult context of a dominant governing party and a young electoral regime need non-material sources of cohesiveness that are rooted in legacies of historic cleavages from processes of de-colonization and nationalization in order to remain competitive. Otherwise, they risk internal fragmentation, factionalism due to infighting and co-optation by the dominant party, because they have not enough material resources to keep the party together in a context of rampant clientelism. Furthermore, legacies of historic cleavages provide opposition parties with the necessary historic and symbolic capital, i.e. a recognizable 'brand identity' that is independent from the current leadership. This enhances its voters' loyalty despite the experience of recurring defeats in elections. If parties stand for something, regardless whether the historic cleavage is still effectively related to contemporary issues of programmatic conflict, they socialize voters into a pre-existing party system structure that is attached to different identities. This makes it more likely that opposition voters are willing to suspend demands for the immediate fulfillment of clientelistic and valence promises. On the one hand, this allows opposition parties to compete more effectively in clientelistic and valence mobilization despite the fact that they mostly have to rely on promises. On the other hand, it makes programmatic position-taking mobilization strategies more effective.

Interestingly, a competitive opposition that relies on legacies of historic cleavages also increases the incentive on the side of the dominant party to reinvigorate its own non-

material sources of cohesiveness. This in turn, makes the dominant party less likely to disintegrate over succession struggles and infighting. On the one hand, a dominant party that relies on sources of non-material cohesiveness is more stable, and this decreases the chance for turnover in the short run. Yet, on the other hand, it also enhances the quality of democracy of a dominant party system, and provides better conditions for further democratic consolidation after eventual, future turnovers because it makes the dominant party more likely to survive defeat and act as a future competitive and institutionalized opposition.

Both the results of the quantitative as well as the qualitative analysis demonstrate that legacies of historic cleavages can only survive from their initial formation around independence until the beginning of the third wave if authoritarian phases did not follow too soon after the introduction of pre-independence elections and were not too stable or suppressive enough to effectively extinct the territorial cleavage – as in the case of Mali – or did not bereave the cleavage of its meaning and 'brand identity' despite the survival of the organizational shells – as in the case of Lesotho. Hence, in Botswana, which never experienced an authoritarian breakdown after independence, and in Ghana, which experienced both substantial routinization of electoral competition before its first authoritarian breakdown as well as two more democratic interregnums before the beginning of the third wave, party systems are still structured according to the historic territorial cleavage.

Hence, this book shows that Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage approach not only helps to make sense of Western European party systems, but can make a decisive contribution to understand contemporary party system structures in African electoral regimes of the third wave, too. Processes of nationalization led to territorial (center-periphery) cleavages in both former African colonies and during the formation of historic party systems in Europe (a church-government cleavage did not play any role in Africa). While the qualitative

analysis demonstrates this in detail, the quantitative large-N analysis makes an important contribution through its systematic and successful quantification of path-dependency: It proxies the path-dependent effect of historical cleavages through an additive index of the age of contemporary runner-up opposition parties in relation to the years since independence and the number of minimally competitive pre-third wave elections.

The results of both the large-N as well as the small-N analysis show that the beginning of the third wave cannot be regarded as a critical juncture that sets subsequent paths of party system and electoral regime evolution in Africa apart. Rather, the first critical juncture of de-colonization and nationalization during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s together with the occurrence, fashion and stability of the second critical juncture of authoritarian disruption during the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s matter for differences in contemporary party system structure and the quality of democracy in Africa. In the same line, my analysis suggests that the size and shape of protest movements in advent of the third wave were not decisive for the subsequent party system structure and quality of democracy.

Lastly, the historic analysis of Ghana shows that ethnic mobilization does not necessarily have to lead to fragmented, volatile, and conflict-prone party systems, as in the case of Kenya, but can lead to an institutionalized party system and a high quality of democracy under the following condition: Ethnic cleavages need to be aligned to an ethnically cross-cutting center-periphery cleavage, and dominant ethnic groups need to gain significant vote shares in each other's ethno-regional strongholds.

This book's results are first and foremost generalizable to African electoral regimes of the third wave that featured a dominant government party at a point in time between 1990 and 2008 and reached overall minimum degrees of freedom in party competition, i.e., elections were accompanied by a minimum degree of uncertainty for the incumbent party. While institutionalized opposition parties in full electoral autocracies most certainly cannot

lead an authoritarian one-party regime to democratization through the ballot box, I do not rule out that they nonetheless can lead to programmatically more responsive authoritarian parties. Hence, this could be an interesting hypothesis for future research. Moreover, it would be an interesting project to investigate whether institutionalized opposition parties in African electoral autocracies also draw some of their non-material sources of cohesiveness and voter loyalty from legacies of historic territorial cleavages. Certainly, Burkina Faso, which has a relatively institutionalized opposition despite being on the brink of my large-N case selection because of its many authoritarian features, would be an interesting case for more detailed investigation in this regard. Furthermore, it seems that Burkina Faso has relatively comprehensive cilvil liberties despite its authoritarian tendencies regarding party competition and regime type, which points to the importance of institutionalized opposition parties, even in rather authoritarian electoral regimes. Regarding Zimbabwe's relatively strong and institutionalized opposition party, the MDC, however, a recent study by LeBas (2011) does not find evidence for a significant role of a historic-territorial cleavage in the make-up of the MDC's non-material cohesiveness.

Both Mozambique and Nigeria's dominant party systems feature competitive and institutionalized opposition parties, yet they did not reach as comprehensive quality levels of democracy as expected. In the case of Mozambique, non-material opposition cohesiveness and institutionalization was reached due to violent conflict rather than legacies of non-violent historic cleavages. This could explain why high opposition competitiveness in Mozambique is not as conducive to higher quality levels of democracy as in other cases. Regarding Nigeria, the reasons for its outlaying status are more unclear. I suspect that the demanding institutional requirements for parties' electoral registration in Nigeria led to a rather artificial institutionalization that has not been as conducive to democratic consolidation as in other cases. Hence, a more detailed analysis of Nigeria's contemporary party system could yield interesting, theory-building insights.

While the quantitative analysis demonstrates that old opposition parties also lead to more opposition competitiveness in the former settler oligarchies Namibia and South Africa, these two cases have not been part of the qualitative historical small-N analysis. Hence, future research has to investigate whether contemporary party system structures in these cases can be traced back to the same territorial cleavage as in the case of former British and French African colonies.

The presented results are only partially transferrable to African party systems of the third wave that never experienced dominance by a governing party. For example, both Malawi and Niger proved to have institutionalized multi-party systems despite relatively young parties and a small record of pre-third wave elections. Nonetheless, my general argument also works to some degree for African electoral regimes that never experienced dominant governing parties since 1990. Accordingly, future research should look into the historic roots of African *non*-dominant party systems of the third wave. Especially through a detailed analysis of the historic roots of Malawi and Niger's party systems, we could gain valuable insights.

Last but not least, the case of Ghana shows some interesting parallels to cases outside of Africa, most notably Mexico and Taiwan, were dominant parties led the way to lower skewness degrees in the playing field of party competition, higher quality levels of democracy, and subsequent turnovers without subsequent disintegration of the previously dominant party. At least in the case of Taiwan, and other Asian nations, which feature a similar timing of decolonization as most African states and experienced dominant party system rule during the third wave, it could be a fruitful exercise to trace the roots of the contemporary party systems structures back to independence, and look for parallels with African cases. Hence, while I do not intend to overgeneralize my results, I argue that some of this book's arguments could apply to countries outside of the African continent that meet similar conditions regarding the timing of decolonization and democratization.

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A Appendix

Table 12: *Descriptive statistics of analogous measure of opposition competitiveness index in* non-*dominant African party systems and its constituting measures*

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*	*N*
Opposition Competitiveness Index (0–10) (average over third wave elections)	4.63	1.69	1.78	6.7	13
% Seat share runner-up (average over third wave elections)	25.39	8.62	10.88	35.06	13
Total volatility (average over third wave elections)	26.27	13.68	3.99	47.79	13

Figure 36: *Scatter-plot of final opposition competitiveness index on seat share of runner-up opposition party (observations are elections in African dominant party systems)*



Figure 37: *Scatterplot of opposition competitiveness on legacy of cleavages in African dominant party systems (including Mozambique)*



Table 13: *Average opposition competitiveness in African third wave dominant party systems as determinant of the 2008 quality level of democracy (Afrobarometer measure)*

	$m1$	$m2$	$m3$	$m4$	$m5$
	b	b	b	b	b
Opposition competitiveness index (avg.) (0–10)[1]	0.16 ∗ ∗	0.20 ∗ ∗	0.16 ∗ ∗	0.16∗	0.16 ∗ ∗
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
GDP / capita (log)		0.05			
		(0.03)			
Resource dependency		−0.57∗			
		(0.22)			
Corruption Perception Index (inverted)			−0.06+		
			(0.03)		
Number of third wave elections				0.00	
				(0.05)	
Political Rights (inverted)					0.06∗
					(0.02)
Constant	2.67 ∗ ∗∗	2.19 ∗ ∗∗	3.07 ∗ ∗∗	2.66 ∗ ∗∗	2.40 ∗ ∗∗
	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Adjusted R^2	.54	.77	.68	.47	.73
F	11.55 ∗ ∗	11.28 ∗ ∗	10.76 ∗ ∗	5.05∗	13.20 ∗ ∗
N	10	10	10	10	10

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Standard errors in parantheses.

[1] *Main independent variable is the average of opposition competitiveness over all elections since the beginning of the third wave in an African dominant party system (1990–2008). The dependent variable is the mean value for approval of the Afrobarometer 2008 question q21 ("people should be free to speak their minds no matter how unpopular their views"). The remaining independent variables are observations of 2008.*

Table 14: *Determinants of average opposition competitiveness in third wave African dominant party systems (observations are party system means over third wave parliamentary elections) (including Mozambique)*

	m1 b	m2a b	m3 b	m4 b	m5a b	m2b b	m5b b
Legacy of cleavages index	1.65∗	2.00+	1.86∗	1.94∗	2.47∗	1.64+	1.90∗
	(0.73)	(1.01)	(0.74)	(0.63)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(0.67)
CPI X maj. electoral system		0.65			1.47		
		(1.15)			(0.96)		
CPI (inverse, centered)		−0.07			−0.93		
		(0.83)			(0.72)		
Maj. electoral system (dummy)		−1.04			−0.16	−1.31	−0.45
		(0.96)			(0.80)	(0.97)	(0.79)
GDP per capita at independence			0.40				
			(0.45)				
No. of third wave elections			−0.67	−0.25	−0.18		−0.40
			(0.48)	(0.37)	(0.40)		(0.45)
Aid/GDP				10.62∗	11.96∗		11.90∗
				(4.09)	(4.28)		(4.48)
Liberation movement (dummy)				0.95			
				(1.15)			
No. of parties boycotting election				−1.41∗	−1.31+		−1.41+
				(0.59)	(0.64)		(0.69)
GDP per capita (adj.) X						−0.20	−0.55
maj. elect. system						(0.77)	(0.62)
GDP per capita						−0.13	0.32
(adj. for resource dep., centered)						(0.29)	(0.27)
Constant	1.60∗	1.76	2.89+	1.35	0.44	2.24+	1.84
	(0.72)	(1.29)	(1.48)	(1.34)	(1.84)	(1.07)	(1.61)
Adjusted R^2	.21	.17	.21	.52	.54	.14	.51
F	5.18∗	1.81	2.42	4.51∗	3.64∗	1.65	3.38∗
N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Standard errors in parantheses.

Party Elites – Survey Questions

Intro: *I would like to learn what position you as an official representative of your party take with respect to different policies and issues. Below you will find questions on several economic, cultural and social, and other issues upon which parties in [COUNTRY] may take different positions.*

1. **State role in governing the economy:**

   [1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining control over key services.

   [10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing economic activity or development.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

2. **Overall left-right placement:**

   [1] Party is best located at the "left" of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.

   [10] Party is best located at the "right" of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

3. **Social spending on the disadvantaged:**

   [1] Party advocates extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.

   [10] Party opposes extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

4. **Public spending:**

   [1] Party supports extensive public provision of benefits such as earnings-related pension benefits, comprehensive national health care, and basic primary and secondary schools for everyone.

   [10] Party opposes an extensive state role in providing such benefits and believes that such things as health insurance, pensions, and schooling should be privately provided (e.g. by the extended family) or that participation in public social insurance programs should be voluntary.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

5. **National identity:**

   [1] Party advocates toleration and social and political equality for minority ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial groups and opposes state policies that require the assimilation of such groups to the majority national culture.

   [10] Party believes that the defense and promotion of the majority national identity and culture at the expense of minority culture are important goals.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

6. **Traditional authority, institutions, and customs:**

   [1] Party advocates full individual freedom from state interference into any issues related to religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life, and social conduct in general.

   [10] Party advocates government-enforced compliance of individuals with traditional authorities and values on issues related to religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life and social conduct in general.

   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

Partisan Voters – Survey Questions (Afrobarometer Round 4)

Partisanship:

Q97:

- *If a general election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?*
  - 100–899=[Political Parties of 20 African countries], 997=Would not vote, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know, -1=Missing data

Economic issues:

Q10:

- *Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.*
  - Statement 1: The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies.
  - Statement 2: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.
    - 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Q11:

- *Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.*
  - Statement 1: The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered.
  - Statement 2: The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few.
    - 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Q99b:

- *Do you think that each of the following has too little, too much, or about the right amount of influence over your government: International businesses and investors?*
  - 1=Far too little, 2=Somewhat too little, 3=About the right amount, 4=Somewhat too much, 5=Far too much, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Non-economic issues:

Q16:

- *Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.*
  - Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders.
  - Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.
    - 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Q66:

- *Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?*
  - 1=1=Decrease a lot, 2=Decrease somewhat, 3=Stay the same, 4=Increase somewhat, 5=Increase a lot, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data.-1=Missing data

Q67:

- *Do you think that traditional leaders should sit on your local government council, or not? If so, do you think they should be elected by the people to these seats, appointed by government officials, or selected in some other way?*
  - 0=No, should not have seats on council, 1=Yes, should have seats elected by people, 2=Yes, should have seats appointed by government officials, 3=Yes, should have seats selected in some other way, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Q83:

- *Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [R's national identity] and being a [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?*
  - 1=I feel only (R's ethnic group), 2=I feel more (R's ethnic group) than [R's national identity], 3=I feel equally [R's national identity] and (R's ethnic group), 4=I feel more [R's national identity] than (R's ethnic group), 5=I feel only [R's national identity], 7=Not applicable, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Table 15: *Results of canonical linear discriminant analyses of partisan voters' issue positions*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Ghana	Mali
	Eco. lib. divide	Welfare divide	Welfare/Eco.lib. divide	Welfare/Ethnicity divide
Economic issues				
Welfare	−0.39	0.83	–	−0.59
Economic liberalism	−0.33	−0.07	–	0.30
Welfare-Economic lib.	–	–	0.98	–
Non-economic issues				
Ethnic tolerance	−0.24	−0.37	−0.14	0.44
Cultural liberalism	0.73	0.28	−0.08	−0.46
N	901	916	645	816
Canonical correlation	0.07	0.13	0.33	0.10
Eigenvalue	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.01
Proportion of variance of total model explained	0.65	0.91	1.00	0.80
p-value of F-statistic	0.675	0.423	0.000	0.732

Loadings are canonical structure coefficients.